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Foreword 
 
 
The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee Study Background 
 
 The 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act (“BAPCPA” or the “Act”) fundamentally altered the consumer 
bankruptcy system.  During the eight-year run up to the eventual 
enactment date, October 17, 2005, there was much political, social, and 
academic commentary and speculation on the impact these amendments 
would have on the operation of the system and on the system 
participants: attorneys, trustees, bankruptcy judges, and of course, 
debtors.  A number of thorough and important empirical studies have 
been conducted which have examined and analyzed the effects of the 
Act’s changes on debtors and debtors’ behavior.  Up until now, however, 
there has not been a comprehensive national study of the impact of 
BAPCPA on the bankruptcy system’s operation, on its professionals, and 
ultimately on the system users.  It is in this context that the Consumer 
Bankruptcy Fee Study was developed. The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee 
Study (the “Fee Study,” the “National Study” or the “Study”) provides the 
most comprehensive, independent look at the cost of access, including 
attorney fees, in Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 consumer cases to date.1  
  
 
Study Support 
 
 This Study was funded with generous contributions from the 
American Bankruptcy Institute Anthony H.N. Schnelling Endowment Fund 
and the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges Endowment for 
Education.  
 
                         
1 In 2004, the American Bankruptcy Institute commissioned a study of professional fees in Chapter 
11 cases.  As noted by Reporter and Principal Investigator Stephen J. Lubben, “The central 
objective of the study is to gather data from a sufficient number of chapter 11 cases across the 
United States so that valid conclusions can be drawn concerning practices and procedures used 
by bankruptcy courts in awarding fees in bankruptcy cases.” Stephen J. Lubben, ABI Chapter 11 
Professional Fee Study, Seton Hall Public Law Research Paper No. 1020477 (December 1, 2007).  
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Disclaimer 
 
 In funding this research, neither the American Bankruptcy Institute 
Anthony H.N. Schnelling Endowment Fund nor the National Conference of 
Bankruptcy Judges Endowment for Education endorses or expresses any 
opinion with respect to any conclusions, opinions, or reports of any 
research funded by these grants. 
 
 
Replication 
 
 The databases developed and used as part of this Study are 
available with source identifying data redacted for replication purposes or 
for those wishing to draft a response to this Report.  Interested parties 
should contact the Principal Investigator.   
 
Scope of Final Report 
 
 This Report summarizes the central findings of the Consumer 
Bankruptcy Fee Study.  It does not attempt to fully analyze all of the 
gathered data in order to reach conclusions and to make specific policy 
recommendations regarding the operation of the consumer bankruptcy 
system, and in particular, professional fees in consumer bankruptcy cases. 
While the Principal Investigator expects to draw specific conclusions and 
recommendations in separate articles based on the Study’s findings, this 
Report is primarily descriptive.  
 
 This Report does not provide a review of case law that has 
developed on the topic of attorney fees and professional compensation.  
The reader is directed to other sources for this information.  
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Introduction 
 
 The 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act had as one of its stated goals the reduction of consumer bankruptcy 
filings, and failing that, a decline in consumer cases filed under Chapter 
7 of the Bankruptcy Code.2  Another declared purpose of the Act was to 
stop the perceived abuse of the bankruptcy system by consumer debtors 
who could pay their debts but instead opted to file for bankruptcy 
protection.3 A theme that ran through the Congressional debates 
preceding BAPCPA’s enactment was the suspicion that the consumer 
bankruptcy system was an institution that meted out extravagant benefits 
to undeserving debtors.4 On this view, thousands of opportunistic debtors 
had to be halted from taking advantage of this generous and accessible 
system.5  
 
 The ordnance chosen to eradicate this scourge was leveled at the 
professionals laboring in the bankruptcy system; swords were sharpened 
and arrows aimed at debtors’ attorneys, trustees and bankruptcy judges.  
Within this rhetorical framework, the way to keep both debtors and 
bankruptcy professionals from reaping unmerited and lavish gains from an 
                         
2 See David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: The Failed Bankruptcy Revolution of 2005, 15 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 223, 318–19 (2007); 152 Cong. Rec. S10647-48 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006) (statement of 
Sen. Grassley) ("We have seen bankruptcy rates fall dramatically from about 2 million bankruptcies 
in 2005 to the point where I doubt there will be over 1 million bankruptcies in 2006, if current 
trends continue . . . . For now, almost one year later, bankruptcy reform seems to have been a 
success.") 
3 "[A significant] factor motivating comprehensive reform is that the present bankruptcy system has 
loopholes and incentives that allow and—sometimes—even encourage opportunistic personal filings 
and abuse . . . . Some bankruptcy debtors are able to repay a significant portion of their debts, 
according to several studies. Current law, however, has no clear mandate requiring these debtors 
to repay their debts." H.R. Rep. No. 109-031, (I), at 92 (2005) (statement of Rep. Gekas). 
4 See 144 Cong. Rec. S10471 (1998) (remarks of Sen. Hatch) (“Bankruptcy has become a routine 
financial planning device used to unload inconvenient debts, rather than a last resort for people 
who truly need it.”); 144 Cong. Rec. S10787 (1998) (remarks of Sen. Grassley) (“The fact is that 
some people use bankruptcy as a convenient financial planning tool to skip out on debts they 
could repay.”) 
5 When President George W. Bush signed BAPCPA into law on April 20, 2005, he remarked, “Too 
many people have abused the bankruptcy laws. They've walked away from debts even when they 
had the ability to repay them . . . . Under the new law, Americans who have the ability to pay will 
be required to pay back at least a portion of their debts." President George W. Bush, Remarks at 
the Signing of Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (Apr. 20, 2005), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/04/2005 0420-5.html.  
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accommodating system was to erect barriers to access.6 These barriers 
take the form of procedural hurdles that were designed to affect the 
ease and cost of navigating the consumer bankruptcy system. 
 
 The primary objective of this Study is to identify and monetize 
these costs of bankruptcy access through the analysis of quantitative and 
qualitative data gathered from court dockets and from professionals 
working within the bankruptcy system. We began the quantitative section 
with the hypothesis that following BAPCPA’s enactment, the cost of access 
to the consumer bankruptcy system increased.7 We did not begin the 
qualitative component of the Study with an explicit hypothesis, however, 
because we wanted the process of theory development to be iterative 
and incremental.  We set out to determine the degree of increased costs, 
as well as to identify the specific policies and practices affecting these 
costs. Additionally, we endeavored to evaluate, with specificity, how 
diverse local procedures and guidelines impact the system’s processes 
and outcomes.  Our focus throughout the Study was on the consumer 
bankruptcy system and its principal stakeholders. 
 
 Until now, empirical study of BAPCPA’s impact has focused primarily 
on the system’s demand side, gathering and analyzing financial and 
sociological data with respect to debtor households.8 The effect of 
                         
6 “Today, many lawyers who specialize in bankruptcy view bankruptcy as an opportunity to make 
big money for themselves. This profit motive causes bankruptcy lawyers to promote bankruptcy as 
the only option even when a financially troubled client has an obvious ability to repay his or her 
debts. In other words, this profit motive creates a real conflict of interest where bankruptcy 
lawyers push people into bankruptcy who don’t belong there simply because they want to make a 
quick buck.” 144 Cong. Rec. S10649 (1998) (remarks of Sen. Grassley); See 144 Cong. Rec. 
S12140 (1998) (remarks of Sen. Grassley) (“[T]he bankruptcy bar is not adequately counseling 
people as to whether or not they should be in bankruptcy, let alone discouraging them from 
being in chapter 7 when they should be in chapter 13.”); (“I think we need to be very cautious 
about [the proposed in forma pauperis provision] . . . . [Bankruptcy] can be a smart financial 
move.  You can just walk away from [your debts], as this [lawyer advertisement] says, ‘For $350 
total.’  And the truth is, that is why we have increased filings of these kinds of ads in phone 
books, in newspapers, in magazines, in the yard sale publications that are [passed out] . . . free in 
this country.”) 144 Cong. Rec. S10572 (1998) (Statement of Sen. Feingold).  
7 Testing this hypothesis was one of the objectives of the Pilot Study.  See infra notes 66–75 and 
accompanying text. 
8 Robert M. Lawless, Angela K. Littwin, Katherine M. Porter, John A. E. Pottow, Deborah K. Thorne 
& Elizabeth Warren, Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 349, 352 (2008) [hereinafter Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail?]; Melissa Jacoby, Bankruptcy 
Reform and Homeownership Risk, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 323 (2007); Melissa Jacoby, Bankruptcy Reform 
and the Costs of Sickness: Exploring the Intersections, 71 MO. L. REV. 903, 914–915 (2006); Ronald 
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BAPCPA on debtors, however, cannot be fully assessed without an 
examination of the architecture that surrounds a consumer’s decision to 
file, coupled with an account of the complexity of factors that inform and 
influence the consumer’s experience in the bankruptcy system. This Study 
addresses issues related to the institutional framework of consumer 
bankruptcy by not only measuring and monetizing the cost of access, but 
by also examining the incentives and constraints imposed by the system.9 
 
 A unique feature of this Study is its scope.  The Study examines a 
national random sample of 11,221 Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 consumer 
cases (approximately 0.12% of the consumer bankruptcy cases filed).  
The data set includes cases filed in 90 judicial districts between 2003 
and 2009.  Analysis of quantitative data was conducted at the circuit, 
state and district level.  In addition, four separate survey instruments 
were administered in an effort to examine and appraise the experiences, 
perspectives, attitudes, and behaviors of frontline bankruptcy providers. 
Qualitative data was also collected from interviews and focus groups 
comprised of bankruptcy professionals: consumer debtors’ attorneys, 
Standing Chapter 13 Trustees, Chapter 7 Panel Trustees, U.S. Trustees, 
and bankruptcy judges. Through the use of multiple quantitative and 
qualitative data sources, complementary facets of the consumer 
bankruptcy system emerged. In using method triangulation to develop and 
analyze the Study data, we are able to examine, from a 360-degree 
perspective, the operation and cost of the consumer bankruptcy system.10  
 
 
 
 
                                                                         
J. Mann & Katherine Porter, Saving Up for Bankruptcy, 98 GEO. L.J. 289 (2010); Katherine Porter & 
Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy's Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 67 (2006); John A. E. 
Pottow, The Rise in Elder Bankruptcy Filings and the Failure of U.S. Bankruptcy Law, 19 ELDER L.J. 
119, 124 n.17 (2011); Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Less 
Stigma or More Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in 
Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213, 213–214 (2006). 
9 “It is notoriously difficult to obtain reliable information about how much it costs to file for 
consumer bankruptcy.” Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card 
Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 395 n.98 (2007). See also Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer 
Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 545–47 (1993).  
10 When a study utilizes “triangulation” it uses more than one approach to investigate a research 
question. The term derives from land surveying, where a series of triangles is used to map out an 
area. MICHAEL QUINN PATTON, QUALITATIVE RESEARCH & EVALUATION METHODS 247 (3rd ed. 2002).  
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Summary of Findings 
 
Descriptive Statistics: Attorney Fees in Chapter 13 Cases 
 There was a 24% increase in Total Direct Access Costs for post-
BAPCPA dismissed Chapter 13 cases.  
 There was a 27% increase in Total Direct Access Costs for post-
BAPCPA discharged Chapter 13 cases.  
 The national mean attorney fee in pre-BAPCPA Chapter 13 cases 
was $2,061.  Post-BAPCPA, the mean attorney fee increased 24% 
to $2,564.   
 At the state level, the highest post-BAPCPA mean attorney fees 
were in Maine, Nevada, and New Hampshire ($4,950, $4,335, and 
$4,294, respectively).  North Dakota had the lowest mean fee 
($1,560).  
 The largest increase in mean attorney fee by state was in Idaho (a 
115% increase), followed by Maryland (an 87% increase), Kentucky 
(an 87% increase), and Nevada (an 85% increase).   
 The only jurisdictions that registered decreases in attorney fees 
were Wyoming and Alaska.   
 Of those states that saw an increase in the mean attorney fee, the 
most modest increases were in Massachusetts (1%), Montana (2%), 
Rhode Island (2%), Oklahoma (4%), North Dakota (6%), Minnesota 
(7%), and Kansas (10%). 
 
Descriptive Statistics: Attorney Fees in Chapter 7 Cases 
 There was a 37% increase in Total Direct Access Costs for post-
BAPCPA discharged Chapter 7 asset cases.   
 There was a 51% increase in Total Direct Access Costs for post-
BAPCPA discharged Chapter 7 no-asset cases.   
 In Chapter 7 asset cases, the national mean attorney fee increased 
from $821 to $1,072—a 30% increase.  
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 In Chapter 7 no-asset cases, the national mean attorney fee 
increased 48%, from $654 to $968. 
 The highest average post-BAPCPA attorney fees by state were 
found in Arizona ($1,530), Texas ($1,314), Alaska ($1,298), Montana 
($1,282), Minnesota ($1,268), South Dakota ($1,238), and Florida 
($1,223). The states with the lowest average fees were Idaho 
($692), Arkansas ($698), Kentucky ($749), Washington ($702), Utah 
($714), and Vermont ($781).  
 The largest post-BAPCPA percentage increases in mean attorney 
fees were found in Montana (90%), Virginia (87%), Oregon (85%), 
Mississippi (82%), Tennessee (81%), and Utah (80%).  
 The states with the smallest percentage increase were Vermont 
(10%), Arkansas (11%), and Illinois (16%).  
 
Pro se Cases  
 Two percent of post-BAPCPA Chapter 13 cases (discharged, 
dismissed, and open) were filed pro se.     
 100% of Chapter 13 cases filed pro se cases were filed with a 
petition preparer’s assistance, none ending in discharge. 
 In Chapter 7, 5.8% of post-BAPCPA (asset and no-asset) cases 
were filed pro se.   
 75% of all Chapter 7 pro se asset cases, and 97.8% of all Chapter 
7 pro se no-asset cases filed post-BAPCPA were filed with the 
assistance of a petition preparer.  
 Average petition preparer fee in post-BAPCPA Chapter 13 cases was 
$181. 
 Average petition preparer fee in post-BAPCPA Chapter 7 cases was 
$184. 
 
Distributions to Unsecured Creditors 
 There was no statistically significant difference, post-BAPCPA, 
holding other factors constant, in distributions to unsecured 
creditors in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases. 
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Regression Modeling  
 Holding all other factors constant, on average, attorney fees in 
Chapter 7 cases were $258 higher in real terms, post-BAPCPA.  
 Holding all other factors constant, on average, attorney fees in 
Chapter 13 cases were $564 higher in real terms, post-BAPCPA.   
 
Qualitative Findings 
 The discord between (i) complexity of the consumer bankruptcy 
system, (ii) the experience and resources needed to represent 
debtors through an often byzantine maze, and (iii) the dearth of 
resources available to pay for this representation. 
 The irony presented by the ostensible goals of BAPCPA and the 
unintended consequences of these changes in practice. 
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 I.  The Consumer Bankruptcy System 
 
“No area of bankruptcy law is more complex than consumer bankruptcy.”11 
 
 Prior to BAPCPA’s enactment, a consumer seeking bankruptcy 
protection had to decide whether to file a bankruptcy case under Chapter 
7—liquidation—or under Chapter 13—court supervised repayment.12  The 
decision commonly turned on which chapter was more suited to meet the 
consumer’s specific objectives in that moment of financial distress. The 
factors that informed such a decision included whether the putative 
debtor: (i) had regular income;13 (ii) owned primarily exempt assets;14 (iii) 
was current on secured debt payments such as a note and mortgage on 
a house or a loan secured by a car; (iv) was current on tax obligations; 
(v) wanted to keep assets, such as a home or a car; (vi) was self-
employed or owned a business; (vii) wanted to discharge a type of debt 
that was only dischargeable under Chapter 13; and (viii) filed a Chapter 7 
                         
11 NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, 79 (1997) available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/05acons.pdf.  
12 Because of the limitations on how much debt a debtor may have to qualify for bankruptcy 
protection under Chapter 13, a growing number of consumers are filing cases under Chapter 11.  
In 2006, 520 consumers filed for relief under Chapter 11. By the close of 2010, the number had 
risen to 1939. American Bankruptcy Institute: Quarterly Non-business Filings by Chapter (1994–
2011), http://www.abiworld.org/am/template.cfm?section=bankruptcy_statistics1 (follow: “Quarterly 
Filings”) (last visited Nov. 22, 2011). See also 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (“only . . . a person that may be 
a debtor under chapter 7 of this title . . . may be a debtor under chapter 11 of this title.”)  In 
1991, the Supreme Court in Toibb v. Radloff announced that individual debtors not engaged in 
business are eligible to file under Chapter 11. 501 U.S. 157 (1991). The inclusion of many 
provisions in Chapter 11 that are manifestly inapplicable in individual cases “reflect an 
understandable expectation that Chapter 11 would be used primarily by debtors with ongoing 
businesses; they do not constitute an additional prerequisite for Chapter 11 eligibility beyond 
those established in § 109(d).” Toibb, 501 U.S. at 163. While the growing number of consumer 
Chapter 11 cases may warrant further investigation, it is beyond the scope of this study. 
13 Relief under Chapter 13 is available only to individuals with regular income whose debts do not 
exceed prescribed limits.  11 U.S.C. § 109(e). 
14 For example, Social Security payments, unemployment benefits, and limited values of equity in a 
home, car, or truck, household goods and appliances, and tools of a trade are protected. The 
types of assets subject to exemption as well as the dollar amount of allowed exemptions may 
vary from the exemption provision in the bankruptcy code, as well as from state to state. 11 
U.S.C. § 522. 
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case within the last 7 years.  In the vast majority of cases, this decision 
was made in consultation with an attorney.15   
 
 Once the decision as to which chapter to file under was made, the 
attorney would work with the debtor to complete the necessary petitions 
and schedules, and the case would be ready for filing.16 If the debtor 
chose to file Chapter 7, he or she would typically receive a discharge 
within 3 to 6 months of case filing.  If the debtor had regular income 
and otherwise qualified for Chapter 13, a plan would be developed, 
confirmed, and after the repayment period was concluded (3 to 5 years 
from plan confirmation), the discharge would be granted.17  If the 
bankruptcy case was filed in 2003 and 2004, in most cases, attorney 
fees would cost the consumer approximately $650 for a Chapter 7 case18 
or approximately $2,000 for a Chapter 13 case.19   
 
 BAPCPA’s enactment changed the consumer bankruptcy system in a 
myriad of small and not-so-small ways.  For example, there is now an 
                         
15 Lois R. Lupica, The Costs of BAPCPA: Report of the Pilot Study of Consumer Bankruptcy Cases, 
18 Am. Bankr. INST. L. REV. 43, 73 (2010) [hereinafter Lupica, Costs].  The Pilot Study found that 
6% of debtors filed pro se, pre-BAPCPA.  Given the variation in practices and costs in districts 
this statistic may not be an accurate reflection of pro se filings nationally.  The U.S. Government 
Accountability Office has estimated that “11 percent of Chapter 7 consumer cases were filed pro 
se in February – March 2005.”  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT NO. GAO-08-697, DOLLAR 
COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005, at 29–
33 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08697.pdf. [hereinafter GAO REPORT].  A 
study of consumer cases filed in the Western District of Washington found that 18.4% of all 
Chapter 7 consumer cases filed between February 1, 2005 and March 31, 2005 were filed pro se. 
Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Examination of Access to Chapter 7 Relief by Pro Se Debtors, 26 
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 5, 21 n.73 (2009). 
16 Of course, this description assumes the straightforward, no-complications case—which is not the 
situation presented by every debtor.  Often attorneys used legal assistants to help them with 
client intake interviews and to aid them in preparing debtors’ petitions. 
17 Under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13, the debtor will not be granted a discharge if he or she 
conceals assets, destroys or falsifies records, or commits fraud. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a). These 
behaviors can be a bar to discharge even if they are not committed in connection with the 
bankruptcy case. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b). Certain debts are excepted from the discharge and the 
debtor remains liable for them after the case is closed. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (some taxes); 11 
U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (domestic support obligations); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (student loans); 11 U.S.C. § 
523(a)(9) (debts for damages for death or personal injury caused by the debtor’s operation of a 
motor vehicle, boat, or aircraft while intoxicated by drugs or alcohol).  
18 See infra Appendix III, Table A - 10; Lupica, Costs, supra note 15, at 70, Figure 4.1. 
19 See infra Appendix II, Table A - 5; Lupica, Costs, supra note 15, at 64, Figure 3.1.  According 
to the Pilot Study data, attorney fees for a Chapter 13 case filed in 2003 and 2004 were $2,000 
at the 50th percentile, $1,500 at the 25th percentile, and $2,500 at the 75th percentile. 
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income and expense standard consumer debtors must meet in order to 
qualify for Chapter 7.20 The most critiqued of all new requirements, the 
means test, mandates that all debtors calculate their income and 
expenses using a system of complex calculations.21  It requires the 
application of various local and IRS expense standards to the debtor's 
financial information, adjusted by geographic location and household 
size.22  
 
 The list of necessary documents and records required by a 
consumer debtor filing under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 has also notably 
increased.  In addition to a schedule of assets and liabilities,23 a 
schedule of current income and expenditures,24 and a statement of 
financial affairs,25 a debtor must now produce: (i) evidence of payment 
from employers, if any, received within 60 days of filing;26 (ii) a statement 
of monthly net income and any anticipated increase in income or 
expenses after filing;27 (iii) a record of any interest the debtor has in a 
                         
20 11 U.S.C. 707(b). 
21 See Official Bankruptcy Form B22A: Chapter 7 Statement of Current Monthly Income and Means 
Test Calculation, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/FormsAndFees/Forms/BankruptcyForms.aspx 
(eight page, 57 point financial questionnaire required of all Chapter 7 debtors to determine if the 
debtor’s circumstance and his or her request for relief under Chapter 7 give rise to a presumption 
of abuse of the bankruptcy system); Official Bankruptcy Form B22C: Chapter 13 Statement of 
Current Monthly Income and Calculation of Commitment Period and Disposable Income, available 
at http://www.uscourts.gov/FormsAndFees/Forms/BankruptcyForms.aspx (eight page, 61 point 
financial questionnaire required of all Chapter 13 debtors to determine the length of time that 
they must commit to repaying their creditors under a Chapter 13 plan before receiving a 
discharge). 
22 Id. 
23 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(i). 
24 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(ii). 
25 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(iii). 
26 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(iv). 
27 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(v)–(vi). 
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federal or state qualified education or tuition account;28 and (iv) a copy 
of his or her tax return for the most recent tax year.29   
 
 Two educational courses are now also required of debtors—a 
debtor must complete a credit counseling course prior to filing, and a 
debtor education course must be completed prior to discharge.30  
 
 The Act also imposed new duties and obligations on attorneys.  
Lawyers must prepare a § 342(b) notice, describing the debtor’s 
bankruptcy options and warning of the consequences of asset 
concealment or fraud.31 Attorneys are also required to certify, “after 
reasonable investigation” that the information in the debtor’s petition is 
“well grounded in fact.”32  In addition, BAPCPA now governs the conduct 
                         
28  The debtor must provide a list of all creditors and the amount and nature of their claims; the 
source, amount, and frequency of the debtor's income; a list of all of the debtor's property; and 
a detailed list of the debtor's monthly living expenses, (i.e., food, clothing, shelter, utilities, taxes 
and transportation); in order to be able to complete the schedules that must be filed with the 
petition.  An individual filer who is married must gather this information from their spouse 
regardless of whether only one member of the couple is filing, both are filing a joint petition, or 
each is filing a separate individual petition. Where only one spouse files, the income and expenses 
of the non-filing spouse are required to be disclosed as part of the debtor’s household’s finances.  
11 U.S.C. § 521; Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(b).  
29 This includes tax returns for prior years that had not been filed when the case commenced 
and any tax returns filed during the course of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 521; Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(b).  
30 11 U.S.C. § 521(b)(1)-(2). It is the lawyer who directs a debtor to the credit counseling course, 
as well as to the pre-discharge debt management course. Many debtors complete these courses 
over the Internet, either at home or at computer stations, and telephone centers set up in their 
lawyers offices. Interview with Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney (Oct. 7, 2009) (transcript on file with 
Principal Investigator); Focus Group of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (Feb. 11, 2010) (transcript 
on file with Principal Investigator). 
31 See 11 U.S.C. § 342(b). 
32 Section 521 makes bankruptcy attorneys liable for misleading statements and inaccuracies in 
schedules and documents submitted to the court or to the trustee. To avoid sanctions and 
potential civil penalties, attorneys must verify the information given to them by their clients 
regarding the list of creditors, assets and liabilities, and income and expenditures. Completing a 
reasonable investigation of debtors’ financial affairs and, for Chapter 7 cases, computing debtor 
eligibility, requires attorneys to expend additional effort. Prior to BAPCPA’s enactment, the 
American Bar Association predicted that this requirement would increase attorney costs by $150 
to $500 per case. Based on the 1.6 million projected filings under Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, the 
Congressional Budget Office estimated that the direct cost of complying with this mandate would 
be between $240 million and $800 million in fiscal year 2007, the first full year of implementation, 
and would remain in that range through fiscal year 2010. The Congressional Budget Office 
expected that some of the additional costs incurred by attorneys would most likely be passed on 
to their clients. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, H.R. Rep. No. 
109-31 at 33–34 (1st Sess. 2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89. 
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of “debt relief agencies” which has been held to include attorneys.33 
These new provisions contain prohibitions on deceptive or improper 
conduct, such as making misrepresentations, and counseling a client to 
take on more debt in contemplation of filing.34 They also require 
attorneys to make extensive written disclosures to their clients about the 
need for accurate information in the petition and supporting documents, 
and to caution their clients about certain aspects of bankruptcy.35 Finally, 
they require the debtor and his or her attorney to execute a written 
contract prior to filing that clearly sets forth the services to be rendered 
and fees to be charged.36    
 
 Most debtors have complied and will continue to comply with the 
new BAPCPA conditions with the aid of an attorney.37 Such compliance, 
however, has not been without cost.  These procedural requirements have 
taken their toll on debtors, attorneys, trustees, and judges and have had 
a direct and quantifiable effect on how the bankruptcy system operates, 
and how bankruptcy is practiced.   
 
  
II. Bankruptcy Code and Rule Provisions Governing 
 Attorney Compensation 
 
                         
33 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 526–528; 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A). The term “debt relief agency” means “any 
person who provides any bankruptcy assistance to an assisted person in return for the payment 
of money or other valuable consideration . . . .” The definition of “debt relief agency” does not 
expressly mention attorneys, but the Supreme Court recently held that debtors’ attorneys are debt 
relief agencies in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v, United States. 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1328 (2010). 
34 11 U.S.C. § 526(a). 
35 11 U.S.C. § 527. 
36 11 U.S.C. § 528. In addition, even debtors who meet the standards and fulfill the requirements 
to file for bankruptcy will receive less relief overall.  The discharge provisions under both Chapter 
7 and Chapter 13 have been contracted, with for-profit student loans, some credit card debts, 
credit card cash advances, and property settlements not in the nature of support, to name a few, 
now presumptively, or absolutely non-dischargeable. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(C), 523(a)(8)(B) 
523(a)(14)(A), 523(a)(15), 523(a)(18). Moreover, the Chapter 13 “super-discharge” has been 
truncated and the time between permitted receipt of a discharge has been extended. 11 U.S.C. §§ 
1328(a), 727(a)(8).   
37 The Study found that 94.2% of Chapter 7 consumer cases and 97.9% of Chapter 13 consumer 
cases filed after BAPCPA’s effective date were filed with the assistance of counsel. See infra 
Appendix II, Table A – 2 and Appendix III, Table A – 7.     
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 Attorney fees in consumer bankruptcy cases are subject to a 
relatively high level of statutory, administrative, and judicial scrutiny.38 
Because they are typically the largest expense associated with a 
consumer debtor’s bankruptcy case, there is considerable tension between 
the potentially competing goals of keeping bankruptcy affordable for 
those who need it, and ensuring a highly competent, professional, and 
sustainable consumer bankruptcy bar.39  
 
 The starting point for understanding the regulatory oversight of 
attorneys’ fees is § 329.  Section 329 requires lawyers who represent 
debtors to disclose all compensation received in a case within the 
preceding year. The reasonableness of such compensation is subject to 
judicial review and if "such compensation exceeds the reasonable value of 
any such services, the court may cancel any such agreement, or order 
the return of any such payment, to the extent excessive, to . . . the 
entity that made such payment."40 As such, any payment or agreement to 
make a payment by a debtor to his or her attorney is valid only to the 
extent it is of a reasonable amount.41  
                         
38 Attorney fees may be subject to challenge by a trustee, client, bankruptcy judge, or any other 
party in interest.  See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2017.  
39 Angela Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How Consumer Bankruptcy's Greatest Weakness May 
Account for its Surprising Success, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 1955-6 (2011). 
40 11 U.S.C. § 329 states:  
“(a) any attorney representing a debtor in a case under this title, or in connection with such a 
case, whether or not such attorney applies for compensation under this title, shall file with the 
court a statement of the compensation paid or agreed to be paid, if such payment or agreement 
was made after one year before the date of the filing of the petition, for services rendered or to 
be rendered in connection with the case by such attorney, and the source of such compensation. 
(b) If such compensation exceeds the reasonable value of any such services, the court may cancel 
any such agreement, or order the return of any such payment, to the extent excessive, to – 
 (1) the estate, if the property transferred – 
  (A) would have been property of the estate; or 
  (B) was to be paid by or on behalf of the debtor under a plan under chapter 11, 
12, or 13 of this title; or 
 (2) the entity that made such payment.” 
41 The court may reduce an attorney’s fee if the court finds that the work done was excessive 
under the circumstances or of substandard quality. See Hale v. U.S. Trustee, 509 F.3d 1139 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (errors in attorney work product justified scrutiny and disgorgement of attorney fee); In 
re Gage, 394 B.R. 184 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2008) (court may order return of excessive fees to the 
estate); In re Laberge, 380 B.R. 277 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008) (court used the lodestar method to 
determine that $6,000 for simple no asset chapter 7 case was excessive); In re Irons, 379 B.R. 
680 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007) (review by the court was appropriate where attorney late-filed an 
unsigned, blank B22 Form on behalf of debtor).  “At the outset, the Court acknowledges that the 
undersigned shares the concern of many bankruptcy judges that the unwarranted application of § 
 
 
15 
 
 
 Section 330, also setting a “reasonable compensation” standard, 
applies when determining the reasonableness of services rendered pre-
petition and to be rendered post-petition.  With respect to debtors filing 
for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 13, § 330(a)(4)(B) provides 
further that lawyers are entitled to receive “reasonable compensation” for 
services rendered “in connection with a bankruptcy case”—including post-
petition services.42 In Chapter 7 cases, § 327 provides that a debtor’s 
attorney must be appointed by the trustee and approved by the court, in 
order to receive fees post-petition or post-conversion.43 Typically, 
attorneys for debtors in Chapter 7 cases are paid in full pre-petition.44  
 
 Bankruptcy Rules 2016 and 2017 implement § 329 and govern the 
disclosure of fee arrangements by the debtor's attorney and the court’s 
scrutiny of such arrangements. Rule 2016 requires an attorney to file a 
written statement of the compensation agreed to be paid or paid within 
one year before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, regardless of 
whether the attorney makes a specific application for compensation.45  
                                                                         
526 could lead to oppression of debtors' counsel who zealously represent clients, often with little 
compensation, great risk and much compassion. Yet, this order is not about competent counsel 
making a simple error. The Court's concern in this case is whether counsel acted competently at 
all. As set forth above, the performance exhibited by counsel in this case may present a rare 
example that lies in stark contrast to the typical performance of attorneys practicing in this Court 
. . . . Nevertheless, the Congressional mandate is clear. When the Court witnesses the possible 
abuse of debtors by their own lawyers, the Court is compelled to act.” 379 B.R. 680, 686–687.  
42 Under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4)(B) in a “chapter 13 case in which the debtor is an individual, the 
court may allow reasonable compensation to the debtor’s attorney for representing the interests 
of the debtor in connection with the bankruptcy case based on a consideration of the benefit and 
necessity of such services to the debtor and the other factors set forth in this section.”  These 
factors include: “(A) the time spent on such services; (B) the rates charged for such services; (C) 
whether the services were necessary to the administration of, or beneficial at the time at which 
the service was rendered toward the completion of, a case under this title; (D) whether the 
services were performed within a reasonable amount of time commensurate with the complexity, 
importance, and nature of the problem, issue, or task addressed; (E) with respect to a 
professional person, whether the person is board certified or otherwise has demonstrated skill and 
experience in the bankruptcy field; and (F) whether the compensation is reasonable based on the 
customary compensation charged by comparably skilled practitioners in cases other than cases 
under this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 330(b). 
43 See Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004). A debtor may employ an attorney, post-petition, 
however, if the representation is for their own benefit, and not for the benefit of the estate, so 
long as the attorney is not paid from estate funds. 
44 But see notes 223-226 and accompanying text.  
45 See 11 U.S.C. § 329(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2016(b). Rule 2016(b) further provides that the 
disclosure mandated by § 329 must be sent to the U.S. Trustee within fifteen days of the filing 
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Rule 2017(a) authorizes bankruptcy courts to examine attorney fees paid 
prior to filing.46  Rule 2017(b) extends courts the same authorization with 
respect to post-petition attorney fees.47 
 
 In order to ensure compensation is reasonable, bankruptcy courts 
typically require attorneys to file a fee application containing an 
itemization of legal services performed.48 In theory, the starting point for 
the analysis of “reasonableness” is the “lodestar method.”49  Under the 
lodestar method,  
 
[t]he fee-setting court first establishes a “threshold point of 
reference” or “lodestar,” which is the number of hours reasonably 
spent by the attorney multiplied by his reasonable hourly rate. The 
“lodestar” may then be adjusted up or down to reflect a variety of 
factors including, (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty 
and difficulty of the questions presented by the case; (3) the skill 
requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of 
other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; 
(5) the customary fee for similar work in the community; (6) whether 
the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time pressures imposed by the 
                                                                         
date. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2016(b).  Moreover, Rule 2016(b) imposes a continuing duty on debtors’ 
attorneys to amend the disclosure when additional payments are made during a Chapter 13 case, 
or after a case converts to a Chapter 7.  See In re Whaley, 282 B.R. 38 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) 
(failure to make such disclosures potentially subjects an attorney to sanctions, such as fee 
reduction or disgorgement). See also McMullen v. Schultz, 428 B.R. 4, 13 (D. Mass 2010) (where a 
court reduced the debtor’s fees by one-fifth, because the attorney failed to completely and timely 
disclose all information required by Rule 2016(b).) 
46 It reads: “[O]n motion by any party in interest or on the court’s own initiative, the court after 
notice and hearing may determine any payment of money or any transfer of property by the 
debtor, made directly or indirectly and in contemplation of the filing of a petition under the Code 
by or against the debtor or before the entry of the order for relief, to an attorney for services 
rendered or to be rendered is excessive.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2017(a). See In re Fricker, 131 B.R. 932 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (the court has the right to examine attorney fees, even in a dismissed 
Chapter 13 case).  See also In re Fox, 140 B.R. 761 (Bankr. D. S. Dakota 1992). 
47 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2017(b).  
48 Every bankruptcy district has unique requirements to satisfy a fee application. See, e.g., Local 
Rules, Compensation of Professionals, Bankr. D. Neb. R. 2016-1(A), available at 
http://www.neb.uscourts.gov/lorule/!SSL!/WebHelp/lorules.pdf; Local Rules, Compensation of 
Professionals, Bankr. S.D. W. Va. R. 2016-1, available at 
http://www.wvsb.uscourts.gov/localrules/LocalRules.pdf. 
49 The Supreme Court said in Hensley v. Eckerhart, “the most useful starting point for determining 
the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation 
multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).   
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client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and results 
obtained as a result of the attorney’s services; (9) the experience, 
reputation and ability of the attorney; (10) the “undesirability” of the 
case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with 
the client; [and] (12) awards in similar cases. If the time expended 
appears duplicative, excessive or otherwise unnecessary, the lodestar 
should be reduced accordingly.50  
 
 Because of the high volume nature of consumer bankruptcy 
practice, however, many jurisdictions have formally or informally adopted 
a “presumptively reasonable,” “RARA,” or in some jurisdictions, a “no-look” 
fee standard.51 Most common in Chapter 13 cases, the “presumptively 
reasonable” fee is a dollar figure that, if charged by a lawyer in 
connection with his or her representation of a consumer debtor, will 
typically allow the lawyer to avoid the necessity of filing a fee application 
with the court.52 In essence, a presumptive fee permits an attorney to 
charge a flat pre-approved fee for an array of professional services.53 
                         
50 McMullen v. Schultz, 428 B.R. 4, 11. 
51 See infra Appendix VI. “RARA” stands for “Rights and Responsibility Agreement” entered into 
between a debtor and his or her attorney. 
52 A few, but not many, jurisdictions recognize a presumptively reasonable fee in Chapter 7 cases. 
See infra note 216 and accompanying text.  A presumptively reasonable fee does not necessarily 
shield a lawyer from judicial scrutiny of the attorney fee and the services provide. As one court 
noted, “This case presents an opportunity for the Court to reiterate that [the order setting a 
presumptively reasonable fee] is not designed to remove the discretion of the bar in establishing 
a reasonable fee depending on the complexity of a particular case.  Attorneys are in the first 
instance in the position to determine the complexity of case, and they should endeavor to 
propose a flat fee that bears some relationship to the work that will likely be required and which 
invariably depends on the unique facts and circumstances of each case.  Attorneys who 
consistently use the flat fee . . . must expect to occasionally encounter a case with unforeseen 
complications, thus resulting in a lower return than cases that proceed in a routine manner.  This 
is, however, the exception rather than the rule.  Cases of increased complexity more often than 
not will be identified prior to the filing of the petition, such that attorneys can opt to utilize the 
hourly fee arrangement.  The Court trusts that attorneys will exercise their best business judgment 
and chose the hourly fee option from the outset in a particular case if and when appropriate.” In 
re Wesseldine, 434 B.R. 31, 40 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2010). 
53 Proponents of establishing presumptively reasonable fees argue that it is “practical and 
consistent with § 330 as long as there are procedures detailed in advance where an attorney can 
apply for additional compensation when the services provided exceed the basic services 
contemplated by the ‘no look’ or standard fee.” STAN BERNSTEIN, MAUREEN A. TIGHE, HENRY J. SOMMER & 
ALAN N. RESNICK, COLLIER COMPENSATION, EMPLOYMENT AND APPOINTMENT OF TRUSTEES AND PROFESSIONALS IN 
BANKRUPTCY CASES, ¶ 3.05[4] (2009). 
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There remains the requirement, however, that the fee charged bear a 
relationship to the services provided in a debtor’s case. 54  
   
 
 
 
 
III.   Studies of the Consumer Bankruptcy System and 
 Profiles of Consumer Debtors  
 
 The first empirical study of the bankruptcy system was conducted 
in the 1960s by David Stanley and Marjorie Girth.55 That report provided 
the first detailed description and analysis of how bankruptcy operated 
and how debtors were faring.56 Since this ground-breaking study, an 
increasing number of scholars have contributed to the growing body of 
empirical bankruptcy research.57 These empirical studies have done much 
                         
54 Typically, presumptively reasonable fees are codified in local rules, general orders or standing 
orders, in case law, or are set by an unwritten practice or custom in the local district. Because 
there is no uniform presumptively reasonable fee enacted across district lines, the presumptive fee 
of each bankruptcy district varies significantly from district to district and year to year. Moreover, 
what is included in the “array of services” also varies by district and by court. It should be noted 
that some bankruptcy districts have chosen not to adopt any form of a no-look fee. See infra 
Appendix VI.  
55 David T. Stanley & Marjorie Girth, Bankruptcy: Problem, Process, Reform (Washington, D.C., 
Brookings Institute, 1971). 
56 Through the analysis of bankruptcy case filings, interviews of 400 consumer debtors, a review 
of 398 business bankruptcy cases, as well as discussions with troubled debtors who did not 
file,“[i]t . . . provided much of what is known about bankruptcy.” TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN 
& JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 16 (1989) [hereinafter AS WE FORGIVE].  In the 
late 1970s, Philip Shuchman engaged in a number of empirical studies in which he examined a 
number of demographic and economic variables in an effort to develop a picture of who was 
using the bankruptcy system.  Id. (citing Philip Shuchman, Theory and Reality in Bankruptcy: The 
Spherical Chicken, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 66 (1977); Philip Shuchman, New Jersey Debtors 1982 
– 83: An Empirical Study, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 541 (1985); Philip Shuchman, The Average 
Bankrupt: A Description and Analysis of 753 Personal Bankruptcy Filings in Nine States, 1983 
COMM. L. LEAGUE 288; Philip Shuchman & Thomas L. Rorer, Personal Bankruptcy Data for Opt-out 
Hearings and Other Purposes, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1982)). 
57 For example, during the years preceding BAPCPA’s enactment, Marianne B. Culhane and 
Michaela M. White conducted an empirical study of a proposed means-testing provision. Marianne 
B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Taking the New Consumer Bankruptcy for a Test Drive: Means 
Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 27 (1999). Data for the means test study 
was originally gathered in 1996 in connection with a project studying reaffirmations in consumer 
bankruptcy cases.  Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela White, Debt after Discharge: An Empirical 
Study of Reaffirmation, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 709 (1999).  Professor Norberg and later, Norberg and 
Velkey sought to provide a detailed portrait of the Chapter 13 system and the extent to which 
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to shape the debate about the function, utility, accessibility and value of 
the consumer bankruptcy system.58   
 
 Empirical study has also provided a detailed profile of consumer 
debtors.59 Led by the researchers of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project 
(“CBP”), we now have a portrait of who is filing for consumer bankruptcy, 
why consumers file, their financial condition at that time, when during 
their period of financial crisis they file, and whether and to what extent 
bankruptcy provides needed relief.60 
                                                                         
Chapter 13 has fulfilled its ostensible purposes.  See Scott F. Norberg, Consumer Bankruptcy's New 
Clothes: An Empirical Study of Discharge and Debt Collection in Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 415, 456–57 (1999); Scott F. Norberg & Andrew J. Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor 
Repayment in Chapter 13, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 473 (2006). 
58 But see Margaret Howard, Bankruptcy Empiricism: Lighthouse Still No Good, 17 AM. BANKR. DEV. J. 
425 (2001) (expressing caution about the impact of empirical data on policy debates). 
59 Data has been collected from consumer cases filed in 1981, 1991, 2001 and 2007. See AS WE 
FORGIVE, supra note 56; Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail?, supra note 8, at 352; Teresa A. Sullivan, 
Elizabeth Warren, & Jay Westbrook, Folklore and Facts: A Preliminary Report from the Consumer 
Bankruptcy Project, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293 (1986); Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, & Jay 
Westbrook, Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial Comparison of Consumer Bankrupts 
1981–1991, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121 (1994). See also Jay L. Zagorsky & Lois R. Lupica, A Study of 
Consumers’ Post-Discharge Finances: Struggle, Stasis or Fresh Start? 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 283 
(2008) (comparing consumers post-discharge financial recovery from financial distress to 
consumers who had never filed for bankruptcy). 
60 Among other findings, the 2007 CBP study revealed that the 2005 amendments to the 
bankruptcy code “functioned . . . like a barricade, blocking out hundreds of thousands of 
struggling families indiscriminately, regardless of their individual income circumstances.” Did 
Bankruptcy Reform Fail?, supra note 8, at 353. Moreover, families have been trending toward ever-
increasing indebtedness, with net worth shrinking, and debt-to-income ratios rising. “Families filing 
for bankruptcy are in ever-increasing financial distress.” Id. The data further show that financially 
troubled families are delaying bankruptcy: “struggling longer with their bills and building up bigger 
loads of debt before succumbing.” Id. Other empirical studies have focused on highly discrete 
issues such a bankruptcy and the health care system, bankruptcy and ethnicity, bankruptcy and 
geography, as well as on filing rates and trends.  See e.g., Rafael Efrat, Minority Entrepreneurs in 
Bankruptcy, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 95 (2008); Melissa B. Jacoby, Teresa A. Sullivan, 
Elizabeth Warren, Rethinking the Debates Over Health Care Financing: Evidence From the 
Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2001); Jean M. Lown, Serial Bankruptcy Filers No Problem, 
26-5 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 36 (2007); Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the 
Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 
405 (2005); Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship 
and Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179 (2009); Katherine Porter, Going Broke the Hard 
Way: The Economics of Rural Failure, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 969 (2005); Steven W. Rhodes, An Empirical 
Study of Consumer Bankruptcy Papers, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 653 (1999); Michael Simkovic, The Effect 
of BAPCPA on Credit Card Industry Profits and Prices, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (2009); William J. 
Woodward, Jr. & Richard S. Woodward, Exemptions as an Incentive to Voluntary Bankruptcy: An 
Empirical Study, 57 AM. BANK. L.J. 53 (1983). See also Charles J. Tabb, Consumer filings: Trends and 
indicators, Part I, 25-9 AM. BANK. INST. J. 1 (2006); Charles J. Tabb, Consumer filings: Trends and 
indicators, Part II, 25-10 AM. BANK. INST. J. 42 (2006). 
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 Thus far, similar empirical attention has not been paid to the post-
BAPCPA bankruptcy institution itself.  While there have been single 
jurisdiction studies,61 studies based on anecdotal and limited scale 
interviews,62 a study of the costs of the new consumer bankruptcy system 
to governmental parties,63 and numerous predictive statements and 
speculation,64 the costs and impact of BAPCPA on debtors, debtors’ 
                         
61 See James J. White, Abuse Prevention 2005, 71 MO. L. REV. 863, 874–876 (2006). White 
conducted a series of interviews with half-a-dozen consumer debtor attorneys concerning the 
costs of consumer bankruptcy. These interview subjects unanimously concluded that the cost of 
consumer Chapter 7 cases rose significantly following BAPCPA’s enactment.  The reasons cited for 
the increase in costs were related to the necessity of multiple meetings with prospective debtors 
prior to filing: “The first visit would be to explain the § 342 disclosures and to begin collecting 
information. The second might be to get additional information and to arrange the counseling 
briefing, commonly done by telephone in the lawyer’s office. Last, the lawyer himself will have to 
verify the information given by the debtor and hector the debtor for his tax return and pay stub. 
The lawyer will also have to do the mandated factual investigation . . . [including] getting credit 
reports, . . . lien searches, and checking other public records to determine if the client is listed as 
the owner of real property.” Id. at 875–876. White argued that the procedural changes would most 
raise the cost of bankruptcy. Specifically, he noted the costs of credit briefings and finance 
courses, and the higher fees that attorneys would be charging to deal with the new complexities 
and increased personal liability. Id. at 866–869. 
62 Robert J. Landry III & Amy K. Yarbrough, An Empirical Examination of the Direct Access Costs 
to Chapter 7 Consumer Bankruptcy: A Pilot Study in the Northern District of Alabama, 82 AM. 
BANKR. L. J. 331 (2008). This single-district study examined the direct access costs of filing for 
Chapter 7 before and after BAPCPA. The study found that costs had in fact risen. After adjusting 
for inflation, attorneys’ fees had gone up 21.54%, and filing fees were up 24.16%. Id. at 335. 
Credit counseling and debtor education requirements had added an additional $100 to the cost 
of Chapter 7 cases. Id. at 336. The total increase in costs in the Northern District of Alabama was 
an increase of 32.73%. Id. at 343.  
63 See GAO REPORT, supra note 15. The GAO study examined the costs of BAPCPA on the U.S. 
Trustee Program, the federal judiciary, consumers, and on private trustees. Id. at 2. The U.S. 
Trustee Program was found to have incurred significant costs in connection with its role in the 
implementation of the means test, debtor audits, data collection and reporting as well as 
counseling and education requirements. Id. at 11. Consumer bankruptcy attorney fees incurred in 
Chapter 7 cases were also examined in the GAO study: a nationwide random sample of 176 
Chapter 7 cases filed pre-BAPCPA was compared to 292 randomly selected Chapter 7 cases filed 
post-BAPCPA. Id. at 21–22.  The GAO study found that the average attorney fee for a Chapter 7 
case increased by $366. Id. at 26, With respect to attorneys’ fees in Chapter 13 cases, the GAO 
study confined its examination to a review of 48 judicial districts’ “no-look” fees, and found an 
increase in nearly every district studied, with more than half of the districts showing an increase 
of 55 percent or more. Id. at 22. The GAO study concluded that filing for consumer bankruptcy 
was more costly for debtors, private trustees, and the U.S. Trustee Program following BAPCPA’s 
enactment than before. Id. at 3–6.   
64 Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing Consumers Under the 
“Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,” 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 191 
(2005) (“There is no doubt that bankruptcy relief will be more expensive for almost all debtors, 
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attorneys, Panel Trustees, Standing Trustees, and judges have not been 
quantified and analyzed on a national scale until now.  This type of 
research has been referred to as “context studies”—an examination of 
the system within which a law or policy is implemented.65  Particularly in 
light of a significantly transformed consumer bankruptcy system, the data 
gathered and analyzed in this Study will go a long way to inform 
interested law and policy makers about how well the consumer 
bankruptcy system is working, the extent to which it is meeting its 
objectives, the impact it has had on the primary system stakeholders and 
the degree of its external effects.   
  
 
 IV.  The Costs of BAPCPA Pilot Study 
 
 In 2009, the Fee Study Research Team conducted a pilot study of 
the costs of BAPCPA (the “Pilot Study”).66  The purpose of the Pilot Study 
was twofold: (i) to “distill the data about the bankruptcy system that is 
available and accessible,” and (ii) to “refine the study’s substance and 
process.”67 The initial Pilot Study examined whether it costs a debtor 
more to access the consumer bankruptcy system after BAPCPA’s 
enactment than it did before.68   
 
 To explore the question of cost of access, we randomly selected 
six judicial districts,69 from which a total of 1,00670 consumer cases filed 
                                                                         
less effective for many debtors, and totally inaccessible for some debtors as a result of the new 
law.”) 
65 Jay Lawrence Westbrook, What We Know and Do Not Know About the Impact of Civil Justice 
on the American Economy and Policy: Empirical Research in Consumer Bankruptcy, 80 TEX. L. REV. 
2123, 2142 (2002) (described as “issues related specifically to the bankruptcy system”). 
66 The Pilot Study was supported by a grant from the American Bankruptcy Institute. 
67 Pilot Study proposal to Samuel J. Gerdano, Executive Director, American Bankruptcy Institute 
(Apr. 24, 2009) (on file with Principal Investigator).  
68 Costs of BAPCPA Pilot Study grant application letter to the American Bankruptcy Institute (Apr. 
9, 2009) (on file with Principal Investigator). 
69 Three judicial districts from each of the eleven judicial circuits were initially selected for a total 
of 33 judicial districts: one from each of the high, low and medium population states in the 
circuit, as determined by the July 1, 2008 Population Estimate published by the U.S. Census.  In 
states with more than one judicial district, the district with the highest population city was 
selected.  Where there was an even number of states in a circuit, we calculated the average 
population for the circuit and selected the state with a population that was closest to that 
number; that state was identified as the “median population” state from that circuit.  From these 
33 judicial districts, six districts were randomly selected: (i) the Middle District of Florida, (ii) the 
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during pre-BAPCPA years (2003 and 2004) were examined and compared 
to access costs of cases filed after BAPCPA (from the years 2007 and 
2008).71  
 
 Analysis of the data extracted from Chapter 13 cases revealed 
significant increases in attorney fees (the largest variable) between cases 
filed pre-BAPCPA and cases filed post-BAPCPA: 66%.72  The median 
attorney fee in Chapter 7 cases was $650 in 2003 and 2004.  In 2007 
and 2008, the median fee jumped to $1,000—representing a 53% 
increase.73 We also found considerable variation in costs between and 
                                                                         
Northern District of Illinois, (iii) the Northern District of Georgia, (iv) Maine, (v) Utah, and (vi) the 
Southern District of West Virginia. This stratified sampling method was used to ensure that cases 
from low, medium and high population states were represented in the Pilot Study sample. Lupica, 
Costs, supra note 15 at 57–58. 
70 Fifty Chapter 7 cases from each of the Pilot Study districts were randomly selected from the 
consumer cases filed in 2003 and 2004 (pre-BAPCPA), and fifty Chapter 7 cases from each of the 
same districts were randomly selected from consumer cases filed in 2007 and 2008 (post-
BAPCPA). The same number of Chapter 13 cases was selected for each of the same time periods. 
Automated Access to Court Electronic Records (“AACER”) created a random list of bankruptcy 
case files that fit the criteria for the study. We are indebted to Mike Bickford, formerly of AACER, 
for his patience and generous support of the Pilot Study.  The Pilot Study core sample included 
293 Chapter 7 cases filed in 2003 and 2004, and 299 Chapter 7 cases filed in 2007 and 2008. 
The core sample of Chapter 13 cases studied in the Pilot Study was 414: 295 Chapter 13 cases 
filed in 2003 and 2004, and 119 Chapter 13 cases filed in 2007 and 2008.  These numbers 
reflect the discarding of some cases for lack of petition information, as well as the fact that in 
some districts, an insufficient number of Chapter 13 cases were closed (but not dismissed). Id. at 
60. 
71 Using the definitions developed in connection with the Harvard Bankruptcy Data Project, we 
examined non-commercial cases filed by actual people, not entities. The Bankruptcy Data Projects 
describes the classification of cases as follows:   
Noncommercial: cases not classified as commercial cases. 
Commercial: cases filed by legal entities, plus those with other indicia that the filing is related to 
a business. That is, the debtor may be an individual who indicates on the petition that she is 
“doing business as” another entity, or the debtor may list a Tax ID number instead of a Social 
Security Number. 
Individual: cases filed by actual, natural people. 
Entity: cases filed by legal entities (corporations, partnerships, and the like).  
BANKRUPTCY DATA PROJECT AT HARVARD, http://bdp.law.harvard.edu/filingsdb.cfm (last visited Nov. 10, 
2011). All cases studied in the Pilot Study sample were closed (discharged), but not dismissed. 
Joint petitions were considered to be one bankruptcy case. Lupica, Costs, supra note 15, at 53.  
72 The fees in the 25th percentile represent a 66% increase, and the fees in the 75th percentile 
increased by 40%. Lupica, Costs, supra note 15, at 65. 
73 Attorney fees charged at the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile each increased by 40%. 
Lupica Costs, supra note 15, at 66. These findings are consistent with the findings in the 2008 
study of the consumer bankruptcy system conducted by the Government Accounting Office.  GAO 
REPORT, supra note 15, at 4.  
 
 
23 
 
among the studied districts.  While these findings confirmed anecdotal 
evidence and hunches about increased costs, we knew a more extensive 
national study was needed to provide the whole story about BAPCPA’s 
consequences—both intended and unintended.   
 
 Moreover, the Pilot Study findings raised many “why” questions. 
Specifically, questions were raised with respect to the “nature and impact 
of the new administrative requirements, the time it takes to represent a 
consumer debtor, the impact of the new requirements on consumer 
behavior and decision-making, and the changes that have proven to be 
most and least significant.”74 Additionally, because the BAPCPA 
amendments overhauled the consumer bankruptcy process in so many 
large and small ways, we wanted to know how this reconstituted system 
affected the professionals who had daily interaction with it.  Ultimately, 
the question examined in the National Study is “whether the 2005 
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code improved bankruptcy law and 
practice or whether the amendments just made the system more 
cumbersome and costly to use.”75 
 
                         
74 Lupica, Costs, supra note 15, at 47. 
75 Id. 
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V.  The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee Study  
 
A. Sample and Methodology 
 
 1. Quantitative Data  
   
 The objective of quantitative study sampling is to draw “a 
representative sample from the population, so that the results of studying 
the sample can then be generalized back to the population.”76 The goal 
is to study a sample large enough to enable valid inferences to be made 
about the population as a whole.77 With that objective in mind, we asked 
AACER to provide group identifying information for all non-commercial 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases filed from 2003 through the 
end of 2009—a total of 9,128,882 cases.78   Given the time and 
resources available to us we believed that we could reasonably obtain 
the case files and manually code the needed information for 
approximately 10,000 cases.  With this target in mind, we divided the 
sample into two groups: Chapter 7 consumer cases and Chapter 13 
cases. We then stratified each group according to judicial district and the 
year in which each case was filed.79  Within these strata, we used 
proportionate sampling, based on the number of cases filed in each 
district for each year, to randomly select the sample.  Specifically, for 
each time period, we randomly selected approximately twice as many 
case numbers as required to achieve the target for each district.  We 
then downloaded the corresponding court documents, and manually 
coded information on cases that had valid entries for the majority of our 
data fields.  Successive cases within each strata were coded in this 
fashion until the target number for that district and year was achieved.80  
We performed informal robustness checks during the coding process to 
verify that proportionate random sampling in this fashion provided a 
                         
76 Martin N. Marshall, Sampling for Qualitative Research, 13 Family Practice 522 (1996).  
77 Id. 
78  United States Courts, Bankruptcy Statistics, 
Filings, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics.aspx (last visited Oct. 16, 2011). 
79 For 2005, we divided the filings into pre- and post-BAPCPA periods using the date of 
implementation, October 17, 2005. 
80 In some instances, we were unable to reach our sampling target for every district, primarily due 
to the fact that electronic filing did not become widespread until closer to BAPCPA’s effective 
date. See Part V.B. for more information.  
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representative number of cases across districts and across months within 
each year. 
 
 The data described below and the tables set forth in Appendix II, 
III, and V are average (mean) values of Total Direct Access Costs and 
attorney fees, with a test of the difference in means pre- and post- 
BAPCPA. The “difference in means” accounts for differences in sample 
size and variability in the two sub-samples.  
 
 Nominal dollar amounts for Total Direct Access Costs and attorney 
fees were deflated using a monthly implicit price deflator constructed 
from current dollar and inflation adjusted, chain-weighted personal 
consumption expenditures for legal services as reported by the U.S. 
Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis.  Thus, the resulting 
values reported in the data described below and in the tables found in 
Appendices are in terms of inflation-adjusted 2005 dollars. 
 
  
 2. Qualitative Data  
 
 Given the expansive range of issues implicated and the complexity 
of the system being studied, we set out to gather qualitative data from a 
broad range of system stakeholders. We wanted to hear detailed and 
varied accounts from professionals working within the system.  
  
 The qualitative portion of the Study was both iterative and open-
ended.  The time at which the data set reached the point of “saturation” 
was very clear. This was the point at which we ceased gathering new 
information.  Thus, while we did not endeavor to provide a statistical 
estimate of the characteristics, perspectives, and experiences of a study 
population, we have a high confidence level that the information we 
gleaned from the data is not anomalous due to the unique experiences 
of the individuals studied.  
 
 a. Focus Groups 
  
 Focus groups provide an effective and efficient way to gather 
qualitative data from study subjects.  They can produce “concentrated 
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amounts of data on precisely the topic of interest.”81 Focus groups can 
offer the opportunity for participants to respond to questions provided by 
the researcher, as well as to engage in and interact with other members 
of the group.82  As has been noted, “[t]he hallmark of focus groups is 
their explicit use of group interaction to produce data and insights that 
would be less accessible without the interaction found in the group.”83 
 
 To develop this qualitative database, I conducted thirteen focus 
groups over a period of eighteen months: nine comprised of consumer 
debtor attorneys, one of Standing Chapter 13 Trustees, one of Chapter 7 
Panel Trustees, one of bankruptcy judges, and one of U.S. Trustees.  
 
 Invitations to participate in a focus group were extended to 
potential participants in a variety of ways. In some cases, we identified 
the debtors’ attorneys with consumer practices who were planning to 
attend an upcoming bankruptcy-related conference. In other cases, we 
contacted the local Chapter 13 Trustee and/or bankruptcy judge in the 
district where a bankruptcy conference was being held to solicit their 
assistance in identifying bankruptcy attorneys with active consumer 
practices. In yet other instances, we solicited the assistance of members 
of the Study’s Advisory Board to suggest names of invitees. In addition to 
five national and regional ABI conferences,84 I conducted focus group 
interviews at each of the following professional organizations’ meetings: 
the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (NACBA);85 the 
                         
81 There are clearly weaknesses associated with focus group interviews as a data gathering tool. 
As observed, “[t]he fact that focus groups are driven by the researcher’s interests can . . . be a 
source of weakness . . . . The fact that the researcher creates and directs the group makes them 
distinctly less naturalistic than participant observation so there is always some residual uncertainty 
about the accuracy of what the participants say. In particular, there is a very real concern that 
the moderator, in the name of maintaining the interview’s focus, will influence the group’s 
interactions.” DAVID L. MORGAN, FOCUS GROUPS AS QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 14 (2nd ed. 1997). There is also 
the concern that “the presence of the group will affect what [participants] say, and how they say 
it.” Id. 
82 Id. at 2.  
83 Id. 
84 ABI Northeast Consumer Bankruptcy Conference, Boston, Mass. Jan. 18, 2010; ABI Caribbean 
Insolvency Conference, Boca Raton, Fla., Feb. 11, 2010; ABI Northeast Bankruptcy Conference, 
Cape Cod, Mass. July 8, 2010; ABI Southwest Bankruptcy Conference, Las Vegas, Nev., Sept. 23, 
2010; Detroit Consumer Bankruptcy Conference, Detroit, Mich., Nov. 10 2010. 
85 National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys Conference, San Francisco, Cal., Apr. 1–
2, 2010. 
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American Consumer Bankruptcy College (ACBC);86 the National Association 
of Bankruptcy Trustees (NABT);87 the National Association of Chapter 13 
Trustees (NACTT);88 and the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges 
(NCBJ).89 Additionally, I conducted a focus group with a visiting group of 
U.S. Trustees at the Executive Office of the United States Trustee in 
Washington, D.C.90 In extending focus group invitations, I endeavored to 
invite a national cross section of bankruptcy professionals and provide 
the opportunity for attorneys to participate in focus groups who were not 
members of ABI, NACBA, or another professional bankruptcy organization.   
 
 The focus group participants were selected by a method known as 
“purposive” or “theoretical” sampling.91 The participants were not randomly 
identified, but were invited because they were “information rich,” and 
offered useful, yet varied experiences of working within the system being 
studied.92  Each focus group was homogenous by professional role. For 
example, focus groups were comprised entirely of debtors’ counsel, or 
Chapter 13 Trustees, or Chapter 7 Trustees, or bankruptcy judges, or U.S. 
Trustees; there was no integration of professionals holding different 
positions in a single focus group.  This homogeneity within each group 
allowed for unrestrained conversations among participants while also 
facilitating later analyses that revealed differences in perspective between 
segmented groups.93 
 
 In each of these focus group interviews, the same series of non-
directed, open-ended questions and the same series of issues were 
raised.94 The issues raised in the focus groups informed many of the 
questions in the surveys. 
                         
86 American Consumer Bankruptcy College meeting, Las Vegas, Nev., Sept. 23, 2010.    
87 National Association of Bankruptcy Trustees Conference, Savannah, Ga., Apr. 10, 2010.  
88 National Association of Chapter 13 Trustees Conference, Grapevine, Tex., July 15, 2010.  
89 National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, New Orleans, La., Oct. 13, 2010.  
90 Focus Group of U.S. Trustees, Washington, D.C., May, 3, 2011.  
91 Morgan, supra note 81, at 35. 
92 Marshall, supra note 76, at 523 (“Qualitative researchers recognize that some informants are 
'richer' than others and that these people are more likely to provide insight and understanding for 
the researcher. Choosing someone at random to answer a qualitative question would be 
analogous to randomly asking a passer-by how to repair a broken down car, rather than asking a 
garage mechanic—the former might have a good stab, but asking the latter is likely to be more 
productive.”)  
93 Morgan, supra note 81, at 35. 
94 See infra Appendix I.  
 
 
28 
 
 b. Survey Instruments 
 
 One purpose of a survey is to provide statistical estimates of the 
characteristics of a target population.95 Surveys can also be used to 
gather generalized and subjective information from and about a cohort of 
people in an effort to elicit information about an event or a program. 
The Study surveys were not strict probability sample surveys but were 
designed to gather descriptive and impressionistic data from a broad 
group of stakeholders so that patterns, themes, and trends would emerge.  
As part of the Study’s qualitative data collection effort, four separate 
survey instruments were crafted, tailored, and administered to four 
different professional cohorts: (i) consumer debtors’ attorneys; (ii) 
Standing Chapter 13 Trustees; (iii) Chapter 7 Panel Trustees; and (iv) 
bankruptcy judges.   
  
 The sample frame used for each surveyed cohort depended upon 
its respective characteristics and size.  With respect to Standing Chapter 
13 Trustees, Chapter 7 Panel Trustees, and bankruptcy judges, the 
sample frame was the finite universe of all members of each respective 
group. We compiled a list of individuals in each group and sent survey 
requests to each person.96  Our response rate was 48% for Standing 
Chapter 13 Trustees, 23% for Chapter 7 Panel Trustees, and 29% for 
bankruptcy judges.97  
  
 With respect to the sample of debtors’ attorneys, our objective was 
to survey as geographically, culturally, and economically diverse a 
population as possible.  We ultimately decided on a multi-prong 
approach, accessing the cohort through multiple entry points, including 
the use of membership lists from professional organizations, website 
                         
95 FLOYD J. FOWLER, JR., SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS 11 (4th ed. 2009). 
96 We developed our list of Standing Chapter 13 Trustees from the Department of Justice’s 
website. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, U.S. Trustee Program, Private Trustee Information, 
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/private_trustee/locator/13.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2011). We 
developed our list of Bankruptcy Judges from ABI’s membership list and from individual court 
websites. Our list of Chapter 7 Panel Trustees was collected from the Department of Justice’s 
website. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, U.S. Trustee Program, Private Trustee Information, 
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/private_trustee/locator/7.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).    
97 Chapter 13 Trustee Survey (data on file with Principal Investigator); Chapter 7 Trustee Survey 
(data on file with Principal Investigator);  Bankruptcy Judges Survey (data on file with Principal 
Investigator).  
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advertising, and “chain referrals.”98 In the end, we developed a pool of 
1,923 potential debtors’ counsel survey respondents.  The response rate 
was 25%.99 
 
 The survey instruments were prepared using the online survey 
development and administration tool, SurveyMonkey.100 There was ample 
opportunity provided for open-ended answers or elaboration of answers 
to multiple-choice questions.  In this way, the survey instruments tracked 
many of the open-ended questions, prompts, and issues raised in the 
focus group interviews.    
 
 c. One-on-one In-Person, Telephone, and E-mail Exchanges 
 
 In addition to the focus group interviews and survey instrument 
administration, data was gathered from dozens of one-on-one in-person 
and telephone interviews and e-mail exchanges with bankruptcy 
professionals practicing and serving around the country.  These interviews 
and correspondence exchanges offered us the opportunity to ask follow-
up questions that emerged from the qualitative data, as well as to build 
on concepts and themes that surfaced as the Study progressed.   
 
 d. Analysis of Qualitative Data 
  
 Initially, the raw qualitative data was in the form of focus groups 
and individual interview transcripts, open-ended survey response 
narratives, and e-mail exchanges. The analytical process involved the 
identification of key words, phrases, and concepts in the raw data. Once 
such key words, phrases, and concepts were identified, the data was 
coded and categorized. We used NVivo social science research software 
to facilitate the data analysis. NVivo enabled us to efficiently classify, 
sort, and arrange reams of relatively unstructured information.  This in 
turn allowed us to target and spotlight key patterns and themes that ran 
through and across the data.101 
                         
98 “Chain referral sampling” is where respondent groups grow through referrals from others in the 
group.  PATTON, supra note 10, at 237. 
99 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
100 See infra Appendix I.    
101 See QSR INTERNATIONAL, http://www.qsrinternational.com/products_nvivo.aspx, for a further 
description of the NVivo product.  
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 3.  Study Limitations 
 
 Every empirical study has inherent limitations, including constraints 
associated with time, money, personnel, tools, and techniques.  This 
Study presents some noteworthy limitations that readers and future 
researchers may want to consider when interpreting and working with this 
Report and its databases.  
 
 With respect to the Study’s quantitative data, our total sample size 
was calculated with the objective of drawing inferences about the 
population as a whole with a reasonable level of confidence.  The data 
set, however, was divided into segments in order to answer many of the 
Study’s fundamental questions.  For example, since one of the Study’s 
objectives was to compare the effects of variables in cases filed before 
BAPCPA’s enactment with cases filed after, the entire sample was divided 
into two subsets based on the date each case was filed.  Further, 
Chapter 7 cases were segmented into “asset” and “no-asset” cases, and 
for some queries, cases were divided into groups of discharged, open, 
converted, or dismissed cases.  Moreover, descriptive queries about 
attorney fees were conducted at the national, as well as at the circuit, 
state, and district level.  When the data was partitioned in this way, the 
size of each sub-sample of cases (e.g., the sample of dismissed post-
BAPCPA Chapter 13 cases in the Eastern District of Missouri) was not 
always sufficient to draw a reliable inference about the sub-population as 
a whole (e.g., all dismissed post-BAPCPA Chapter 13 cases in the Eastern 
District of Missouri). Thus, if future researchers use larger sub-samples to 
answer narrower research questions, their results may diverge from the 
Study results. 
 
 What is more, the data from post-BAPCPA cases was gathered from 
cases filed immediately and within a few years of the date of BAPCPA’s 
enactment.  It may be the case that if the Study were replicated in a few 
years, after the period of adjustment has passed, both the quantitative 
and qualitative analysis and results would look very different.  Moreover, 
many of the questions studied for purposes of this Report were in the 
context of discharged cases.  Because a Chapter 13 case takes as long 
as five years to reach discharge, it is possible that Chapter 13 cases 
filed post-BAPCPA that reached discharge in years after 2009 may be 
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different, in any number of ways, than the cases we studied (filed from 
October 17, 2005 through December 31, 2009).    
 
 Missing data was also an issue with the quantitative database.  As 
we relied on electronic data accessible via PACER, we were limited by 
when each district’s PACER system was operational.  In some jurisdictions 
PACER was not fully operational until BAPCPA’s effective date.102  In some 
instances, this limitation accounted for small numbers of observations in 
some jurisdictions.103 
  
 There are also limitations associated with respect to qualitative 
data collection. First, there are obvious issues with respect to self-
reported surveys. Respondents may not accurately self-report, and there 
is no way to measure the degree of intentional deception, poor memory, 
                         
102 In those districts that did not have all records available online for 2003 and 2004, we found 
that generally we were able to access Chapter 13 filings for earlier years than Chapter 7 filings. 
For example, we were unable to access Chapter 13 cases filed in 2003 from: Alaska, Middle 
District of Alabama, Northern District of Alabama, Southern District of Alabama, District of 
Columbia, Northern District of Illinois, Southern District of Mississippi, Southern District of Ohio, 
Eastern District of Tennessee, and Eastern District of Wisconsin.  For Chapter 13 cases filed in 
2004, we were unable to access cases filed in: Eastern District of Arkansas, Western District of 
Arkansas, Southern District of Mississippi, Eastern District of Tennessee, and Northern District of 
Texas. For Chapter 7 cases filed in 2003, we were unable to access cases from: Northern District 
of Alabama, Arizona, Central District of California, Northern District of California, Connecticut, 
Northern District of Georgia, Central District of Illinois, Middle District of Louisiana, Eastern District 
of Michigan, Southern District if Mississippi, Eastern District of Tennessee, Middle District of 
Tennessee, Western District of Tennessee, Western District of Virginia, Vermont, and Eastern 
District of Wisconsin. Additionally, we were unable to access Chapter 7 cases from 2004 filed in: 
Western District of Arkansas, Eastern District of California, Southern District of Georgia, Eastern 
District of Michigan, Southern District of Mississippi, Eastern District of Tennessee, Eastern District 
of Texas, Northern District of Texas, and Vermont.  Fortunately, all but a handful of districts were 
online in early 2005 and those remaining districts came online during 2005. All districts had all 
documents available online as of BAPCPA’s enactment date. Despite the inability to access earlier 
case files in some districts, we were able to collect data from both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 
cases from every district in the Study for the pre-BAPCPA time period.  
103 For example, our goal was to examine a total of six Chapter 7 cases from the Western District 
of Virginia for 2003, 2004, and pre-BAPCPA 2005. Because of the inability to access the cases 
filed before mid-2004, we were only able to code two Chapter 7 cases pre-BAPCPA in that district.  
A similar situation arose in Vermont where we were only able to examine three Chapter 7 cases 
and our goal was to examine six. For Chapter 13 pre-BAPCPA, only the Southern District of 
Mississippi, Idaho, and Wyoming posed problems that resulted in a small number of observations.  
In the Southern District of Mississippi, we sought to examine five cases but were only able to 
examine two. In Idaho, we examined three cases and our goal was four. In Wyoming, our goal was 
to examine three cases but we were only able to examine two.  These small numbers of 
observations can be attributed to a combination of the inability to access older case files and 
relatively few filings in those districts—which in turn sets a low goal number for a district.  
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or misunderstanding of questions.  With respect to focus group interviews, 
there is always the risk that participants, in relaying experiences and 
perspectives, sacrifice accuracy or thoroughness for a version of an 
experience that offers higher entertainment value. There is also the 
chance that “group-think” takes over the assemblage’s discussion, thus 
suppressing the views of a minority of members. 
 
 These limitations however can be addressed by engaging in close 
textual analysis of open-ended survey responses and interview transcripts, 
thus allowing for patterns of information to emerge.  In this way, the 
researcher can focus on key analytic ideas and emergent attitudes rather 
than merely on a transcription of the literal.   
 
 Moreover, the data gathered from our sample of survey 
respondents, interview subjects, and focus group participants reflects the 
individual professional’s perspectives and experiences.  As noted, we did 
not endeavor to develop a random sample that would be representative 
of the population as a whole.  While we know that we studied a diverse 
sample, there may be perspectives and experiences that differ in 
important ways that we were not able to capture. The inability to extend 
findings to wider populations with the same degree of certainty as 
quantitative analysis is always a disadvantage of qualitative research.  It 
is the only way, however, to provide a complete, detailed description of a 
system in action.  
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B. Descriptive Statistics 
  
 As previously described, our sample consisted of 0.12% of the 
population of cases filed from each of 90 districts, in proportion to the 
number of filings during that period. This resulted in a database of 
11,221 cases.  Of those cases, 3,871 were Chapter 13 cases.  Of the 
Chapter 13 cases, 1,814 were discharged, 1,304 were dismissed, and 753 
were open.  Converted cases were captured in the Chapter 7 data.  With 
respect to cases filed under Chapter 7, there were 7,350 cases; 6,603 
no-asset cases, and 747 in which there were assets available for 
liquidation and distribution.  Both the numbers of asset and no-asset 
cases include cases that were converted from Chapter 13. 
 
 
 1. Chapter 13 Cases 
 
 The chart below shows the distribution of cases in the sample filed 
under Chapter 13 by circuit.    
 
 
Table 1. Distribution of Cases in the Sample Filed Under Chapter 13 by Circuit 
 Pre-BAPCPA Post-BAPCPA 
Circuit Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
1 89 6.1% 63 2.7% 
2 56 3.8% 87 3.7% 
3 107 7.3% 128 5.4% 
4 142 9.7% 229 9.7% 
5 178 12.1% 244 10.3% 
6 173 11.8% 383 16.2% 
7 126 8.6% 223 9.4% 
8 100 6.8% 169 7.1% 
9 195 13.3% 295 12.5% 
10 75 5.1% 111 4.7% 
11 224 15.3% 424 17.9% 
D.C. 3 0.2% 8 0.3% 
 
 
 With respect to the pre-BAPCPA Chapter 13 cases studied, 54.9% 
were discharged, 42.2% were dismissed and 2.9% were open.  Of the 
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post-BAPCPA cases examined, 41.5% were discharged, 28.7% were 
dismissed, and 29.9% remained open.  The high rate of post-BAPCPA 
open cases is a consequence of the timing of the commencement of the 
Study; we began our data collection in early 2010, and thus there was 
insufficient time from BAPCPA’s effective date for many of the post-
BAPCPA filed cases to come to their eventual disposition. 
 
 We examined the Total Direct Access Costs (“TDAC”) for Chapter 
13 cases filed pre-BAPCPA, and compared them to the costs of filing 
comparable cases post-BAPCPA.  TDAC were defined to include: (i) 
debtors’ attorney fees and expenses, (iii) filing fees, (iv) credit counseling 
course fees and, (v) debtor education course fees.104  As noted, BAPCPA 
affected filing fees, and each consumer debtor is now required to pay for 
two financial management and education courses.105  While we added $50 
each for these courses when we calculated the TDAC in the Pilot Study, 
due to competition in the consumer education market, fees for these 
courses have declined.106  As such, to calculate TDAC in this Study, $85 
was added for both mandatory courses to each debtor’s case.107 There 
was a 24% increase in TDAC for Chapter 13 cases that were 
dismissed.108 
 
 
 
 
                         
104 The definition of Total Direct Access Costs in the Pilot Study differs from the definition of 
Total Direct Access Costs in this Study. We determined that the inclusion of Trustee fees in Total 
Direct Access Costs was not helpful as Trustee fees were more reflective of distributions than out-
of-pocket costs to debtors.  
105 Before 10/31/03, the fee for filing a Chapter 13 case was $185.  From 11/1/03 to BAPCPA’s 
enactment date, the filing fee was $194. BAPCPA temporarily lowered the fee to $189, but the fee 
was raised again to $274 on 4/9/06. The filing fees for Chapter 13 cases increased again on 
November 1, 2011 to $281. 28 U.S.C. § 1930; Memorandum from the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts to the Judges United States Bankruptcy Courts, Clerks, United States 
Bankruptcy Courts (Sept. 27, 2005) available at 
http://vaeb.uscourts.gov/files/new_fees_20050927.pdf. 
106 Focus Group of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (Feb. 11, 2011) (transcript on file with principal 
investigator).  
107 As the majority of the credit counseling and debtor education services are online or via 
telephone, a uniform fee could be applied nationally. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, APPROVED CREDIT 
COUNSELING AGENCIES, http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/ccde/cc_approved.htm (last visited Nov. 
21, 2011).  
108 The statistical significance of our findings is set forth in Appendix II, Table A – 1.   
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Figure 1. Mean Total Direct Access Costs in Dismissed Chapter 13 Cases 
 
  
 These national numbers, however, only offer a glimpse of the 
narrative about how and how much debtors’ counsel receive when a 
Chapter 13 case is dismissed prior to discharge.  The dollar amount not 
only varies greatly by district but also by individual case.109  Typically, the 
dollar amount is capped by the amount the lawyer has received and the 
amount the Trustee has on hand at the time of dismissal. As discussed 
below, this amount ranges from “nothing” to the entire amount the lawyer 
charged.110  Whether or not the case is dismissed pre- or post-
confirmation also impacts the fee received by the attorney.111  
 
 The single largest variable included in Total Direct Access Costs is 
attorney fees.  With respect to cases that were dismissed prior to 
discharge, attorney fees increased 18% post-BAPCPA, from $1,262 at the 
mean, to $1,491 at the mean. 
                         
109 See infra Appendix V. 
110 See supra notes 284–289 and accompanying text.  
111 Id. 
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Figure 2. Mean Attorney Fee in Dismissed Chapter 13 Cases 
 
  
 
 In inflation adjusted 2005 dollars, there was a 27% increase in 
Total Direct Access Costs in discharged Chapter 13 cases filed post-
BAPCPA.  
 
 
Figure 3. Mean Total Direct Access Costs in Discharged Chapter 13 Cases 
 
 
 Attorney fees in discharged Chapter 13 cases also increased post-
BAPCPA.  The national pre-BAPCPA mean of $2,061 increased to $2,564 
post-BAPCPA—a jump of 24%.   
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Figure 4. Mean Attorney Fee in Discharged Chapter 13 Cases 
 
 
 
 While the degree of increase at the national level is significant, it 
tells only part of the story.  Only when fees are examined at the circuit, 
state, and district levels does a full picture of BAPCPA’s impact of 
attorney fees emerge.  
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 Map 1 reveals considerable variation in pre-BAPCPA fees received 
by attorneys in Chapter 13 discharged cases by geographic region.  The 
highest fees were found in the First Circuit, followed by the Ninth 
Circuit.112  The lowest fees during the pre-BAPCPA period were in the Mid-
Atlantic and Mid-West regions (Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits).  Average 
fees ranged from $1,636 (Sixth Circuit) to $3,151 (First Circuit).  A 
comprehensive table of mean attorney fees by circuit in discharged 
Chapter 13 cases is found at Table A - 16 in Appendix V. 
 
 
Map 1. Mean Pre-BAPCPA Attorney Fee in Discharged Chapter 13 Cases by Circuit 
 
                         
112 The D.C. Circuit fees were the lowest nationally, but the sample size of discharged non-pro 
bono Chapter 13 cases was too limited to meaningfully compare the mean to the mean fee in 
other circuits. 
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 The fees charged in Chapter 13 discharged cases, post-BAPCPA, 
followed a similar geographic pattern.  Again, the highest mean fees were 
in the First Circuit, followed by the Ninth.  Attorneys in the Eighth Circuit 
received the lowest fees.  Post-BAPCPA, mean fees by circuit were more 
compressed than they were pre-BAPCPA: they ranged from $2,150 to 
$3,349.113 
 
 
Map 2. Mean Post-BAPCPA Attorney Fee in Discharged Chapter 13 Cases by 
Circuit 
 
                         
113 See infra Table A - 16 in Appendix V for comprehensive table of mean attorney fees by 
judicial circuit. 
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 When the difference in fees received in discharged Chapter 13 
cases was calculated by circuit, the largest difference in mean was found 
in the Fourth Circuit (58%), followed by the Third (47%) and Sixth Circuits 
(45%).114 The most modest increase was found in the First Circuit (6%); 
the circuit that had the largest pre- and post-BAPCPA fees.  Table A - 16 
in Appendix V sets forth the percentage increase in mean attorney fees 
each circuit. 
 
 
Map 3. Percentage Post-BAPCPA Increase in Mean Pre-BAPCPA Attorney Fee in 
Discharged Chapter 13 Cases by Circuit 
 
  
                         
114 The D.C. Circuit’s difference was 61%, but again, the sample of cases examined was too 
limited for the mean fee to be meaningfully compared to the mean fee in the other circuits.  
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 The data became more interesting and arguably more meaningful 
when we examined it at the state level. For the pre-BAPCPA period, the 
highest fees were found in Maine and New Hampshire ($3,711 and 
$3,373, respectively).  The lowest were found in Wisconsin, Mississippi, 
Iowa, and Idaho (ranging from $1,273 to $1,391). 
 
 
Map 4. Mean Pre-BAPCPA Attorney Fee in Discharged Chapter 13 Cases by State 
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 Post-BAPCPA, the highest mean fees were in Maine, Nevada, and 
New Hampshire ($4,950, $4,335, and $4,294, respectively).  North Dakota 
had the lowest mean fee ($1,560).  By state, the majority of fee averages 
were between $2,000 and $3,000.  
 
 
Map 5. Mean Post-BAPCPA Attorney Fee in Discharged Chapter 13 Cases by State 
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 When we looked at the increase in fees as a percentage of the 
mean pre-BAPCPA fee by state, we found the most severe change to be 
in Idaho (a 115% increase), followed by Maryland (an 87% increase), 
Kentucky (an 87% increase), and Nevada (an 85% increase).  The only 
jurisdictions that registered decreases in fees were Wyoming and 
Alaska.115  Of states that saw an increase in mean fee, the most modest 
increases were in Massachusetts (1%), Montana (2%), Rhode Island (2%), 
Oklahoma (4%), North Dakota (6%), Minnesota (7%), and Kansas (10%). 
 
 
Map 6. Percentage Post-BAPCPA Increase in Mean Pre-BAPCPA Attorney Fee in 
Discharged Chapter 13 Cases by State 
 
                         
115 The samples for Wyoming and Alaska were small relative to the samples studied in other 
jurisdictions due to a low number of Chapter 13 cases filed.   
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 The story grows in complexity when viewed at the district level.  
Again, because Maine and New Hampshire are single district states, it 
was no surprise that for the pre-BAPCPA period they again led the field 
with the highest mean attorney fees. The Western District of Wisconsin 
had the lowest mean fees ($859), followed by the Eastern District of 
Kentucky ($945), the Southern District of West Virginia ($1,121), the 
Western District of Virginia ($1,140), the Western District of New York 
($1,168), and the Eastern District of Tennessee ($1,179). 
 
 
Map 7. Mean Pre-BAPCPA Attorney Fee in Discharged Chapter 13 Cases by 
District 
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 Post-BAPCPA, the single district states of Maine, Nevada, and New 
Hampshire again had the highest mean attorney fees in Chapter 13 
cases.  The districts with the lowest fees, post-BAPCPA, were the 
Southern District of West Virginia ($1,262) and the Western District of 
Wisconsin ($1,451). Appendix V, Table A - 18 sets forth in detail, each 
judicial district’s mean fee. 
 
 
Map 8. Mean Post-BAPCPA Attorney Fee in Discharged Chapter 13 Cases by 
District 
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 Map 9, illustrating the percentage change between the two time 
periods by district, reveals the most acute differences in the Eastern 
District of Kentucky (153%), the Northern District of West Virginia (118%), 
the District of Idaho (115%), and the Northern District of Iowa (107%). 
The District of Alaska and the District of Wyoming’s mean fees 
decreased.116 Of those districts who saw an increase in the mean fee, the 
most minor increases were in the District of Massachusetts (1%), the 
District of Montana (2%), the Northern District of Oklahoma (2%), the 
District of Rhode Island (2%), the Northern District of Alabama (3%), the 
Southern District of Iowa (3%), the Western District of North Carolina 
(3%), the Central District of California (4%), and the Western District of 
Missouri (4%).  
 
                         
116 Again, samples for Wyoming and Alaska were small relative to the samples studied in other 
jurisdictions due to a low number of Chapter 13 cases filed.   
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Map 9. Percentage Post-BAPCPA Increase in Mean Pre-BAPCPA Attorney Fee in 
Discharged Chapter 13 Cases by District 
 
 2. Chapter 7 Cases 
 
 Table 2 below shows the distribution of cases in the sample filed 
under Chapter 7 by circuit, broken down by asset and no-asset cases.  
 
 
Table 2. Distribution of Cases in the Sample Filed Under Chapter 7 by Circuit117 
Circuit Pre-BAPCPA Post-BAPCPA 
 Asset No-Asset Asset No-Asset 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
1 7 1.7% 113 3.0% 7 2.1% 84 3.0% 
2 15 3.6% 284 7.6% 22 6.6% 171 6.1% 
3 15 3.6% 233 6.2% 11 3.3% 163 5.8% 
4 22 5.3% 333 8.9% 26 7.8% 210 7.5% 
5 31 7.5% 276 7.4% 17 5.1% 134 4.8% 
                         
117 The percentage column reflects the percentages of the total cases of that type (e.g. pre-
BAPCPA asset cases) studied in each circuit.    
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6 77 18.6% 526 14.1% 54 16.2% 400 14.2% 
7 54 13.0% 478 12.8% 47 14.1% 320 11.4% 
8 39 9.4% 269 7.2% 18 5.4% 220 7.8% 
9 58 14.0% 593 15.9% 60 18.0% 571 20.3% 
10 47 11.4% 335 9.0% 39 11.7% 161 5.7% 
11 49 11.8% 290 7.8% 32 9.6% 377 13.4% 
D.C. 0 0.0% 7 0.2% 0 0.0% 5 0.2% 
 
 With respect to the pre-BAPCPA Chapter 7 cases studied, 9.9% 
were asset cases and 90.1% were no-asset cases. Of the cases filed pre-
BAPCPA in the sample, 92.5% of all asset cases and 98.8% of all no-
asset cases concluded in a discharge.  Of the post-BAPCPA Chapter 7 
cases examined, 10.6% were asset cases, and 89.4% were no-asset 
cases. Of these cases, 95.8% of asset cases, and 97.2% of no-asset 
cases ended with a discharge.118  
 
 We examined the Total Direct Access Costs (“TDAC”) for Chapter 7 
cases filed pre-BAPCPA, and post-BAPCPA.  TDAC were defined to include: 
(i) debtors’ attorney fees and expenses, (iii) filing fees, (iv) credit 
counseling course fees and, (v) debtor education course fees.  As noted 
above, filing fees increased from $209 pre-BAPCPA to $274 post-BAPCPA, 
and each debtor became obligated for the cost of mandated credit 
counseling and debtor education courses.119 In inflation adjusted 2005 
dollars, there was a 37% increase in TDAC in discharged Chapter 7 asset 
cases filed post-BAPCPA.   
 
 
                         
118 See infra Appendix III. 
119 Before 10/31/03, the fee for filing a Chapter 7 case was $200.  From 11/1/03 to BAPCPA’s 
enactment date, the filing fee was $209. With BAPCPA’s enactment the fee was raised to $274. 
The fee was raised to $299 on 4/9/06. The filing fees for Chapter 7 cases increased again on 
November 1, 2011 to $306. See 28 U.S.C. § 1930; Memorandum from the Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts to the Judges of the United States Bankruptcy Courts, Clerks of the 
United States Bankruptcy Courts (Sept. 27, 2005) available at  
http://vaeb.uscourts.gov/files/new_fees_20050927.pdf. 
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Figure 5. Mean Total Direct Access Costs in Discharged Chapter 7 Asset Cases 
 
  
 With respect to no-asset Chapter 7 cases, TDAC increased 51%: 
from $868 pre-BAPCPA to $1,309 post-BAPCPA. 
 
Figure 6. Mean Total Direct Access Costs in Discharged Chapter 7 No-Asset Cases 
 
  
 Attorney fees, in both asset and no-asset Chapter 7 cases, were 
the largest piece of the total cost of access. In Chapter 7 asset cases, 
the mean attorney fee rose from $821 to $1,072—a 30% increase.  
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Figure 7. Mean Attorney Fee in Discharged Chapter 7 Asset Cases 
 
 
 In no-asset cases, mean attorney fees increased 48%, from $654 
to $968.120   
 
Figure 8. Mean Attorney Fee in Discharged Chapter 7 No-Asset Cases 
 
 
 As is the case with the Chapter 13 attorney fee data, these 
nationally aggregated mean numbers only tell part of the story.  The 
attorney fees received in Chapter 7 no-asset cases significantly varied 
when examined at the circuit, state and district levels.  With respect to 
                         
120 With respect to no-asset Chapter 7 cases, in some districts, attorneys agreed with their clients 
to take a portion of their fee upfront, and receive the balance post-petition.  In those infrequent 
instances, we only recorded the pre-petition fee actually received by the debtor as there was no 
way to verify if the balance of the fee was actually paid post-petition. 
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pre-BAPCPA circuit level data, the highest fees in no-asset cases are 
found in the First, Third, and Fifth Circuits.  
 
Map 10. Mean Pre-BAPCPA Attorney Fee in Discharged No-Asset Chapter 7 Cases 
by Circuit 
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 Post-BAPCPA, the highest fees are again found in the Fifth and 
Ninth Circuits. At the mean, the fees received in Chapter 7 no-asset 
cases in these circuits exceeded $1,150. The fees in the Sixth Circuit 
were the lowest—$808 at the mean.  
 
 
Map 11. Mean Post-BAPCPA Attorney Fee in Discharged No-Asset Chapter 7 Cases 
by Circuit 
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 When we compared the Chapter 7 no-asset case mean fee 
received pre-BAPCPA to the mean fee in comparable cases received post-
BAPCPA, the largest divergence was found in the Ninth Circuit—a 
difference of almost 70%. The smallest difference was in the Seventh 
Circuit, but the increase was still significant at 27%.121 A comprehensive 
table of mean attorney fees pre- and post-BAPCPA and percentage 
difference by judicial circuit is found in Appendix V.  
 
 
Map 12. Percentage Post-BAPCPA Increase in Mean Pre-BAPCPA Attorney Fee in 
Discharged No-Asset Chapter 7 Cases by Circuit  
 
 
  
                         
121 The D.C. Circuit difference was 70% but the sample size was too limited to allow reasonable 
inferences to be drawn.  
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 At the state level, the distinctions in cost are even more severe. 
The highest mean Chapter 7 fees pre-BAPCPA were in Alaska, Texas, 
Massachusetts, and Arizona.122 The lowest mean pre-BAPCPA fees were 
found in Utah ($396), Tennessee ($473), and Washington ($484).  
 
Map 13. Mean Pre-BAPCPA Attorney Fee in Discharged No-Asset Chapter 7 Cases 
by State 
 
 
 
  
                         
122 The pre-BAPCPA sample from Alaska consisted of five Chapter 7 Cases. The sample size is too 
limited to meaningfully compare it to the fee means in other states.  
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 The highest average post-BAPCPA fees by state were found in 
Arizona ($1,530), Texas ($1,314), Alaska ($1,298), Montana ($1,282), 
Minnesota ($1,268), South Dakota ($1,238), and Florida ($1,223). The 
states with the lowest average fees were Idaho ($692), Arkansas ($698), 
Kentucky ($749), Washington ($702), Utah ($714), and Vermont ($781).  
 
 
Map 14. Mean Post-BAPCPA Attorney Fee in Discharged No-Asset Chapter 7 Cases 
by State 
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 The largest post-BAPCPA percentage increases in mean attorney 
fees in Chapter 7 no-asset cases were found in Montana (90%), Virginia 
(87%), Oregon (85%), Mississippi (82%), Tennessee (81%), and Utah 
(80%). The states with the smallest percentage increase were Vermont 
(10%), Arkansas (11%), and Illinois (16%).   
 
 
Map 15. Percentage Post-BAPCPA Increase in Mean Pre-BAPCPA Attorney Fee in 
Discharged No-Asset Chapter 7 Cases by State  
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 At the district level, the variation in mean fees is most dramatic. 
The highest mean pre-BAPCPA fees in Chapter 7 no-asset cases were in 
the District of Alaska ($1,470),123 the Northern District Texas ($1,018), the 
Western District of North Carolina ($1,008), the Northern District of 
Illinois, ($946), and the District of Massachusetts ($956).124 The mean fees 
in the Middle District of Tennessee ($356), the District of Utah ($396), the 
Eastern District of Washington ($400), the Central District of Illinois 
($410), the Southern District of Mississippi ($443), and the Western 
District of Tennessee ($468), were the lowest. 
 
                         
123 Again, the pre-BAPCPA sample from Alaska consisted of five Chapter 7 Cases. The sample size 
is too limited to meaningfully compare it to the fee means in other states. 
124 Because the Southern District of Florida went online with PACER on October 16, 2005, we were 
only able to capture data for pre-BAPCPA cases filed that day.  Based on that limited data, the 
mean pre-BAPCPA attorney fee for Southern District of Florida was $1,920.  
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Map 16. Mean Pre-BAPCPA Attorney Fee in Discharged No-Asset Chapter 7 Cases 
by District  
 
 Post-BAPCPA, the Southern District of Georgia ($1,581), the District 
of Arizona ($1,530), the Southern District of California ($1,514), and the 
Northern District of Texas ($1,419) had the highest mean fees in Chapter 
7 cases. The smallest mean fees were found in the Eastern District of 
Washington ($538), the Northern District of Oklahoma ($607), the 
Southern District of Alabama ($678), the Middle District of Tennessee 
($680), and the Southern District of West Virginia ($688). 
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Map 17. Mean Post-BAPCPA Attorney Fee in Discharged No-Asset Chapter 7 Cases 
by District 
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 Finally, the “percentage increase” district map reveals that the 
Southern District of Georgia (122%) and the Eastern District of Virginia 
(101%) had post-BAPCPA percentage increases in mean attorney fee 
exceeding 100%.  The lowest percentage increases were found in the 
Eastern District of Arkansas (2%), the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(3%), and the Middle District of North Carolina (7%).125  
 
 
Map 18. Percentage Post-BAPCPA Increase in Mean Pre-BAPCPA Attorney Fee in 
Discharged No-Asset Chapter 7 Cases by District 
 
 
 
  
                         
125 See infra Appendix V, Tables A - 21, A – 22, A – 23 for complete Chapter 7 no-asset attorney 
fees.  
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We further found that fees in no-asset Chapter 7 cases that were 
converted from Chapter 13 are considerably higher than in those cases 
that are originally filed as Chapter 7s.  For example, pre-BAPCPA the 
inflation adjusted mean attorney fee was $1,394 (compared to $653 for a 
comparable discharged case that was originally filed as a Chapter 7 
case).  Post-BAPCPA, the mean fee for a discharged case that had been 
converted from Chapter 13 was $1,655 (compared to $968 for a case 
originally filed under Chapter 7).126   
 
 
Figure 9.  Mean Attorney Fee in No-Asset Discharged Chapter 7 Converted Cases 
Compared to No-Asset Discharged Chapter 7 Cases 
 
  
 3. Fee Trends Across Practice Areas 
 
 The Study’s quantitative data detail the mean dollar amounts 
received by lawyers in individual consumer bankruptcy cases. The data do 
not tell us, however, how much each attorney earns across cases, nor 
account for differences in experience, firm size, or other variables. 
  
 Additionally, the data do not tell us the relative degree increases in 
recent years compared to lawyers in other practice areas. Moreover, as 
noted, in contrast to many other legal specialists, consumer bankruptcy 
lawyers typically charge a “flat fee” per case, rather than an hourly rate. 
                         
126 See infra Appendix III, Table A – 10.  
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This difference in billing practice makes it difficult to place fee trends in 
the consumer bankruptcy market within the greater context of attorney 
billing trends generally. A few observations, however, can be made.  
 
 ALM Legal Intelligence conducts an annual Survey of Law Firm 
Economics (“SLFE”). The 2009 Survey focused on the billing practice of 
attorneys in private sector law practice across the country, including a 
trend comparison of average billing rates in law firms for “senior 
partners” and fifth year associates. 127 According to the SLFE, from 2003 
to 2009, hourly billing rates for senior partners increased 26%.128  For 
fifth year associates, the percentage increase was 15%.129 While it 
appears that attorney fees have generally increased during the Study’s 
time frame, our models demonstrate that a specific degree of increase is 
a direct function of “BAPCPA effects.” A discussion of the regression 
modeling and findings is found in Part IV.D. 
 
 
 4.  Pro se Cases in Chapter 13 and in Chapter 7  
  
 The increase in costs of bankruptcy access lead us to question 
whether debtors were less likely to engage an attorney and more likely 
to file their case pro se, or whether the system had become too 
complicated for debtors to even try to represent themselves.130  
 
 The data reveal that the number Chapter 13 cases (discharged, 
dismissed, open) filed pro se was quite low both pre-BAPCPA (3%) and 
post-BAPCPA (2%).  The rates are even lower when the pro se cases that 
                         
127 ALM LEGAL INTELLIGENCE, THE SURVEY OF LAW FIRM ECONOMICS 2009 EDITION (July 2009).  
128 Id. at 5, 82. The statistics presented in this report represent “broad performance benchmarks 
against which an individual firm can be measured.” Id. at 5. Senior partners are defined as 25th 
to 29th year partner/shareholders. Id. at 82. It is not clear whether the SLFE data uses inflation-
adjusted dollars.  
129 Id. at 82.  
130 One scholar predicted that the number of pro se debtors filing for bankruptcy protection would 
decline following BAPCPA’s enactment. A. Mechele Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy Reform, 
71 MO. L. REV. 919, 951 n.181 (2006) (“There were very few pro se filers pre-BAPCPA and that 
number will likely decrease since bankruptcy petitions and schedules are even longer and more 
detailed than they were under the pre-reform law, and the means testing formula is almost 
undecipherable.”). Professor Rafael Pardo in his single district 2008 study had similar findings. 
Pardo, supra note 15, at 17 n.60. The difference in methodology and sample used make it 
difficult to compare and reconcile results across samples.  
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Figure 11. Post-BAPCPA Chapter 13 
Discharged Cases Filed Pro Se : 0.8% 
resulted in a discharge are isolated: 1.5% of all Chapter 13 cases filed 
pre-BAPCPA and 0.8% of all Chapter 13 cases filed post-BAPCPA  that 
ended the debtor receiving a discharge were filed pro se and received 
discharge.  The number of dismissed Chapter 13 cases that were 
originally filed pro se was higher: 5% pre-BAPCPA and 5.9% post-
BAPCPA.131 
 
 Further, we found that during the pre-BAPCPA period 40% of 
Chapter 13 pro se cases were filed with the aid of a petition preparer.  
Post-BAPCPA, 100% of pro se cases were filed under Chapter 13 with a 
petition preparer’s assistance.  Not one of the post-BAPCPA cases filed 
with the assistance of a petition preparer ended in the debtor receiving a 
discharge.132  Average petition preparer fees for Chapter 13 petitions were 
$204 pre-BAPCPA and $164 post-BAPCPA (in inflation adjusted 2005 
dollars).133   
 
 
 We found a decrease in the rate of pro se filings post-BAPCPA, 
compared to pre-BAPCPA in Chapter 7 cases.  With respect to all Chapter 
7 cases (asset and no-asset), 7.4% of cases were filed pro se pre-
BAPCPA, compared to 5.8% post-BAPCPA.134  The rate is slightly higher 
                         
131 See infra Appendix II, Tables A – 2, A – 3.  
132 The sample analyzed in this instance was too small to allow any meaningful inferences to be 
drawn. 
133 The sample analyzed was too small to allow any meaningful inferences to be drawn. 
134 The CBP data reveals a 2007 Chapter 7 pro se rate, for the five districts surveyed to be 5.3%. 
Using the CBP 2001 data set, 2% of debtors 2001 were unrepresented. The CBP used a five 
district sample (2001) and 2007 (subsample). The difference in study methodologies and sample 
selection could well account for different results. Littwin, supra note 39 at 1960. See also GAO 
0.8%
99.2%
1.5%
98.5%
Figure 10. Pre-BAPCPA Chapter 13 
Discharged Cases Filed Pro Se : 1.5% 
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when just no-asset cases are considered: 7.6% pre-BAPCPA compared to 
6.1% post-BAPCPA.  We further found that 23.4% of all dismissed pre-
BAPCPA Chapter 7 no-asset cases and 28.2% of dismissed post-BAPCPA 
Chapter 7 no-asset cases were filed pro se.135   
 
 The vast majority of Chapter 7 debtors filing pro se had the 
assistance of a petition preparer: 100% of all pro se asset cases and 
97.4% of all pro se no-asset cases filed pre-BAPCPA; and 75% of all 
asset cases, and 97.8% of all no-asset cases filed post-BAPCPA. Petition 
preparer fees declined post-BAPCPA, from a mean of $191 for a no-asset 
Chapter 7 case to a mean of $181.  The frequency of use of petition 
preparers varies by jurisdiction; in some regions, they are far more 
common than others.  The issue of the frequency of petition preparer 
use and cost by geographic region calls for further study.136 
 
 
 5. Pro Bono Representation in Chapter 13 and in Chapter 7  
  
 We also examined the frequency of pro bono representation in our 
sample.  With respect to Chapter 13 cases, we found a slight drop in the 
incidence of pro bono representation post-BAPCPA, from 6.8% to 4.9% of 
all closed cases. 137   
 
Table 3. Pro Bono Representation in Chapter 13 Cases 
 
Pre- 
BAPCPA 
Post-
BAPCPA 
Statistical 
Significance138 
All closed cases 6.8% 4.9% ** 
Discharged cases 2.8% 1.4% ** 
                                                                         
REPORT, supra note 15, at 57-58 (finding that 5.9% of post-BAPCPA cases were filed pro se, 
compared with 11% pre-BAPCPA). 
135 See infra Appendix III, Table A – 7 for further information. 
136 See infra Appendix III, Table A – 8. See also Littwin, supra note 39 at 1935; Philip Tedesco, In 
Forma Pauperis in Bankruptcy, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 79, 85 (2010).  
137 We defined “pro bono” as any case where there was an attorney of record on the docket 
listing, but there was no fee paid.  We based the determination of whether a fee was paid on the 
2016 Disclosure and, if available, the Trustee Final Report.  
138 * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level; 
"no" no statistically significant difference. 
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Dismissed cases 12.0% 10.0% no 
 
 In Chapter 7 cases, there was no statistically significant difference 
in the rate of pro bono representation, post-BAPCPA compared to pre-
BAPCPA.  In both time periods, the percentage of cases in which the 
Chapter 7 debtor was represented by a pro bono attorney hovered 
around 7%. 
 
Table 4. Pro Bono Representation in Chapter 7 Cases 
  Pre-BAPCPA Post-BAPCPA Statistical Significance 
All cases 7.0% 7.6% no 
All asset cases 8.0% 10.2% no 
  Discharged cases 7.8% 10.7% no 
  Dismissed cases 9.7% 0.0% no 
No asset cases 6.8% 7.3% no 
  Discharged cases 6.7% 7.1% no 
  Dismissed cases 14.9% 12.8% no 
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C.  Distributions to Unsecured Creditors 
 
 1. Chapter 13 
 
 Distributions to unsecured creditors in all closed Chapter 13 cases 
modestly declined.  In inflation adjusted 2005 dollars, the mean 
distribution as a percentage of claims was 29.5% pre-BAPCPA and 26.4% 
post-BAPCPA.. A discussion of the factors that explain variations in 
distribution to unsecured creditors is found in Part IV.D. below.  
 
 
Table 5. Distribution to Unsecured Creditors as a Percentage of Allowed 
Unsecured Creditor Claims in Discharged Chapter 13 Cases139 
Pre-BAPCPA Post-BAPCPA 
Statistical 
Significance 
  
Distributions ÷   
Claims 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
Distributions ÷   
Claims 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
All closed cases 29.5%  26.4%   
  Average 
unsecured claims $25,090 $25,980 $25,836 $24,519 no No 
  Median unsecured 
claims $13,532 $14,206 $13,918 $13,245  
  Average 
distributions $7,373 $7,670 $6,700 $6,465 no * 
  Median 
distributions 
 
$2,021 $2,119 
 
$1,674 $1,617  
 
                         
139 See infra Appendix IV, Tables A – 12, A – 13.  
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2. Chapter 7 
 
 With respect to Chapter 7 asset cases in which the debtor received 
a discharge, the mean distribution as a percentage of claims were 10.4% 
pre-BAPCPA and 5.1% post-BAPCPA. This difference, however, was not 
statistically significant. A discussion of the factors that explain variations 
in distribution to unsecured creditors is found in Part IV.D. below.  
 
 
Table 6. Distribution to Unsecured Creditors as a Percentage of Allowed 
Unsecured Creditor Claims in Chapter 7 Asset Cases140 
Pre-BAPCPA Post-BAPCPA 
Statistical 
Significance  
  
Distributions ÷   
Liabilities 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
Distributions ÷   
Liabilities 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
Discharged asset 
cases 10.4%   5.1%     
  Average 
unsecured claims $36,614 $37,995 $68,944 $61,916 *** ** 
  Median unsecured 
claims $22,434 $23,085 $35,037 $30,660   
  Average 
distributions $3,826 $3,951 $3,489 $3,169 no no 
  Median 
distributions   $1,547 $1,590 
  
$900 $818  
 
                         
140 See infra Appendix IV, Tables A – 14, A – 15. 
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D. Modeling Statistical Data: What Factors Accounted for the 
Increase in Attorney Fees and Total Direct Access Costs 
  
 The mean attorney fees and creditor distributions reported above 
tells us only a part of the story. We developed regression models to 
account for the many factors that may influence the rate of attorney 
fees and distributions in consumer cases.  Included among these factors 
are a host of economic variables and state economic effects.141   
 
 To control for macroeconomic events in the models presented 
below, data on state-wide employment levels and unemployment rates 
were obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.142 The 
unemployment rate and the monthly change in total employment 
(seasonally adjusted) for each state and the District of Columbia were 
matched to individual case filings in our database according to the 
corresponding month in which each case was filed. 
 
 Nominal dollar amounts for attorney fees and total direct access 
costs were deflated using a monthly implicit price deflator constructed 
from current dollar and inflation adjusted, chain-weighted personal 
consumption expenditures for legal services as reported by the U.S. 
Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis.  Thus, the resulting 
values used in the regression models are in terms of inflation-adjusted 
2005 dollars. 
 
 Six regression models are presented below.  Each model seeks to 
explain differences in a dependent variable pre- and post-BAPCPA while 
controlling for the impact of macroeconomic effects that occurred during 
the period and a variety of other relevant factors recorded from case 
documents.  State fixed effects were included in the models to control 
for average differences across states in any observable or unobservable 
                         
141 The recession that occurred during the period of December 2007 through June 2009 was 
precipitated by a collapse of the housing market and resulted in dramatic reductions in household 
wealth. National Bureau of Economic Research Dating Committee recession dates are available at: 
http://www.nber.org/cycles/. 
142 Data on state unemployment rates were obtained from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics 
databases, available at http://www.bls.gov/data/#unemployment (last visited Nov. 7, 2011). See 
infra Appendix VII, Table A – 25.  
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factors that do not change over time, and that might uniquely 
characterize the judicial districts within each state. 
 
 In Models 1 through 4, the estimates corresponding to the 
variables in the lower part of each respective table measure the partial 
effect of a change in each explanatory variable during the post-BAPCPA 
period.  The estimated coefficients in the upper part of each table are 
the effects for the pre-BAPCPA period.  The net post-BAPCPA effect is the 
sum of the coefficients for the pre-BAPCPA period and the post-BAPCPA 
period.  The asterisks next to the pre-BAPCPA coefficients indicate their 
statistical significance for that period.  The post-BAPCPA effects require a 
different method of testing to determine whether or not the two sets of 
coefficients are jointly significant.  These results are in each Model’s final 
column.   
 
 For Models 5 through 8, the coefficients for the pre- and post-
BAPCPA periods appear next to each other.  The intuition for the tests of 
significance, however, is the same. 
 
 Model 1 examines variations in the reported level of attorney fees 
as a function of a variety of relevant explanatory factors from court 
document filings for Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases.143 All else fixed, attorney 
fees were $258 higher in real terms post-BAPCPA.  The effects of 
macroeconomic events during the 2003-2009 time horizon are captured 
by state-wide unemployment rates at the time the case was filed.  As 
noted in Appendix VII, unemployment rates were much higher for many 
states on average during the post-BAPCPA period.  According to the 
Model, a one percentage point increase in post-BAPCPA unemployment 
rates served to lower attorney fees on average by $9.  Attorney fees in 
no-asset cases were not significantly different.  However, for dismissed 
cases, attorneys received on average $7 less for dismissed cases, holding 
all else constant. Similarly, the number of motions filed, monthly income, 
and the estimated value of real estate assets all factored significantly in 
the determination of attorney fees. 
 
                         
143 Data for attorney fees, total direct access costs, monthly client income, and real estate assets 
were adjusted for inflation and reported in units of constant 2005 dollars using an implicit price 
deflator constructed from the personal consumption expenditures on legal services as reported by 
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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Model 1. Dependent Variable: Attorney Fees in Chapter 7 Cases 
Variable 
 
Estimated 
Coefficients Pre-BAPCPA Effect Post-BAPCPA Effect 
Post-BAPCPA joint 
tests of significance 
Post-BAPCPA 280.585 ***  $258 *** 
Unemployment 
Rate 14.631  $15 -$9 *** 
No-Asset 
Cases -49.215 * -$49 $1  
Dismissed 
Cases 220.066 *** $220 -$7 *** 
Motions Filed 76.394 *** $76 $57 *** 
Monthly 
Income 0.0347 *** $0.03 $0.06 *** 
Real Estate 
Assets 
0.0003 *** $0.0003 $0.0006 *** 
Unemployment 
- post -24.024 ** 
No-asset - 
post 50.014  
Dismissed -
post -227.104 *** 
Motions - post -19.109 ** 
Income - post 0.0250 *** 
Real estate    
- post 0.00036 *** 
State Fixed 
Effects *** 
Observations 6,266 
Adj R-squared .0278 
Discharged or dismissed cases only; excluding all pro bono and 
pro se debtor cases. 
Numerical totals are in terms of inflation-adjusted, constant 2005 
dollars. Post BAPCPA effects were calculated using mean values 
for the explanatory variables. 
 
*** p-value < .01;  ** p-value < .05;  * p-value < .10 
 
 
 The results for Model 2, examining the effects on inflation adjusted 
Total Direct Access Costs, mirror those for Model 1 with the post-BAPCPA 
period playing a dominant role in the determination of these costs.  As 
noted above, the definition of TDAC includes attorney fees, the filing fee, 
and debtor education expenses (inflation-adjusted). 
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Model 2. Dependent Variable: Total Direct Access Costs in Chapter 7 Cases 
Variable Estimated Coefficients Pre-BAPCPA Effect Post-BAPCPA Effect 
Post-BAPCPA joint 
tests of significance 
Post-BAPCPA 437.378 ***  $488 *** 
Unemployment 
Rate 14.962  $15 -$13 *** 
No-Asset 
Cases -49.733 * -$50 $1  
Dismissed 
Cases 222.023 *** $222 -$6 *** 
Motions Filed 76.487 *** $76 $58 *** 
Monthly 
Income 0.0349 *** $0.03 $0.06 *** 
Real Estate 
Assets 0.0003 *** $0.0003 $0.0006 *** 
Unemployment 
- post -28.240 *** 
No-asset - 
post 51.205  
Dismissed -
post -228.165 *** 
Motion - post -18.956 ** 
Income - post 0.0245 *** 
Real estate -
post 0.00036 *** 
State Fixed 
Effects *** 
Observations 6,266 
Adj R-squared 0.336 
Discharged or dismissed cases only; excluding all pro bono and 
pro se debtor cases. 
Numerical totals are in terms of inflation-adjusted, constant 2005 
dollars. Post BAPCPA effects were calculated using mean values 
for the explanatory variables. 
 
*** p-value < .01;  ** p-value < .05;  * p-value < .10 
 
 
 Model 3 examines variations in the reported level of attorney fees 
in Chapter 13 cases as a function of a variety of relevant explanatory 
factors.144 Holding all other factors constant, on average, attorney fees 
were $564 higher in real terms post-BAPCPA.  Cases in states with higher 
employment growth witnessed higher attorney fees; on average, fees 
during the post-BAPCPA period were $541 higher for every percentage 
point increase in monthly employment growth.   
 
 Not surprisingly, fees on average were lower for cases that ended 
in a dismissal than they were for cases where the debtor received a 
                         
144 Total attorney fees equal the sum of debtor attorney pre-petition and post-petition fees.  
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discharge. Holding all else fixed, pre-BAPCPA, attorney fees in dismissed 
cases were, on average, $656 lower than fees in discharged cases.  Post-
BAPCPA fees were $653 lower.   
 
 The number of motions and plan amendments filed both had a 
positive effect on attorney fees.  Post-BAPCPA, fees rose by an average 
of $28 per motion, holding all else constant.  Plan amendments increase 
fees, on average, by $96 per amendment. 
 
 Debtors’ income, real estate assets and personal property assets 
also had a positive effect upon attorney fees in Chapter 13 cases.  For 
every additional $1,000 in monthly income, the post-BAPCPA increase in 
average fees was $25.  With respect to real estate assets, debtors with 
an additional $100,000 in real estate assets paid on average $60 more 
in attorney fees in the post-BAPCPA time frame.  Personal property assets 
also positively affected fees. Clients with an additional $100,000 in 
personal property assets, post-BAPCPA, paid an average of $220 more in 
attorney fees.  
 
 Finally, the filing of fee applications had a positive effect on 
attorney fees.  Post-BAPCPA, the filing of an additional fee application 
corresponded to an increase in average attorney fees of $123.  
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Model 3. Dependent Variable: Attorney Fees in Chapter 13 Cases 
Variable Estimated Coefficients Pre-BAPCPA Post-BAPCPA 
Post-BAPCPA joint 
tests of significance 
Post-BAPCPA 524.708 ***  $564 *** 
Employment 
Rate (1 mo.) 23.735  $24 $541 * 
Dismissed 
Cases -656.22 *** -$656 -$653 *** 
Motions Filed 46.951 *** $47 $28 *** 
Plan 
Amendments 53.766  $54 $96 ** 
Monthly 
Income 0.0141  $0.0141 $0.025 *** 
Real Estate 
Assets 0.0003  $0.0003 $0.0006 ** 
Personal 
Property Assets 0.0005  $0.0005 $0.0022 * 
Fee 
Applications 504.72 *** $505 $123 *** 
Employment. 
post 517.458 * 
Dismissed -
post 3.035  
Motions - post -18.751  
Amendments -
post 42.080  
Income - post 0.011  
Real estate -
post 0.0000  
Personal prop 
- post 0.0017  
Application -
post -381.89 *** 
Discharged or dismissed cases only; excluding all pro bono and 
pro se debtor cases. 
Numerical totals are in terms of inflation-adjusted, constant 2005 
dollars. Post BAPCPA effects were calculated using mean values 
for the explanatory variables  
 
*** p-value < .01;  ** p-value .05;  * p-value < .10 
State Fixed 
Effects *** 
Observations 2,009 
Adj R-squared .0294 
 
 
 
 The results in Model 4, examining the effects on inflation adjusted 
Total Direct Access Costs for Chapter 13 cases mirror those for Model 3 
with the post-BAPCPA period playing a dominant role in the determination 
of these costs.   
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Model 4. Dependent Variable: Total Direct Access Costs in Chapter 13 Cases 
Variable Estimated Coefficients Pre-BAPCPA Post-BAPCPA 
Post-BAPCPA joint 
tests of significance 
Post-BAPCPA 630.311 ***  $667 *** 
Employment 
Rate (1 mo.) 20.895  $21 $500 * 
Dismissed 
Cases -656.12 *** -$656 -$638 *** 
Motions Filed 46.749 *** $47 $29 *** 
Plan 
Amendments 54.00  $54 $92 ** 
Monthly 
Income 0.014  $0.0140 $0.025 *** 
Real Estate 
Assets 0.0003  $0.0003 $0.0006 ** 
Personal 
Property Assets 0.0004  $0.0004 $0.0022 * 
Fee 
Applications 505.186 *** $505 $122 *** 
Employment - 
post 479.324 * 
Dismissed -
post 18.504  
Motions - post -18.215  
Amendments -
post 38.457  
Income - post 0.011  
Real estate -
post 0.0000  
Personal prop 
- post 0.0017 # 
Application -
post -383.62 *** 
Discharged or dismissed cases only; excluding all pro bono and 
pro se debtor cases. 
Numerical totals are in terms of inflation-adjusted, constant 2005 
dollars. Post BAPCPA effects were calculated using mean values 
for the explanatory variables 
 
*** p-value < .01;  ** p-value .05;  * p-value < .10 
State Fixed 
Effects *** 
Observations 2,009 
Adj R-squared .0304 
 
 
 
 The complexity of the issues increased significantly when we 
tried to explain the effects of a host of variables on distributions to 
unsecured creditors.  We found that in Chapter 7 cases, the ratio of 
distributions per dollar of claims was about a half-cent lower, on average, 
during the post-BAPCPA period.  Economic effects also impacted creditor 
distributions.  Post-BAPCPA, the ratio of distributions to claims was about 
a half-cent lower for every percentage point increase in unemployment 
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rate.  Attorney fees had a small effect upon creditor distributions, but 
this effect was not statistically significant.  
 
 
Model 5. Dependent Variable: Distributions to Unsecured Creditors in Chapter 7 
Cases 
Variable Estimated Coefficients Pre-BAPCPA Effect Post-BAPCPA Effect 
Post-BAPCPA joint 
tests of significance 
Post-BAPCPA 0.005   -$0.005 1% (99% confidence level) 
Unemployment 
Rate 0.007 ** 
Unemployment 
Rate - post -0.011 *** 
$0.01 -$0.004 1% (99% confidence level) 
No-asset cases -0.156 *** 
No-asset -post 0.053 *** 
-$0.16 -$0.10 1% (99% confidence level) 
Dismissed 
Cases -0.090 *** 
Dismissed-post 0.128 *** 
-$0.09 $0.04 1% (99% confidence level) 
Attorney fee 0.00001  
Attorney fee -
post 0.000003  
$0.00001 $0.00001 10% (90% confidence level) 
State Fixed Effects *** 
Observations 7,068 
Adj R-squared 0.108 
 
Discharged or dismissed cases only, for values of the ratio of 
distributions to claims less than or equal to 1.0 
Numerical totals are in terms of inflation-adjusted, constant 2005 
dollars.  Post BAPCPA effects were calculated using mean values 
for the explanatory variables. 
 
*** p-value < .01;  ** p-value < .05;  * p-value < .10 
 
 
 
 When we developed models to explain the effects of economic and 
case-specific variables on distributions to unsecured creditors in Chapter 
13 cases, we found that holding everything else constant, distributions to 
unsecured creditors were two cents lower per dollar of claims, post-
BAPCPA. This difference however, was not statistically significant. We also 
found that the ratio of distributions to claims was, on average, nine cents 
higher for every percentage point increase in employment growth.  This 
result was also not statistically significant.  Dismissed cases resulted in 
lower distributions to creditors, by a statistically significant forty-one 
cents, on average, during the post-BAPCPA period.  There was no 
statistically significant relationship between attorney fees and the ratio of 
distributions to unsecured claims.  
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 It became very clear when developing these models that there are 
significant differences across states, and across cases, given the variation 
in how payments are made to unsecured creditors.  The issue of the 
impact of BAPCPA on distributions to unsecured creditors, as well as of 
the effects of a range of economic variables warrants further study. 
 
 
Model 6. Dependent Variable: Distributions to Unsecured Creditors in Chapter 13 
Cases 
Variable Estimated Coefficients Pre -BAPCPA Effect 
Post -BAPCPA 
Effect 
Post- BAPCPA joint 
tests of significance 
Post-BAPCPA -0.015   -$0.02 not statistically significant 
Employment 
Change (1 m) -0.026  
Employment -
post 0.113 * 
-$0.03 $0.09 not statistically significant 
Dismissed 
Cases -0.378 *** 
Dismissed - 
post -0.031  
-$0.38 -$0.41 1% (99% confidence level) 
Attorney Fee 0.00001 # 
Attorney fee -
post -0.000001  
$0.00001 $0.00001 not statistically significant 
State Fixed Effects *** 
Observations 2,572 
Adj R-squared 0.281 
 
Discharged or dismissed cases only, for values of the ratio of 
distributions to claims less than or equal to 1.0 
Numerical totals are in terms of inflation-adjusted, constant 2005 
dollars.  Post BAPCPA effects were calculated using mean values 
for the explanatory variables. 
 
*** p-value < .01;  ** p-value < .05;  * p-value < .10 
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E. Qualitative Data  
 
 Quantitative data and its analysis has limitations. The quantitative 
data in this Study reveals an increase in attorney fees in Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 13 consumer cases following BAPCPA’s enactment. The data also 
allow us to monetize the increased costs at the national, circuit, state, 
and district levels.  Regression analysis of the data allows us to account 
for the many factors that influence dependent variables.  To augment the 
Study’s quantitative findings, we developed a qualitative data pool and 
undertook a rigorous examination of the gathered information. This 
qualitative data analysis enables insights into the context in which 
attorney fees increased, and allows us to gain a deep understanding of 
how affected stakeholders experience the consumer bankruptcy system. 
 
 As described, the Study’s qualitative data pool emerged from focus 
group interviews, open-ended survey questions, and in-person one-on-one 
interviews and conversations.  Consumer debtors’ attorneys, Chapter 7 
Panel Trustees, Standing Chapter 13 Trustees, U.S. Trustees and 
bankruptcy judges were all subjects of the qualitative study.  The data, in 
its raw form, identify and describe the subjective experiences of 
respondents. In that state, the data reflect the “undigested complexity of 
reality.”145 When critically and discreetly analyzed, however, patterns, 
themes, and categories emerge, framing a holistic picture of the 
bankruptcy system.    
 
 
 1. Demographics of Respondents 
 
 From dozens of interviews, focus groups, and hundreds of open-
ended survey responses by attorneys, a picture of the professionals who 
work within the consumer bankruptcy system emerged.  A striking feature 
of the sample studied was the polarity presented by each respondent 
pool’s internal homogeneity and the heterogeneity of the bankruptcy 
system as each individual experienced it. While each cohort presented 
many perspectives and features in common, there was considerable 
disparity in how consumer bankruptcy law operates, and how it can be 
                         
145 PATTON, supra note 10, at 463. 
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and is practiced.146 What follows is an outline of the demographic 
characteristics of the Survey respondents.  Focus group participant and 
interview subject demographics closely tracked the Survey sample. 
 
 We found that most debtor counsel respondents were solo 
practitioners, or practiced in small firms of 2 to 5 attorneys.147 A majority 
of respondents were partners or equivalent in their firms (85%)148 and 
most practiced bankruptcy law (55%)—in most cases consumer 
bankruptcy law (45%)—for more than 20 years.149   
 
Figure 12. Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys’ Practice Context 
 
  
 Most of the reporting lawyers limited their practice to consumer 
bankruptcy; 60% reported devoting between 75% and 100% of their 
practice to consumer debtor representation.150 Small business bankruptcy 
was the most common practice area reported after consumer 
bankruptcy.151   
 
                         
146 Purposeful Sampling was employed to gather the survey data.  See notes 321–322 and 
accompanying text for a complete discussion of the sample method.  
147 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, question 3 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
148 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, question 6 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
149 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, question 7 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
150 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, question 5 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
151 Id. 61% reported at least some degree of their practice was spent on small business 
bankruptcy cases. 
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Figure 13. Percentage of Practice Respondents Devoted to Consumer Debtor 
Representation 
 
 These findings are consistent with trends in the legal profession 
generally. In recent decades, specialization among lawyers has become 
increasingly more common, largely as a result of the growing complexity 
of the law, coupled with an increasingly competitive market.152   
  
 We also found the cohort of respondent consumer bankruptcy 
lawyers to have considerable experience; close to 80% of survey 
respondents reported practicing law for 11 to over 20 years, and over 
70% reported practicing consumer bankruptcy for the same duration.153 
 
Figure 14.  Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys’ Years of Consumer Bankruptcy 
Practice 
 
                         
152 See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 63–68 (1995); RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 202–203 
(1989) (noting that attorneys tend to be positioned not only by practice area but also by the 
types of clients served; lawyers typically represent either individual or business interests). 
153 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, questions 7–8 (data on file with Principal Investigator).  
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 Most attorneys surveyed do not have “high volume practices,” 
defined as filing more than 75 consumer cases a month.  Fifty-eight 
percent of respondents reported that they personally filed ten or fewer 
cases each month, and 76% reported that their firms typically filed under 
twenty-five cases each month.154 When asked about the mix of Chapter 7 
and Chapter 13 cases filed, the responses fell into one of three 
categories: very few Chapter 7 cases relative to the number of Chapter 
13 cases; a one third (Chapter 13)/two thirds (Chapter 7) split; or few 
Chapter 13 cases relative to the number of Chapter 7 cases.155  
 
 The Chapter 7 Panel Trustee is another central player in Chapter 7 
consumer bankruptcy cases. The Chapter 7 Trustee’s primary 
responsibility is to liquidate and administer a debtor’s non-exempt assets 
and to maximize the return to creditors.  These private sector 
professionals, appointed and supervised by the Office of the U.S. Trustee, 
collectively administer over one million cases annually.156 Hundreds of 
Chapter 7 Panel Trustees responded to the Study survey, and dozens 
were interviewed over the course of eighteen months.  
 
 Most Survey respondents have served as a Chapter 7 Panel Trustee 
for many years; the vast majority since before BAPCPA’s enactment.157 
Forty-six percent of respondents reported having a full-time Chapter 7 
Trustee practice, and 54% reported a part-time practice.158  A strong 
majority of Chapter 7 Panel Trustee respondents (72%) reported 
administrating between 51 and 150 new Chapter 7 consumer cases per 
month.159 The Trustees reporting were from all judicial circuits, and a 
cross-section of judicial districts.160 
 
                         
154 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, questions 10–11 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
155 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, question 12 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
156 Alabama and North Carolina are the two jurisdictions that have Bankruptcy Administrators 
rather than U.S. Trustees.  In such jurisdictions, the bankruptcy court appoints the trustee in 
Chapter 7 cases.  Most Chapter 7 Trustees are attorneys or accountants.  Often, in addition to 
their Trustee work, they maintain an independent law or accounting practice.  
157 Chapter 7 Trustee Survey, question 3 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
158 Chapter 7 Trustee Survey, question 4 (data on file with Principal Investigator).  
159 Chapter 7 Trustee Survey, question 5 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
160 Chapter 7 Trustee Survey, questions 1–2 (data on file with Principal Investigator).  
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Figure 15. Years of Service as Chapter 7 Panel Trustee 
 
  
  With respect to Chapter 13 cases, the Standing Chapter 13 Trustee 
is involved in a debtor’s case from the petition filing to the case’s 
ultimate conclusion.161 As one focus group participant observed, the 
Chapter 13 Trustee “is the center of gravity” in Chapter 13 cases.162   
   
 Scores of Standing Chapter 13 Trustees responded to the Survey 
and over fifteen Trustees participated in a focus group interview.  In 
addition, numerous individual Chapter 13 Trustee interviews were 
conducted over a period of eighteen months. Of the respondent Chapter 
13 Trustees, over two-thirds have served as a Trustee for eleven or more 
years.163 Over 95% of the Chapter 13 Trustee respondents are attorneys, 
and about 85% have at least one other lawyer working in their office.164  
Chapter 13 Trustee offices also rely upon a cadre of non-legal support 
staff to perform many of the necessary administrative and accounting 
tasks.165 
 
                         
161 The statutory duties of Chapter 13 Trustees are set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 1302, which 
incorporates by reference a number of the duties of Chapter 7 Trustees that are laid out in 11 
U.S.C. § 704. 
162 Focus Group of Chapter 13 Trustees (July 15, 2010) (transcript on file with Principal 
Investigator). 
163 Chapter 13 Trustee Survey, question 3 (data on file with Principal Investigator).  
164 Chapter 13 Trustee Survey, question 4 (data on file with Principal Investigator).  
165 As one Chapter 13 Trustee observed, “My office staff rarely ‘comes up for air,’ meaning they 
are always busy and occupied with processing respective caseloads.” Chapter 13 Trustee Survey, 
question 39 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
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Figure 16. Years of Service as Standing Chapter 13 Trustee166 
 
 
 The bankruptcy judges responding to the Survey were from each of 
the judicial circuits and a cross section of states.  The focus group of 
judges mirrored the survey cohort.  A majority of the judge survey 
respondents have served on the bench for 11 or more years (53%).167  
Sixteen percent of the responding judges have only been bankruptcy 
judges since BAPCPA’s enactment.168   
 
Figure 17. Years of Service as a Bankruptcy Judge169 
 
  
 Prior to becoming bankruptcy judges, a majority of respondents 
had been involved in the consumer bankruptcy system, as debtors’ 
counsel (37%) or creditor’s counsel (34%).170  A few judges are former 
Chapter 13 Trustees (6%), Chapter 7 Trustees (20%), or U.S. Trustees 
                         
166 Chapter 13 Trustee Survey, question 3 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
167 Bankruptcy Judges Survey, question 2 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
168 Id.  
169 Id.   
170 Bankruptcy Judges Survey, question 3 (data on file with Principal Investigator).  
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(6%).171  A small percentage (1%) of respondents formerly exclusively 
practiced consumer bankruptcy law; while 36.5% of respondents had no 
experience with the consumer bankruptcy system before becoming a 
judge.172 
 
 
Figure 18. Past Involvement of Bankruptcy Judges in the System173 
 
  
 Finally, a focus group was conducted with a small cohort of U.S. 
Trustees in an effort to evaluate their experiences working within the 
bankruptcy system since BAPCPA’s enactment.  Because this group was 
limited in size and scope, the views and experiences of the U.S. Trustee 
participants were not necessarily reflective of the U.S. Trustee population 
as a whole.  Nonetheless, the focus group discussion made a significant 
contribution to the qualitative data set by providing a necessary and 
important perspective on the system’s operation.  
 
 
 2. Consumer Bankruptcy “In Action”: Descriptive Data 
 
 A study of consumer bankruptcy “in action” examines the system 
not only as it exists in the statute and in the case law, but how the 
enterprise actually works in practice.174 It allows for the realization of how 
principal stakeholders and constituents are affected and their 
                         
171 Id.  
172 Id. 
173 Id.  
174 This approach has its roots in the Wisconsin School. See UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN, Law In Action, 
http://law.wisc.edu/law-in-action/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2011).  
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corresponding responses.175 As has been observed, “the bankruptcy 
system is not simply imposed on judges, trustees, lawyers, and other 
repeat players; instead, these parties make the system what it is 
today.”176  By engaging in careful scrutiny of the system through 
experiences as reported by front-line service providers, an authentic 
picture of how a consumer moves through the consumer bankruptcy 
system emerges. 
 
 Typically, the first contact a consumer has with the bankruptcy 
system is a phone call or a meeting with a lawyer.177 Commonly, there is 
no charge for this first meeting: over 80% of lawyers offer prospective 
clients free initial consultations.178  Attorneys reported, however, that 
sometimes, “initial” consultations drag on for two or three visits to the 
lawyer’s office, during which time prospective clients are gathering needed 
documentation, and acclimating themselves to the decision to file for 
bankruptcy protection.179 Attorneys noted that a significant number of 
prospective clients do not return to file after an initial consultation.180     
 
 When asked why such prospective clients do not return, the most 
common responses were (i) a mismatch between their problems and the 
remedy offered by the bankruptcy system, (ii) prospective clients’ 
                         
175 See e.g., Rafael Efrat, Legal Culture and Bankruptcy: A Comparative Perspective, 20 EMORY BANKR. 
DEV. J. 351, 352–353 (2004) (“Law and society scholars attribute some of the disparity between 
the formal laws and the laws in action, as well as the substantial local variations in the 
implementation of the laws, to the influence of legal culture.”); Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, 
Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers’ Heads, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1498, 1508 (1996). 
176 Melissa B. Jacoby, Ripple or Revolution? The Indeterminacy of Bankruptcy Reform, AMER. BANKR. 
L.J. 169, 177 (2005). 
177 Of the Chapter 13 cases in our quantitative data set, 97% of cases pre-BAPCPA and 97.9% of 
cases post-BAPCPA were filed with the assistance of counsel. Of the Chapter 7 cases in our 
quantitative data set, 92.6% of cases pre-BAPCPA and 94.2% of cases post-BAPCPA were filed 
with the assistance of counsel. See infra Appendix II, Table A – 2; Appendix III, Table A – 7.  
178 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, question 18 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
179 Focus Group of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (Feb. 11, 2010) (transcript on file with Principal 
Investigator). 
180 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, question 19 (data on file with Principal Investigator). The 
majority of respondents indicated that 11%–50% of prospective clients never returned after an 
initial consultation: 32.6% of attorney respondents reported that 11%–25% of prospective clients 
did not return; 27.5% of attorney respondents reported that 25%–50% of prospective clients did 
not return.  
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emotional condition, on the continuum from denial to depression,181 and 
(iii) bankruptcy’s costs.182 
 
  An attorney vividly described the emotionally taxing nature of 
financial distress and the consumer’s decision to file for bankruptcy:  
 
It takes a lot of courage to call us, more to show up, then even more 
to bring back our paperwork and “go through” with it.  Debt is like 
cancer.  You realize you need help but you hate the treatment 
program so going back to the doctor is tough.  We don't force a 
timeline or follow-up appointments on clients so they have to build 
their courage to come back.183 
 
 In response to the question of what were the “triggers” or 
“catalysts” for consumer debtors’ ultimate decision to file for bankruptcy, 
Chapter 13 debtors’ top three precipitates were (i) to stop a foreclosure, 
(ii) a job loss, and (iii) to discharge debt following a divorce.184  These 
triggers were confirmed by the responses to the same question in the 
survey of Standing Chapter 13 Trustees, although a high incidence of 
medical-related debt was also recurrently mentioned as a key instigator 
                         
181 See Elizabeth Kübler-Ross, ON DEATH AND DYING (1st Collier books trade ed. 1993) (identifying the 
five stages of grief as denial, anger/resentment, bargaining, depression and, finally, acceptance). 
182 Illustrative answers to the question why prospective clients do not return after initial 
consultation include: procrastination; price shopping; lack of income or expiration of 
unemployment; the fees are more than they had expected; they chose to not file bankruptcy; they 
do not qualify; they are overwhelmed with the paperwork; the free consultation tells them what 
they want to know; cannot organize their paperwork to go forward; bankruptcy is not an 
appropriate solution based on the circumstances; debtor has opted for bankruptcy alternatives; 
debtors use petition preparers instead of attorneys; some do not have a poor enough financial 
condition to justify filing bankruptcy; some want results that cannot be obtained; some have a 
strong aversion to bankruptcy; some find another way out of their financial issues (usually with 
help from relatives); the attorney and client cannot reach an agreement as to how to proceed; 
competition among attorneys; failure of the means test for Chapter 7; and depression. Consumer 
Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, question 19 (data on file with Principal Investigator). Professors Mann 
and Porter assert that bankruptcy does not provide an adequate remedy or proxy for financial 
distress. Mann & Porter, supra note 8, at 313 (observing that “debtors must ‘save up’ certain 
emotional resources, such as humility, before they will consider bankruptcy.”) 
183 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, question 19 (data on file with Principal Investigator). See 
also Mann & Porter, supra note 8, at 289.   
184 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, question 23 (data on file with Principal Investigator). See 
also Mann & Porter, supra note 8, at 289 (noting that in jurisdictions where the foreclosure 
process has a shorter time frame, Chapter 13 filings are more likely to be filed on an emergency 
basis.) 
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of the case filing.185 It was reported that Chapter 7 debtors are compelled 
to file by (i) a job loss, (ii) a reduction in income, and (iii) to discharge 
debt following a divorce.186   
 
 With respect to both Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 cases, respondents 
were clear that in most cases, there is an amalgam of intertwined 
instigating factors, it is hard to identify a “top choice” and few debtors 
present just one or two.187 
  
 A debtor’s decision to file for bankruptcy is often a protracted 
one.188 The drawn-out deliberation period has a significant negative effect 
on debtors. They continue to endure both the internal and external 
stressors that led them to seek bankruptcy counsel in the first instance.  
Delays also adversely affect attorneys’ practice and emotional well-being.  
Respondents described numerous frustrating instances of preparing a 
debtor’s petition and necessary schedules, only to have a debtor’s 
decision to delay a filing necessitating a repeat of the exercise the 
following month.189 It was also reported that an attorney’s ability to file 
                         
185 Chapter 13 Trustee Survey, question 11 (data on file with Principal Investigator). Mann & 
Porter, supra note 8, at 292 (noting that emergency Chapter 7 filings are rare).  
186 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, question 24 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
187 Id.  
188 See Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, question 22 (data on file with Principal Investigator).  
One-fourth of respondents reported that approximately 75% of their clients file within the first 
three months after an initial consultation. Another third reported that approximately 50% of their 
clients file within the first three months. A majority (76%) of attorney respondents reported that 
approximately 25% of their clients wait either three to six months, or six months to a year before 
filing. Id.  
189 Changes in income and other circumstances can greatly affect the means test calculation. 
Debtors looking to file for Chapter 7 must qualify under the Form 22A Chapter 7 Statement of 
Current Monthly Income and Means-Test Calculation. Debtors looking to file Chapter 13 use Form 
22C, Chapter 13 Statement of Current Monthly Income and Calculation of Commitment Period and 
Disposable Income.  These forms require debtors’ income and expense information as well as 
state median family income from the Census Bureau and standards data from the IRS. Form 22C 
for Chapter 13 filing is used to calculate debtors’ disposable income which will be paid into their 
Chapter 13 plan. Included in the deductions of Chapter 13 debtors are deductions for debt 
payment. As debt balances decline each month, the calculations of pay-off balances and amount 
owed change. See Official Bankruptcy Form B22A: Chapter 7 Statement of Current Monthly Income 
and Means Test Calculation, http://www.uscourts.gov/FormsAndFees/Forms/BankruptcyForms.aspx; 
Official Bankruptcy Form B22C: Chapter 13 Statement of Current Monthly Income and Calculation 
of Commitment Period and Disposable Income, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/FormsAndFees/Forms/BankruptcyForms.aspx.  “Once a potential client 
comes in to see an attorney, the process starts and stops and delays and starts all over again.” 
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for bankruptcy on an “emergency basis”—to stop a foreclosure or wage 
garnishment—has been limited by the array of pre-filing requirements, 
thus hindering the attorney’s ability to address client exigencies.190 
 
 Once the decision to file for bankruptcy protection is finally made, 
however, “there is relief.”191  At this point, the consumer can “see the 
problem and face up to it,” and the lawyer is in a position to try to help 
the client “get to a better spot.”192 The path to this better spot, however, 
is paved with paper; debtors must now gather and produce specifically 
prescribed documentation of their financial condition.  Attorneys 
consistently reported the most daunting BAPCPA requirement is getting 
debtors to produce six months of pay advices and three years of tax 
returns.193 For many debtors, personal financial organization is not a 
strong suit, and efforts made to get their hands on these documents can 
be time-consuming and are often futile, particularly for those debtors who 
do not receive “W2” wages, but are self-employed, contract employees, or 
those who work on commission.194  Chapter 7 Trustees, Chapter 13 
Trustees, and bankruptcy judges affirmed that the inflexible document 
requirements are an obstacle that often results in delay, and at times, 
denial of bankruptcy relief.195  The pressure to extract these necessary 
documents from a client was recurrently reported as “changing the 
                                                                         
Notes on File with Principal Investigator. “People come in with a circumstance and come back a 
month later in a different circumstance.” Notes on file with Principal Investigator.  
190 “I used to be able to help people if their house was set for a sheriff’s sale . . . .  [Now] they 
come in the day before the sheriff’s sale and say, ‘I need to file bankruptcy to save my home,’ 
and I can’t help them anymore because there’s no way I can gather all of the information.” Focus 
Group of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (Apr. 2, 2010) (transcript on file with Principal 
Investigator). “By default because at least where I am the cases start off very slow at the 
beginning of the month, and then build up at the end because if you wait until the beginning of 
the next month then you have to have the documents from the preceding month.  So the 1st 
through the 15th, it’s dry.  The 15th through the 30th, it’s a sharp curve up until the last three 
days of the month when there’s a lot of cases.  So that indicates at least that they’re having 
trouble getting documents, but they’re doing it by scrambling at the end of the month because 
they know they’ll have to start again in the scramble.” Focus Group of Chapter 13 Trustees (July 
15, 2010) (transcript on file with Principal Investigator).  
191 Notes on file with Principal Investigator. 
192 Notes on file with Principal Investigator. 
193 Focus Group of Chapter 7 Trustees (Apr. 10, 2010) (transcript on file with Principal 
Investigator).  
194 Attorneys reported that in some cases, the inability to produce copies of pay stubs keeps 
some people who bankruptcy would help from filing.  Notes on file with Principal Investigator.  
195 Notes on file with Principal Investigator.  
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relationship between clients and lawyers,” at times transforming the 
lawyer from “advocate to adversary.”196  
 
 Attorneys, Panel Trustees, and Chapter 13 Standing Trustees 
consistently reported the necessity of hiring more and better skilled 
support staff to gather, prepare and review the additional required 
documentation. Attorneys lamented that a consequence of hiring support 
staff was the challenge of taking on an increased number of cases to 
support the firm’s higher overhead.197 Chapter 13 Trustees noted the 
increased administrative burden on their offices, but an initial decline in 
the number cases necessitated “doing more with less.”198   
 
 Panel Trustee in Chapter 7 cases also reported being burdened by 
the administrative responsibility imposed by BAPCPA.199 When asked about 
the most time-consuming part of administering a no-asset Chapter 7 
case, 35.6% of Panel Trustees identified “gathering the required additional 
documentation from the debtor or debtor's counsel” as “very time-
consuming” (5 on a scale of 1 to 5).200 Additionally, “reviewing the 
required additional documentation” was rated 4 on the same scale by 
30.4% of Trustees, as was “tracking down unscheduled or hidden 
assets—by 37.2% of respondents.201   
 
 The same survey question provided an opportunity for respondents 
to offer a narrative about the most time-consuming aspect of 
administering no-asset cases.  Of the 35.7% of respondents who took 
advantage of this opportunity, (i) dealing with pro se debtors’ questions 
and requests for legal advice, (ii) sending out and tracking domestic 
support obligation notices, (iii) compliance with new data entry 
                         
196 Notes on file with Principal Investigator.  
197 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, question 95 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
198 Notes on file with Principal Investigator.  
199 86.4% of Chapter 7 Trustees “strongly agreed” that Chapter 7 consumer no-asset cases take 
more Trustee time under BAPCPA than cases took pre-BAPCPA.  An additional 11.9 % of 
respondents “agreed.”  With respect to asset cases, 92.4% of respondents “strongly agreed” 
(63.8%) or “agreed” (28.6%) that BAPCPA Chapter 7 cases took more Trustee time. (Chapter 7 
Trustee Survey, question 22 (data on file with Principal Investigator).  
200 Chapter 7 Trustee Survey, question 23 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
201 Id. 
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requirements, and (iv) gathering and reviewing additional documentation, 
were all repeatedly identified.202  
 
 Chapter 7 Trustees further observed that it now takes “two to three 
[times] as much time [to administer] no-asset cases as [it] did before 
BAPCPA.”203  It was noted that courts are reluctant to dismiss cases 
where required documents are not produced, and continuances are more 
common than they used to be.204 One Trustee observed that it was not 
unusual for “at least 50% of new cases to be continued [because of the 
debtor’s failure to produce required documents at the 341 hearing.]”205  
Elaborating further that trustee noted, “One continuance [may not] seem 
like much, but [if you multiply it] by the number [of] cases [handled by a 
Chapter 7 Trustee] . . . [and the need to] reacquaint yourself with the 
case when the documents come in . . . there is a direct impact on 
Trustee time . . . .”206 
 
 The data further revealed that there are fewer asset cases to 
balance the increased number of no-asset cases.207 Moreover, Panel 
Trustees reported spending more time on each no-asset case, which 
means less time available to spend on cases in which a Trustee is 
entitled to receive a commission.208 
 
 In addition to the challenge of producing required financial 
documents, BAPCPA mandates that debtors take two financial education 
courses: credit counseling as a pre-requisite to filing, and a debtor 
education course prior to receipt of a discharge.209 While most lawyers 
reported not being directly impacted by this requirement, they 
nonetheless consistently and emphatically reported their clients describing 
the pre-filing credit counseling course requirement as “worthless,” “stupid,” 
                         
202 Id.  
203 Interview with Chapter 7 Trustee (July 11, 2011) (notes on file with Principal Investigator).  This 
observation was made by numerous Chapter 7 Trustees in formal and informal conversations and 
interviews. 
204 Id. 
205 Interview with Chapter 7 Trustee (July 11, 2011) (notes on file with Principal Investigator).   
206 Id. 
207 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, question 65 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
208 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, question 70 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
209 See 11 U.S.C. § 727(11).  
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“time-consuming,” a “significant expense,” and “offensive.”210 Numerous 
judges confirmed these observations.  As one judge observed, “pre-filing 
credit counseling is a joke. I am aware of not one case in which the 
counseling has resulted in a debtor not proceeding with a bankruptcy 
filing. It is expensive for people who can barely afford the . . . filing 
fee.”211 
 
 Some attorneys noted, however, there was “some value” in the pre-
discharge debtor education course. Calling it “surprisingly useful,” more 
than one lawyer observed that a “fair number of clients come away with 
a better grasp on what it means to borrow money.”212 Numerous Chapter 
13 Trustees confirmed the positive observations about this course.  One 
Trustee observed, “pre-bankruptcy credit counseling has added a costly, 
ineffective and unnecessary administrative layer. On the other hand, the 
personal financial management education requirement is beneficial.”213 In 
response to a question about the best feature of BAPCPA, one judge 
said, “the pre-discharge financial management course. I generally ask my 
pro se debtors at discharge whether they found this course to be helpful. 
To a person, they have responded ‘yes’.”214  
 
 Not all comments about the pre-discharge course were positive.  A 
number of judges observed that they are seeing more Chapter 7 case 
dismissals directly as a result of pro se debtors’ failure to meet the 
financial management course requirement.215  
 
 With respect to the “core” issue of this Study—attorney fees and 
costs of access—the quantitative data enabled the answers to the “what” 
                         
210 Focus Group of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (Apr. 1, 2010) (transcript on file with Principal 
Investigator); Focus Group of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (Sept. 13, 2010) (transcript on file 
with Principal Investigator); Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, questions 41 & 95 (data on file 
with Principal Investigator). 
211 Bankruptcy Judges Survey, question 27 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
212 Focus Group of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (Apr. 1, 2010) (transcript on file with Principal 
Investigator). 
213 Chapter 13 Trustee Survey, question 39 (data on file with Principal Investigator)  
214 Bankruptcy Judges Survey, question 28 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
215 Bankruptcy Judges Survey, question 11 (data on file with Principal Investigator). Another judge 
commented, “as far as the financial management course, it is clear from the reaffirmation motions 
I have coming before me, these debtors have learned nothing from these courses.” Bankruptcy 
Judges Survey, question 27 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
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and “how much” questions.  The qualitative data allows us to ask and 
answer the “why” and “how” questions about fees.  
 
 We asked debtors’ lawyers to explain how a client typically pays 
them in Chapter 7 cases.  While a majority of attorneys stated, that as a 
rule market forces determine legal fees, a few lawyers reported practicing 
in districts with codified “no look” fees in Chapter 7 cases.216  
 
 Many respondents also reported a high level of competition for 
Chapter 7 clients, and in some geographic areas, market saturation. The 
decline in legal business in other practice areas, such as real estate, has 
resulted in many new entrants into the consumer Chapter 7 market.217 
The issue raised by attorneys as well as by Panel Trustees and 
bankruptcy judges, is not simply the matter of increased competition, but 
the perception that there may be price undercutting, and sub-quality work 
being performed by lawyers less experienced in consumer bankruptcy 
practice.218  Moreover, a U.S. Trustee noted that in some jurisdictions, 
“petition preparers . . . [put] a lot of downward pressure on the fees.”219 
 
   Respondents repeatedly observed a disconnect between the time it 
takes to responsibly represent a consumer debtor in a Chapter 7 case, 
and the legal fee the market will support. One attorney noted, “Doing a 
thorough job is time-consuming, and unfortunately most debtors can’t 
                         
216 See In re Williams, 357 B.R. 434, 439 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2006) (“A growing number of districts have 
established standardized attorney’s fees for routine bankruptcy cases. These standardized fees are 
commonly referred to as ‘presumptive,’ ‘fixed,’ ‘flat,’ or ‘no look’ fees. These standard fees allow 
attorney’s fees without requiring a detailed fee application in the absence of an objection. The 
Panel recognizes that this type of standardization, or uniform fee guideline, promotes efficiency by 
relieving the courts of the administrative burden of reviewing numerous attorney's fee applications; 
encourages predictability and efficiency for all involved in a chapter 7 or 13 case; and saves time 
for the court, trustees and the attorneys who represent debtors.”) See Focus Group of Chapter 13 
Trustees (July 15, 2010) (transcript on file with Principal Investigator); infra Appendix VI. 
217 Interview with Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney (Apr. 2, 2010) (notes on file with Principal 
Investigator); Focus Group with Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (Jan. 18, 2010) (transcript on file 
with Principal Investigator); Focus Group of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (Apr. 2, 2010) 
(transcript on file with Principal Investigator); Focus Group of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (Sept. 
23, 2010) (transcript on file with Principal Investigator); Focus Group of U.S. Trustees (May 3, 
2011) (transcript on file with Principal Investigator); Interview with Chapter 13 Trustee (Jan. 1, 
2010) (notes on file with Principal Investigator); Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, questions 
19, 30, 54, 64, & 69  (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
218 See notes 294–299 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion of the quality of 
consumer bankruptcy practice. 
219 Focus Group of U.S. Trustees (May 3, 2011) (transcript on file with Principal Investigator). 
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afford to pay a fee sufficient to compensate for that time.”220 Others 
remarked that market fees are “depressed by attorneys . . . operating at 
a loss.”221 Still another remarked, “My fee does not cover my time for 
most of my Chapter 7 practice.  I probably represent Chapter 7 debtors 
because I’ve always done so, and as a favor to referring attorneys who 
refer other bankruptcy matters to the office.”222 
  
 Most counsel reported that clients typically pay their lawyers in full 
prior to filing a Chapter 7 case—the bankruptcy code does not allow a 
debtor’s attorney to be paid from estate property.223 Moreover, post-
petition obligations that are incurred pre-petition are dischargeable, so 
any agreement to pay attorney fees after the filing is unenforceable.224 
Some respondents reported, however, that in order to enable cash-poor 
clients to file under Chapter 7, they enter into unenforceable agreements 
to be paid fees post-petition.225 When asked if they end up receiving 
these fees, typically the response was, “sometimes I do, and sometimes I 
don’t.”226 
 
 Debtors’ counsel is not the only professional in Chapter 7 cases 
for which compensation is an issue. Chapter 7 Panel Trustees uniformly 
expressed consternation about the Trustee fee structure currently in 
place. While Chapter 7 Trustees primary role is to liquidate and 
administer a debtor’s non-exempt assets in asset cases,227 in all cases—
including cases in which there are no assets to liquidate and 
administer—the Chapter 7 Trustee is accountable for reviewing the 
debtor’s petition and schedules, investigating the debtor’s financial affairs, 
questioning him or her under oath, and submitting reports to the 
                         
220 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, question 69 (data on file with Principal Investigator).  
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004) (“§ 330(a)(1) does not authorize compensation 
awards to debtors’ attorneys from estate funds, unless they are employed as authorized by § 327. 
If the attorney is to be paid from estate funds under § 330(a)(1) in a chapter 7 case, he must be 
employed by the trustee and approved by the court.”) 
224 Id. 
225 Focus Group with Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (Jan. 18, 2010) (transcript on file with 
Principal Investigator); Focus Group of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (Apr. 2, 2010) (transcript on 
file with Principal Investigator); Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, question 69 (data on file 
with Principal Investigator). 
226 Notes on file with Principal Investigator. 
227 11 U.S.C. § 726. 
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bankruptcy court, and the Office of the U.S. Trustee.228  In addition, 
BAPCPA imposes a host of new responsibilities on Panel Trustees.  They 
are now required to: collect, track, store, and safeguard case documents, 
such as tax returns; notify appropriate parties of domestic support 
obligations; review the accuracy of information in forms associated with 
the means test; and comply with the new requirements for uniform final 
reports.229 They are also charged with the responsibility of investigating 
bankruptcy filings for abuse, criminal activity, and fraud, including 
mortgage fraud on the part of creditors.230  
 
 For these services, Chapter 7 Panel Trustees are paid a portion 
($60) of the filing fee paid by debtor.  If the Trustee does liquidate 
assets, the Trustee will receive, in addition to the $60, a “trustee 
commission” based on the sliding scale formula set forth in § 326 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.231 The commission is based on the value of the assets 
the Trustee brings into the bankruptcy estate.  In cases where there are 
no assets for the Trustee to liquidate, the only compensation the Trustee 
receives is the $60 from the filing fee. The compensation scheme is 
justified by the theory that commissions received from asset cases will 
offset the nominal no-asset fee, such that the Trustee earns overall, 
reasonable compensation for his or her service. 
 
 According to the Study data, the system has failed Chapter 7 Panel 
Trustees.  As observed by a Panel Trustee in testimony before the House 
Judiciary Committee, 
 
A major concern for trustees has been the lack of any compensation 
adjustment since 1994. Under the present law, trustees receive $60 
for administering Chapter 7 cases in which “no assets" are liquidated. 
The last increase in this trustee compensation occurred in 1994, when 
                         
228 11 U.S.C. § 341. 
229 See e.g. 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 351. 
230 See 11 U.S.C. § 707.  
231 According to the statutory bankruptcy commission formula, the Chapter 7 trustee will receive: 
(i) 25% of the first $5,000; (ii) 10% of the next $45,000; (iii) 5% of the next $950,000; and (iv) 
3% of the balance. In addition, Chapter 7 Trustees are entitled to be paid for any legal services 
that he or she performs in order to collect and liquidate and administer assets.  Some trustees 
will hire other lawyers or law firms to do this legal work, but other Chapter 7 Trustees will do the 
work themselves and bill the estate accordingly.  Trustees must apply to the court and receive 
court approval for all commissions and legal fees. 11 U.S.C. § 326 (a). 
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the fee was raised from $45 to $60. Let me emphasize that this is a 
flat fee per case. A case could take an hour, a few hours, days, 
weeks, or in some unique circumstances, years, to bring to closure. 
Trustees essentially work on a “contingent” basis because if their 
efforts do not result in a dividend to creditors, they receive only the 
$60 no asset fee. Every trustee can tell about cases in which he or 
she devoted many hours and much money and did not recover any 
assets. In other cases, trustees are obligated by their statutory duties 
to spend the time and money to fulfill their duty without additional 
compensation. That happens on a daily basis in my practice.232  
 
 The matter of increasing the fee for Panel Trustees has been 
recurrently raised by bankruptcy stakeholders over the course of the past 
twenty years, and multiple Congressional hearings have been held on this 
subject, the most recent one in July 2011.233  Provisions increasing the 
fee have been included in numerous bills, but to date, none have passed. 
When asked, if given the opportunity, what they would change about the 
Chapter 7 consumer bankruptcy system, the vast majority of Chapter 7 
Trustee respondents said the fee level in no-asset cases should be 
increased to reflect the increased time spent meeting BAPCPA’s 
mandates.234 Eighty-six percent of respondents said that no-asset Chapter 
7 cases take more Trustee time than they did prior to BAPCPA’s 
enactment.235  Sixty-four percent of Trustees said the same thing about 
Chapter 7 asset cases.236 
 
 Another strongly expressed concern was the impact of the in forma 
pauperis (“IFP”) provision in BAPCPA.237 The IFP provision allows for a 
                         
232 Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee Responsibilities and Remuneration: Hearing before the House 
Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial and Admin. Law, of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 
(2011) (statement of Robert C. Furr, on behalf of the National Association of Bankruptcy Trustees.)  
233 Id. See also Bankruptcy Trustee Compensation: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Commercial 
and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008). 
234 Chapter 7 Trustee Survey, question 26 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
235 Chapter 7 Trustee Survey, question 22 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
236 Id. 
237  A recent empirical study using the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project IV data examined the 
frequency of IFP filings. The sample was supplemented by an oversample of cases in which 
debtors filed an in forma pauperis application. The study found that only 2.6% of income eligible 
debtors applied for fee waivers.  Of all income qualified Chapter 7 debtors, (i) two-thirds of pro se 
filers, (ii) half of those with pro bono counsel, (iii) less than a third of debtors using a petition 
preparer, and (iv) 2.1% of those represented by an attorney, applied for a fee waiver.  The study 
concluded that the “Chapter 7 filers who applied for a waiver do not appear to have been, on the 
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filing fee waiver for debtors with income of less than 150% of the 
poverty level and an inability to pay the Chapter 7 fees in installments.238 
When a debtor’s bankruptcy petition is granted in forma pauperis status, 
the filing fee is waived and, as a result, the Chapter 7 Trustee receives 
no fee at all. 
 
 When this provision was enacted as part of BAPCPA,239 one of the 
more controversial issues was whether an IFP petition could be filed (and 
granted) if a paid attorney was representing the debtor in the bankruptcy 
case.  Such an arrangement was ultimately sanctioned, although it was 
predicted that the issue would not frequently arise.240  
      
 Despite the prominence this issue took in the survey responses, the 
quantitative data revealed the incidence of IFP filings to be low: 1.9% of 
all Chapter 7 cases. Of all IFP petitions filed, 71.2% of them were 
approved.  A number of Chapter 7 Panel Trustees observed, however, that 
the incidence of IFP filings have increased in the past two years as 
attorneys and debtors have become increasingly aware of their 
availability.241 It was further observed that statistical data about the 
number of IFP cases and their impact on Chapter 7 Trustees does not 
reflect cases where motions are granted to pay filing fees in installments 
and the case ends in dismissal.242 In such cases, the Panel Trustee may 
                                                                         
whole, economically more needy than non-applicants.” Philip Tedesco, In Forma Pauperis in 
Bankruptcy, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 79, 85 (2010).  
238 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f). This is known as filing in forma pauperis which means, “in the character or 
manner of a pauper.” BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 783 (7th ed. 1999). Eligibility for in forma pauperis 
filing is determined under the “poverty guidelines last published by the United States Department 
of Health and Human Services applicable to a family of the size involved.”  JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE UNITED STATES, INTERIM PROCEDURES REGARDING CHAPTER 7 FEE WAIVER PROVISIONS OF THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE 
PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005 available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts/jcusguidelines.html. 
239 See 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f). I am indebted to Judge James E. Massey of the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia for his counsel and observations.  
240 Philip Tedesco, In Forma Pauperis in Bankruptcy, 84 AM. BANKR. DEV. L.J. 79, 85 (2010). 
241 A Panel Trustee, who conducted an informal study of IFP waivers, noted, “As a matter of 
reference, during the period of July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2011 there were 1,105 cases filed in 
Vermont and 31 IFP’s granted for a most recent percentage of 2.8% or an effective rate on the 
No-Asset fee of $58.32 currently . . . . During the period of October 1, 2011 to September 30, 
2011 there were [according to] PACER 15,336 Chapter 7 cases filed, of which there were 1,023 
IFP applications filed, for a 6.67%. This would result in an effect rate based on IFP cases of $56.” 
Notes on file with Principal Investigator.  
242 As was observed by a Chapter 7 Trustee, another issue related to IFP waivers needs to be 
recognized: “the number of installment cases which are filed, and subsequently dismissed . . . . 
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receive only fraction of the $60 fee. The quantitative and qualitative data 
make clear that the frequency of use of in forma pauperis filings varies 
considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
 
 As noted above, if a debtor does not pay a filing fee, the Chapter 
7 Trustee receives no payment for administering the case.  But in some 
instances, debtors’ counsel is charging their indigent client a fee. We 
found that in all cases in which an IFP motion was filed and an attorney 
was paid, the mean debtor’s attorney fee was $695.  In cases where the 
IFP was granted, the mean attorney fee was $502.243   
 
 
Table 7. In Forma Pauperis Cases  
Post‐BAPCPA 
Attorney Fees 
  
% of cases 
Current $  Inflation Adjusted 
2005 dollars 
All in forma pauperis cases  1.9%  $783  $695 
  in forma pauperis granted  71.2%  $563  $502 
in forma pauperis no assets  100%  $783  $695 
 
 
 Bankruptcy judges also expressed consternation about the nominal 
fees paid to Panel Trustees in no-asset cases. As one judge observed, 
“we have primarily no-asset cases with minimal compensation to panel 
trustees, as well as numerous pro se filers who require additional time to 
be spent by the trustee.”244 Another judge noted,  
 
no commission for in forma pauperis cases [and] inadequate 
compensation for no-asset cases [are concerning]. These all take 
time. [There are] very few asset cases to earn the commissions. I 
am amazed that many of the trustees have not yet quit. In most 
                                                                         
[O]ver 13% of the cases filed sought to pay the filing fee by installments, and of that, 
approximately 47% appear to actually complete the installments. Depending upon the amount paid 
under the installments, the resulting Trustee Compensation in failed cases is also reduced. This is 
a bit of a wildcard since verification of the data is difficult, but on the assumption that the 
installments are nominal the amount of cases not paid increases to over 14% making the 
effective rate in that District at $51.43.” Notes on file with Principal Investigator.   
243 See infra Appendix III, Table A – 11.  
244 Bankruptcy Judges Survey, question 23 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
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cases they are the “face of the system”—it is important we have 
good trustees.245   
 
It was further observed, “the $60 they get for a no-asset is grossly 
inadequate to compensate them for the amount of documents and 
information they must review. This low fee discourages people who would 
be great trustees from considering applying to be trustees. It is bad for 
the system.”246 
 
 The concern about Panel Trustees leaving the system, and being 
discouraged from entering it appears to be real.  As observed by one 
Chapter 7 Trustee who is giving up his trusteeship,  
 
The other portions of my firm’s practice have been subsidizing my 
Chapter 7 consumer trustee practice for years. [There] are no 
financial rewards and [it has become] an administrative hassle.  
Cases with assets to distribute mostly occur in urban areas.  [Even 
when I have an asset case] there is more tension [than there used 
to be] about whether I will receive my maximum compensation on 
assets distributed.247  
 
 The no-asset Trustee fee and IFP issue and their impact on 
Chapter 7 Trustees implicates fundamental fairness. The collective effect 
of low or no fees paid to Chapter 7 Trustees for cases that require 
increasingly more work and resources resulted in 62% of respondents 
reporting a current lower net income from their Chapter 7 Trustee 
consumer practice than before BAPCPA’s enactment.248  Moreover, 92% of 
respondents “disagreed” or “strongly disagreed” with the statement, “I am 
fairly compensated by my work as a Chapter 7 Trustee in consumer 
cases.”249  Seventy-eight percent of respondents reported a “higher” or 
“much higher” stress level attributed to their Chapter 7 Trustee consumer 
practice.250  
 
                         
245 Id.  
246 Bankruptcy Judges Survey, question 23 (data on file with Principal Investigator) 
247 Interview with Chapter 7 Trustee (July 11, 2011) (Notes on file with Principal Investigator). 
248 Chapter 7 Trustee Survey, question 27 (data on file with Principal Investigator).  
249 Chapter 7 Trustee Survey, question 28 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
250 Chapter 7 Trustee Survey, question 29 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
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 With respect to fees in Chapter 13 cases, there are significant 
distinctions in all fee-related practices, customs and policies at the state, 
district, court, and even individual levels. Over 50% of attorneys surveyed 
charge a flat fee to their Chapter 13 clients.251 Fifteen percent of the 
lawyers reported charging by the hour, and ~15% used a combined 
hourly rate and flat fee.252 Others reported charging a “sliding scale,” 
depending upon what debtors can pay.253  The median hourly rate 
reported by those responding attorneys who charge an hourly rate is 
$271.254  Note however, that this is the rate charged, not necessarily the 
rate ultimately received.255  In many instances, there is a significant 
divergence between the two.256 Moreover, many lawyers reported that their 
effective hourly rate, when they charged the presumptively reasonable fee 
was considerably lower than their “usual” hourly rate.257 
 
 In many jurisdictions, the “flat fee” is a de jure or de facto 
“presumptively reasonable fee” arrangement (“PRF”).258 A PRF allows the 
lawyer to charge a flat, pre-approved fee for an array of services and 
avoid the necessity of filing a fee application with the court.259 In some 
jurisdictions, the lawyer determines up front whether he or she will charge 
client the PRF.  In at least one district, the attorney is afforded more 
flexibility in terms of the timing of the decision: “Attorneys make the 
decision within 30 days of the 341 completion to opt out of the base fee 
and this is due to complicated issues in the case.”260 In yet other 
jurisdictions, the amount of the PRF turns on the size of the plan 
payments: “In [my district] there is an ‘official’ no-look fee of $3,000, but 
if the plan will pay less than a total of $5,000 (including attorney's fees 
and trustee's commission) the attorney fee is only $2,000.”261  
                         
251 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, question 43 (data on file with Principal Investigator).  
252 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, question 43 (data on file with Principal Investigator).  
253 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, question 48 (data on file with Principal Investigator).  
254 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, question 44 (data on file with Principal Investigator).  
255 See supra notes 284–289 and accompanying text. 
256 Id. 
257 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, question 45 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
258 See infra Appendix VI. 
259 As one Chapter 13 Trustee observed, “Per local rule, fee [applications] are an option if counsel 
does not want to be bound by the no-look fee. Some few always chose that option; most accept 
the no-look fee.”  Chapter 13 Trustee Survey, question 25 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
260 Chapter 13 Trustee Survey, question 25 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
261 Notes on file with Principal Investigator.  
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 According to the Survey, in almost all jurisdictions with a PRF, the 
PRF array of services for Chapter 13 representation includes: 
 
1. Initial meeting with debtors to explain the bankruptcy process; 
2. Advice to debtors concerning their obligations and duties under the 
Bankruptcy Code and Rules, applicable court orders, and the 
provisions of their Chapter 13 plan; 
3. Preparation and filing of the documents required by § 521 of the 
Bankruptcy Code; 
4. Preparation and filing the plan; 
5. Attending the 341 meeting; 
6. Communication with client after the 341 meeting; 
7. Attendance of confirmation hearing.262 
 
  In some jurisdictions, the PRF services also include: 
 
1. Preparation and filing of all motions required to protect the 
debtor’s interest; 
2. Preparation and filing of responses to all motions filed against the 
debtor; 
3. Preparation and filing any and all plan amendments; 
4. Representing the debtor in connection with a motion for relief from 
stay; 
5. Representing the debtor in connection with a motion for relief from 
stay which is resolved by agreement; 
6. Representing the debtor in connection with a motion by the 
Chapter 13 Trustees seeking dismissal of the case; 
7. Representing the debtor in connection with a motion by the 
Chapter 13 Trustee seeking dismissal of the case for which there is 
an agreement or no opposition; 
8. Representing the debtor in connection with debtor’s motion to 
modify the plan; 
9. Representing the debtor in a contested matter.263 
 
 In a few jurisdictions, the PRF services also include: 
                         
262 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, question 51 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
263 Id.  
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1. Representing the debtor in an adversary proceeding as plaintiff; 
2. Representing the debtor in an adversary proceeding as defendant; 
3. Representing the debtor in any matter in which the court orders 
“fee shifting”; 
4. Representing the debtor in any matter in for which the first hearing 
is set more than 120 days following confirmation.264 
 
 In those jurisdictions where the PRF is a “cradle to grave” fee, 
there is no opportunity, even if the unforeseeable happens, for the lawyer 
to receive additional compensation.265 Most often however, the debtor is 
charged the PRF in a standard case, but if a complication arises, such as 
the filing of an adversary proceeding, the attorney may be entitled to 
either a fixed amount of additional compensation, or payment of an 
hourly rate for time spent.266 
 
 The circumstances under which a lawyer would file either an 
abbreviated fee application and receive a fee amount in accordance with 
a local rule-based schedule, or file a more extensive fee application and 
receive an hourly rate, varies by district and by court.  Illustrations 
include:  
 
• “Motions for Relief from Stay generate a request for additional fees 
when multiple hearings are required.” 
• “All post-confirmation fees are by application with the exception to 
allowance of fees by stipulation with the debtor and Chapter 13 
trustee if under $1,000.” 
• “We mostly see supplemental fee requests in connection with 
requests to modify confirmed plans.” 
• “Adversary proceedings almost always require fee applications.” 
• “There are basically two times I see fee applications: in failed 
cases that do not get confirmed (attorneys frequently file a fee 
application so that their unpaid fees are paid from the money in 
                         
264 Id. 
265 Focus Group of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (Sept. 23, 2010) (transcript on file with 
Principal Investigator).  
266 Notes on file with Principal Investigator.  
 
 
102 
 
my possession . . . these are routinely granted by the Court); and 
exceedingly complicated cases (rarely see these filed . . . but when 
filed by my ‘regular’ debtors' bar, the fees are generally 
granted).”267   
 
 Not all lawyers exercise their right to augment the PRF by filing an 
application for additional fees. As one Chapter 13 Trustee noted,  
 
the most frequent participants in the system are “scared” to file 
the fee applications because they don't know what to expect and 
many comment that filing the application takes far longer than the 
fees incurred in many cases (and they can't seek payment for 
much of the time preparing the application) so they don't bother.268   
 
 At least one district builds an “administrative reserve” into every 
Chapter 13 plan as a way of ensuring the debtor will be able to pay 
additional legal fees if approved.269  If the reserve fund is not used for 
attorney fees, it is distributed to unsecured creditors.270 According to the 
data, the administrative reserve is not widely used.271 
 
 We further found in some Chapter 13 cases, fees charged by 
attorneys do not rise to the level of the PRF.  A variety of reasons were 
cited for this, including: (i) filing a Chapter 13 to pay attorney fees, with 
the intention of converting to a Chapter 7 as soon as the fees were 
paid,272 (ii) agreeing to a lesser fee for those in the military or other 
“sympathetic” clients,273 (iii) determining that a debtor “can’t afford” the 
                         
267 Chapter 13 Trustee Survey, question 25 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
268 Id. 
269 Notes on file with Principal Investigator.  
270 Notes on file with Principal Investigator. 
271 Notes on file with Principal Investigator. 
272 “Debtor can file [a Chapter] 7 but can't come up with the [fee] to file . . . . So the attorney 
has the debtor file [a Chapter] 13 to collect fees [through] the plan, but charges a fee between 
the normal [Chapter] 7 fee and the no-look [Chapter] 13 fee.  If the debtor is having his pay 
garnished, this may be only way to get the case filed.” Notes on file with Principal Investigator.  
273 Fee discounts for service men and women, members of legal plans, and a few other 
“sympathetic” debtors were reported.  “There aren’t any hard and fast rules, but understand, I am 
a bankruptcy lawyer because I want to help people.  If that means I decided to make less, that’s 
a decision I make.  And it’s not a decision I make lightly.”  Interview with Consumer Bankruptcy 
Attorney (Sept. 25, 2011) (transcript on file with Principal Investigator).  
 
 
103 
 
no-look fee,274 (iv) the case is a “disguised” Chapter 7,275 (v) market 
pressures,276 and (vi) the operational complexity of a case.277 
  
 A majority of lawyers reported, and the quantitative data confirmed, 
only the exceptional cases merited charging less than the PRF. One 
attorney observed that the client’s ability to pay the PRF was used as a 
prognosticator of the success of the Chapter 13 plan: “if a debtor cannot 
afford the full legal fee, they are likely not able to complete a plan.”278  
 
 The mean attorney fee values, however, revealed twenty-two 
jurisdictions where the PRF was higher than the mean fee received in a 
discharged case.   
 
 
Table 8. Districts Where the Average Fee for Discharged Chapter 13 Cases Was 
Below the Presumptively Reasonable Fee Post-BAPCPA279  
District Average Fee 
Post-BAPCPA 
Presumptive Fee Post-
BAPCPA 
                         
274 Chapter 13 Trustee Survey, question 25 (data on file with Principal Investigator) (“Many debtors’ 
[attorneys] do not charge the full no-look fee if the debtor cannot afford it.”) “Sometimes you 
might agree with the debtor to take less.  This isn't that common since even a $1,000 price 
cut, only lowers a plan payment by $16 a month or so.” Notes on File with Principal Investigator.   
275 “The [C]hapter 13 is a [C]hapter 7 in disguise. The most appropriate circumstance for this to 
occur is when the debtor does pass the means test in [Chapter] 7, but has a 0% payout to 
unsecured in a [Chapter] 13. This can occur when the debtor has child support income which is 
included in [Current Monthly Income] in [Chapter] 7 but excluded in [Chapter] 13, or has 
retirement account payroll deductions which are not an allowable expense in [Chapter] 7 but are 
in [Chapter] 13.  The case is simpler than the normal [Chapter] 13 and the attorney charges less.”  
Notes on file with Principal Investigator.  
276 “I would attribute below no-look median fees virtually entirely to market pressures . . . we have 
attorneys who take [Chapter] 13s for $2,000 or even less, while our no-look is $4,000/$4,500.” 
Notes on file with Principal Investigator.   
277 “[It] depends on the complexity of the case, not just legal complexity but also (and probably 
more importantly) operational complexity, i.e., how can we rearrange the debtor's business/income 
vis a vis his overhead/expenses to make what appears to be a non-feasible plan feasible (one of 
the useful services a good attorney provides in the absence of an accountant who in a Chapter 
11 would be doing that).”  Notes on File with Principal Investigator.  
278 Notes on file with Principal Investigator. 
279 Presumptively reasonable fees values dating from 2006 to 2008 were considered post-BAPCPA. 
For the average fee numbers, the values from the quantitative analysis were used. Only those 
districts with a difference between the presumptively reasonable fee and the average fee of more 
than $200 were included. Districts where the presumptively reasonable fee was set by unwritten 
practice were not included in these tables. See infra Appendix VI, Table A – 24 and Appendix V, 
Table A – 18 for the complete data. 
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District Average Fee 
Post-BAPCPA 
Presumptive Fee Post-
BAPCPA 
ALNB $1,685.06 $2,500 
ALSB $2,183.64 $3,000 
AKB $2,048.46 $2,500 
CACB $2,671.52 $3,000 to $4,000 
CAEB $3,265.09 $3,500 
GASB $2,260.53 $2,500 
ILCB $2,157.86 $2,500 to $3,000 
ILSB $3,156.43 $3,500 
INSB $3,195.96 $3,500 
LAMB $2,112.32 $2,500 
MNB $1,712.20 $2,000 to $2,500/$3,000 
MOEB $2,639.35 $3,000 
NJB $2,528.60 $3,500 
NCEB $2,614.70 $3,000 
NCMB $2,399.47 $2,500 to $3,000 
NCWB $2,299.51 $3,000 
OHSB $2,656.29 $3,000 
OKEB $1,942.42 $3,750 
RIB $2,832.21 $3,500 
TNEB $1,916.92 $3,000 
TXSB $2,435.13 $3,085 
WYB $1,798.04 $2,000 
 
 
 Not only is there variation in how much an attorney is paid, and 
the method by which the amount of the fee is determined, there are also 
material differences in Chapter 13 cases as to how the attorney fee is 
structured.280 The extent to which an attorney receives his or her fees up 
front, in whole or in part, or over time as part of the plan payments, and 
over what period of time, turns on one of more of the following 
variables: (i) the lawyer’s or the lawyer’s firm’s policies, predilections or 
business model, (ii) the presiding judge, (ii) the interpretation of the 
Bankruptcy Code in the jurisdiction, (iii) the Chapter 13 Trustee, (iv) the 
                         
280 A number of lawyers observed that clients frequently shop for the lowest upfront fees and the 
willingness of lawyers to pay filing fees for clients (and receive later reimbursement through plan 
payments). This affects the market for consumer debtors’ attorneys. Focus Group with Consumer 
Bankruptcy Attorneys (Jan. 18, 2010) (transcript on file with Principal Investigator); Focus Group of 
Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (Feb. 11, 2010) (transcript on file with Principal Investigator); 
Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, question 19 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
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lawyer’s predictions about the feasibility of the debtor’s case, (v) the 
market for legal services, and (vi) local custom and practice.281  
 
 How fees are structured impacts not only how much is paid by a 
client, but also how much is received by the lawyer.  The structure also 
affects chapter choice as well as the issue of how cases perform and 
their eventual disposition. An example of how this plays out was 
described by an attorney as follows: 
  
In [District A] attorneys get paid $200 a month, meaning that if 
nothing is taken in advance, the attorney [is] paid [over] . . . 15 
months.282 There is no judicial opinion on where these funds 
[should be] taken from, so frequently Debtors have “step” plans 
that provide $200 more a month for the first 15 months, then drop 
down. 
  
In [District B], however, the Court [determined] that while [section] 
1325 requires secured creditors to receive “equal monthly 
payments” it does not require that [those] . . . payments start at 
confirmation.  Accordingly, these plans pay only “adequate 
protection payments” to secured creditors (usually cars) basically 
swiping some of their money to pay attorneys fees.  Additionally, 
since the Code only requires pre-confirmation adequate protection 
payments for personal property collateral, the 2-4 months of pre-
confirmation mortgage payments get diverted to pay attorneys 
fees, with that amount being added to the mortgage arrearage.  
With these . . . maneuvers, debtors’ attorney fees usually get paid 
within 6-12 months of filing a case. 
  
Lastly, in [District C] the attorney fees are spread over the length 
of the Chapter 13 plan. This means that if nothing is taken in 
advance, the full amount is paid in 60 installments. Because of 
this, fees paid through the plan are incredibly devalued, both 
[because of the time value of money] and because of the [higher] 
risk of case dismissal.  Accordingly, most attorneys [in District C] 
require $1500 or more “up-front.” 
                         
281 Notes on file with Principal Investigator.  
282 If the plan payment is lower than $200/month, it takes longer for attorneys to receive their 
fee. 
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These three different schemes for paying attorney fees have real 
effects on chapter selection.  [District C] has far fewer Chapter 13 
cases . . . . [In many instances] potential clients either don’t file or 
the attorney works with him or her to get them into a Chapter 7. 
  
Similarly, [District B] might have higher dismissal rates, since an 
attorney only needs a debtor to last 6-10 months to cover his or 
her costs, making it less risky [for the attorney] to take a more 
tenuous case. 
  
In [District A] with step-down plans, the first year, which is already 
often the hardest for a debtor, is even harder due to the 
heightened payment.283 
  
 On their face, these appear to be mere procedural decisions about 
the timing of fee distributions, but in practice, these decisions have a 
critical substantive effect on the debtor, the attorney as well as on the 
bankruptcy system as a whole.  
  
 The above discussion concerns fees charged in cases in which the 
debtor receives a discharge.  The story with respect to attorney fees 
received in cases that end in a dismissal is very different. As the 
objective data reveals, attorney fees received in dismissed cases were 
42% lower than those fees received in cases that end in discharge.284  
This, in part, accounts for the difference between the fee an attorney 
charges, and the fee the attorney receives.285 When Chapter 13 Trustees 
were asked how much attorneys charged and how they are paid in 
dismissed cases, the answers varied greatly. 286  With respect to cases 
dismissed prior to confirmation, the range of answers included: 
 
• “$800 paid pre-petition plus 25% of unpaid balance up to a 
max amount of $300; Any fees awarded in a dismissed or 
converted case must be by application (unless under $1,000).” 
                         
283 Interview with Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney (Apr. 2, 2010) (notes on file with Principal 
Investigator). 
284 See infra Appendix II, Table A – 5.  
285 Id. 
286 The Chapter 13 Trustee responses included cases that were converted as well as dismissed.  
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• “In addition to the amount of the fee paid pre-petition, 
sometimes attorneys receive a portion of payments made prior to 
dismissal or conversion.” 
• “To the extent that pre-confirmation plan payments were 
made, the debtor’s attorney will receive some pro rata portion 
distribution after, i) all required adequate protection payments are 
paid in full, and ii) the Trustee’s ‘new case set up fee.’ Usually they 
receive nothing.”  
• “Generally, the dismissal orders provide for attorney fees to 
be paid up to $400.”  
• “Funds are refunded to the debtor in care of the attorney.  
The attorney may resolve with the debtor what if any are paid 
from the refund.” 
• “Pursuant to court order they get up to one-half of the no 
look fee if the case is dismissed.” 
• “We have a local rule that allows them up to $500 of the 
funds on hand toward their unpaid fee claim in a case that is 
dismissed or converted pre-confirmation.  They also get to keep 
whatever they were paid pre-petition.” 
• “Debtors’ attorneys will now receive up to $1,000, depending 
on balance on hand, in converted or dismissed cases.” 
• “My rule . . . is not to object to all but $100 or so of the 
requested fee (usually $2,500) if the dismissal/conversion is not 
the attorney's fault and the case was otherwise ready for 
confirmation.  Often there is not enough money in our account to 
pay all that.” 
• “The attorney generally gets paid his retainer and some 
amount as an administrative fee based upon the Court's granting 
of a fee application.” 
• “If their client has made plan payments and there are funds 
in the case, the attorney will file a fee application for the ‘no look’ 
fee balance remaining less trustee's fees from the available funds.” 
• “It depends on the amount on hand after payment of the 
filing fee. Usually $300 to $900.” 
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• “Cases crater in the first 9 months.  The plan dictates how 
such fees are paid and in many cases, the fees have not been 
satisfied at the time of dismissal.”  
• “Attorneys who want to be paid need to file a motion for an 
administrative expense.  These motions are typically allowed for the 
full amount of the no-look fee, though there is rarely enough 
money on hand to pay it.” 
• “We are a jurisdiction that pays pre-confirmation, so often 
times counsel is paid in full.” 
• “Depends on the amount of the plan payment—but 60-70% 
are likely getting the entire fee because such a small portion is 
going to adequate protection payments in most cases.” 
• “$300 per court order.” 
• “Presumptive fee of $900 if funds are on hand.”  
• “If attorney timely completed all tasks and dismissal was 
debtors fault, they can get the full presumptive fee (however, I 
usually only have one or two payments to disburse on attorney 
fees).  Other times, the court only allows the retainer, and in 
extreme cases, the [court] will require disgorgement.”287 
 
 These answers show that the debtor's ability to complete a multi-
year plan dictate whether an attorney will received their full fee, or 
nothing.288 One attorney observed that a consequence of these varied 
policies is that lawyers take Chapter 13 cases essentially on a 
contingency basis. 289 This, in turn, has a profound effect upon the quality 
of legal services delivered.  
 
 When asked about the time it takes to represent a consumer 
debtor in a Chapter 13 case, the answers ranged from 3 to 50 hours, 
with most respondents making clear that there is no such thing as a 
“typical” or average case, and the time varies greatly from case to 
                         
287 Chapter 13 Trustee Survey, question 37 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
288 With respect to cases that were dismissed following confirmation, attorneys fared somewhat 
better. A majority of Chapter 13 Trustees reported that attorneys received what they had already 
been paid.  In many jurisdictions, by that point, attorneys were paid all or most of their fee. 
Chapter 13 Trustee Survey, question 37 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
289 Notes on file with Principal Investigator.  
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case.290 The mean number of hours spent by attorneys representing a 
Chapter 13 debtor in a case that resulted in a discharge fell between 12 
and 25 hours.291 Interestingly, responding attorneys reported spending 
roughly the same amount of time on a Chapter 13 case that was 
discharged, as they did in a case that was converted or dismissed. 
 
Figure 19. Time Spent on Discharged and Dismissed/Converted Chapter 13 
Cases292 
 
 
 Attorneys were asked to break down how long it took to perform 
each discrete task when representing Chapter 13 debtors. The most time-
consuming tasks were (in order) (i) gathering the required documentation 
from the debtor, (ii) client “handholding,” and (iii) drafting and preparing 
the petition, schedules, plan, and means test, and (iv) calculating Current 
Monthly Income.293 
 
                         
290 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, questions 72–74 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
291 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, question 72 (data on file with Principal Investigator).  
292 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, questions 72–73 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
293 Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey, question 81 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
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Figure 20. Ranking of Tasks as Most and Least Time-Consuming, Top Time-
Consuming Tasks 
 
 
 3. Qualitative Analysis  
 
 Part III above describes the raw qualitative data that emerged from 
focus groups, interviews, and survey responses. Analysis of the data 
enables us to assess the operation of the consumer bankruptcy system 
generally, and evaluate the extent to which its objectives are being met.  
Two central themes became apparent:  
 
1. The disunion between (i) complexity of the consumer bankruptcy 
system, (ii) the experience and resources needed to represent debtors 
through an often byzantine maze, and (iii) the dearth of resources 
available to pay for this representation; and 
 
2. The irony presented by the ostensible goals of those who sought 
the 2005 Bankruptcy Code amendments and the unintended 
consequences of these changes in practice. 
 
 These themes cut across a preponderance of the data, and across 
all data sets. They also reveal causal linkages between the consumer 
bankruptcy process and outcomes.   
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 a. Complexity, Experienced Professionals & Needed Resources 
 
 As the raw data details, the consumer bankruptcy system is 
exceptionally complex, and only more so since BAPCPA’s enactment.  
Even a “seemingly simple” case may turn out to be “a minor 
quagmire.”294 And there are ever fewer “seemingly simple” cases.  As 
observed, “the paradigmatic Chapter 13 debtor” no longer exists: one in 
which a client has lost a well-paying job, incurs debt, gets another well-
paying job, and then files for bankruptcy to discharge the debt incurred.  
It takes more skill and experience to responsibly and professionally 
represent consumer debtors—especially in this economic climate—than it 
used to. There is a greater need to have a nuanced understanding of the 
dissonance between how the system is designed to work in theory, and 
how it works in practice. Lawyers consistently report working harder than 
ever before, and experiencing higher stress levels that they directly 
attribute to practicing in the new consumer bankruptcy environment.   
  
 Moreover, the system is less tolerant of mistakes and yet there are 
so many more opportunities presented by BAPCPA for even seasoned 
attorneys to make errors.295 Without a detailed understanding of how to 
make the system work, the temptation is there for lawyers to “cut 
                         
294 The following was described in the blog post, What Are We Worth as Bankruptcy Lawyers? “I 
sat with a new client discussing his bankruptcy options, puzzling how to price a Chapter 7 that’s 
fair to me and fair to the client.  To the client, it no doubt looked like a ‘simple’ Chapter 7:  a 
job, a couple of pieces of underwater property, no taxes, no spouse, no sweat, right? 
To me, it looks like a minor quagmire: 
• There’s an income blip in the look back period; 
• Client’s parent lives on one property and pays “rent” only sporadically; 
• We’ve got business expenses for investment properties, with any records scattered; 
• Values of properties are undetermined; 
• Credit card payments are made by automatic bank draft, the debtor hopes to stop; 
• There’s recent purchase activity on several cards; 
• The car loan is with a credit union that issued client a credit card: cross collateralization 
• Future income both from job and properties will be different than look back; AND 
• We expect to file a subsequent 13 to strip off/cram down underwater liens—so 
consistency is important.” 
Cathy Moran, What Are We Worth As Bankruptcy Lawyers?, BANKRUPTCY MASTERY 
http://www.bankruptcymastery.com/what-are-we-worth-as-bankruptcy-lawyers/. 
295 The consumer bankruptcy system was described as evidencing an “iceberg effect”—more 
beneath the surface than what meets the eye.  Focus Group of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys 
(Apr. 2, 2010) (transcript on file with Principal Investigator). 
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corners” in order to minimize time spent on a client’s case, or 
conversely, to spend so much time on a case that the legal fee exceeds 
what an insolvent client can reasonably afford. Efficiency coupled with a 
high level of skill, while important in every area of law practice, is crucial 
to the success of a consumer bankruptcy practice. “Best practices” for 
consumer bankruptcy lawyers requires finding a balance between 
comprehensively addressing a financially distressed client’s interests, and 
doing so in a time sensitive and efficient manner.   
 
 “Best practices” however, are not consistently achieved by the 
whole of the consumer bankruptcy bar. Stakeholders noted “a lot of 
variation in the quality of practice,” but this variation was not necessarily 
tied to the BAPCPA changes.296  At least one trustee observed, “I [saw] 
crappy attorneys before, I [see] crappy attorneys now, I [saw] good 
attorneys before [and I see] good attorneys now.”297 It was also 
recognized that the cost of entry to the market is high, and “new 
entrants to the market disappear as fast as they appear,” especially 
those lawyers who “occasionally” represent consumer debtors.298  
Attorneys, trustees, judges, and U.S. Trustee respondents all expressed 
concern about the system-wide negative effects of the expedient entry of 
less experienced and opportunistic lawyers into the consumer bankruptcy 
market.  
 
 Despite the observations about uneven quality of legal 
representation, one scholar recently asserted that compared to other 
government “redistributive programs,” bankruptcy is a “relative success.”299  
Recognizing that consumers are paying a high price for bankruptcy 
“benefits” and describing the phenomenon of the high cost of bankruptcy 
as the “affordability paradox,” it was argued: 
                         
296 Focus Group of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (Jan. 18, 2010) (transcript on file with Principal 
Investigator); Chapter 13 Trustee Survey, question 15 (data on file with Principal Investigator); 
Chapter 7 Trustee Survey, question 13 (data on file with Principal Investigator).   
297 Focus Group of Chapter 13 Trustees (July 15, 2010) (transcript on file with Principal 
Investigator). 
298 Focus Group of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, (Apr. 2 2010) (transcript on file with Principal 
Investigator). 
299 Littwin supra note 39 at 1939 (defining success in terms of accessibility).  Professor Littwin 
further noted, “Consumer bankruptcy attorneys contribute to the smooth running of the system, 
protect their clients from overreaching, and lobby against bankruptcy legislation that could 
potentially harm consumers.” Id. at 1040. 
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when struggling bankruptcy consumers hand over much-needed 
funds to their lawyers, they are paying for more than 
representation in their individual cases.  They are paying for the 
fact that much of the administrative work necessary to process 
their bankruptcies will be completed by people they have hired, 
rather than by government officials operating under the pressures 
of bureaucratic entitlement.  They are paying for the continued 
development of a community of lawyers and judges that wants 
consumer bankruptcy to work.300 
 
 This community of lawyers is comprised of a mix of highly skilled 
and professional practitioners, and a cadre of less capable, experienced 
or committed counsel. The matter of encouraging and tangibly rewarding 
proficiency, dedication and best practices is a matter of serious concern.  
As with other professionals, attorneys are motivated by “objective symbols 
of recognition.”301 These symbols include reputational capital, professional 
honors, and high rates of remuneration.302 Many respondents described a 
disconnect between the skill, time, and commitment it takes for attorneys 
to provide debtors with first-rate representation, and compensation that 
does not always reflect such excellence.  
 
 It is not just attorney personal income that is at issue—significant 
gross receivables are required to support a law office.  A law firm’s 
income and cash flow must cover staffing an office with highly skilled 
and proficient support staff,303 investments in expensive software, hardware 
and document storage systems,304 as well as office rent, insurance, and 
other immutable operating costs.305 Moreover, because consumer debtors 
                         
300 Id. at 1941. 
301 TALCOTT PARSONS, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, 43–46 (1964). 
302 Id. 
303 It was observed that practice under BAPCPA requires support staff to be “much smarter,” and 
thus more expensive. Focus Group of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, (Sept. 23, 2010) (transcript 
on file with Principal Investigator). 
304 The necessary software investments included Best Case Solutions, Chromata, Quickbooks, and 
Adobe Reader, among others.  Notes on File with Principal Investigator. 
305 Because consumer debtor representation may be as long as a five-year commitment, once an 
attorney invests in the practice, the attorney has the incentive to maintain the practice. 
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are not likely to be repeat clients, at least in the short term,306 lawyers 
must take affirmative steps to ensure a steady stream of new clients. 
This typically requires substantial investments in advertising.307  
 
 It was repeatedly observed by those attorneys struggling with these 
conflicting forces and by trustees and judges observing this struggle, that 
there a tension inherent in the indispensability of highly skilled consumer 
bankruptcy attorneys, and the resources reasonably available to sustain a 
quality bar. If the goal is for the consumer bankruptcy system to continue 
to operate with the integrity it does when “best practices” are adhered 
to, policies directed at reconciling this tension ought to be carefully 
considered. 
  
 b. BAPCPA’s Unintended Consequences 
 
 Many of BAPCPA’s unintended effects have turned the concept of 
relief for “poor but unfortunate debtors” on its head.  It was consistently 
observed that BAPCPA’s dictates resulted in “the poorest debtors [having] 
highest plan payments because their apparent disposable income cannot 
be taken out of the mix by high mortgage and car payments . . . .”308 As 
numerous scholars have observed, “consumer bankruptcy suffer[s] from 
the irony that those who need it the most are often too poor to take 
advantage of its relief.”309 Moreover, “additional administrative costs in 
increased attorney fees [result in] reduced dividends to non-priority 
unsecured creditors.”310 As we found in our analysis of the quantitative 
                         
306 Jean M. Lown, Serial Bankruptcy Filers No Problem, 26-5 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 36 (2007) (finding in 
a limited district study few financial and demographic variables helpful in identifying serial filers). 
307 Advertisements commonly take the form of web pages, paid Google placements, yellow page 
ads, billboards, and less frequently, radio and television ads. In addition, a number of lawyers 
have established on-line blogs, to both educate their future clients, as well as to heighten their 
name recognition. Other lawyers with long-standing enough practices, however, reported largely 
relying on word of mouth and client referrals to develop and maintain their practices. We 
conducted a review of hundreds of consumer bankruptcy attorney websites in an effort to 
augment our survey sample size.  We found many of these websites to have a great deal of 
substantive content, and for the most part, found them to be informative and consumer-centric. 
We also found that billboard advertising is more common in some areas of the country than 
others.   
308 Chapter 13 Trustee Survey, question 39 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
309 Littwin, supra note, 39 at 1935. 
310 Chapter 13 Trustee Survey, question 39 (data on file with Principal Investigator). “Debtors are 
now permitted to pay less to their unsecured creditors, and to propose from the outset of their 
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data, overall distributions to unsecured creditors were uncharged—an 
irony that cannot be lost on the financial services industry lobbyists.311   
 
 Respondents consistently recounted the irony of how easy it was to 
“game” a system that facially appeared to leave little room for discretion 
and flexibility, but yet left the door wide open for manipulation.312 Chapter 
13 Trustees confirmed this observation. “The purpose of the means test 
was to create uniformity. In reality it created gamesmanship and 
absurdity. The real losers are the debtors and creditors [who] are paying 
more in fees for a process that has not improved.”313 
 
 Moreover, it was observed that in an effort to achieve the goals of 
the bankruptcy system, judges are also working around the system’s 
inflexible dictates. As one Chapter 13 Trustee observed, “the means test . 
. . uses totally made up numbers, and our judge uses special 
circumstances to get around it so we can go to the actual budget.”314 A 
Chapter 13 Trustee observed, “[based on] some comments that I get from 
the bench, [judges] felt that the law wasn’t in the best interest of the 
system as a whole.  And so they kind of, through local rules, and 
through local practices, have refined it a little bit.”315 
 
 The vast majority of respondents were adamant, however, that the 
variety of “strategic approaches” to working with the system were not 
taken for the purpose of corrupting or abusing the bankruptcy process 
                                                                         
case to pay less, even if, were the pre-BAPCPA Code requirements applied, they would be required 
to pay more and in many cases would be required to remain in plans longer.” Id. 
311 See supra notes 139–144 and accompanying text.  
312 BAPCPA has removed much of the discretion that had been exercised by Trustees and judges 
pre-BAPCPA, and it has “turned trustees into collection agents and paper pushers rather than 
actively involved decision and judgment makers at the level and to the extent they were pre-
BAPCPA.” It was further noted, “Section 1325(b)(1) and related provisions such as 101(10)(A) [are] 
designed to eliminate judicial discretion and create a formula that often punishes the prudent but 
unfortunate [debtors] and rewards the more wealthy [imprudent] consumer with a sizeable house 
and car payment . . . .” Chapter 13 Trustee Survey, questions 29, 39 (data on file with Principal 
Investigator). 
313 Chapter 13 Trustee Survey, question 39 (data on file with Principal Investigator). But see Mann, 
Sweat Box supra note 9 (predicting that creditor benefits from BAPCPA would not come from 
greater bankruptcy case distributions but from the effect of slowing the time of debtors’ inevitable 
filings). 
314 Chapter 13 Trustee Survey, question 39 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
315 Focus Group of Chapter 13 Trustees (July 15, 2010) (transcript on file with Principal 
Investigator).   
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but in an effort to enable needed relief for financially distressed 
debtors.316  The strategies employed were an attempt to scale the 
“unproductive barriers to the success of a case.”317 
 
 With all that said, the consumer bankruptcy system still leaves 
room for debtors, with the help of their attorneys, to achieve “success”—
although definitions of success may differ depending upon the 
circumstances. Despite BAPCPA’s procedural hurdles, debtors are 
continuing to file for bankruptcy protection and to receive, in many 
cases, needed discharge. Moreover, sometimes all a debtor needs is 
some time—to move, to refinance or modify a loan.  As recounted by a 
Chapter 13 Trustee, “[to get] the debtor . . . 30 more days, . . . the 
debtor go[es] into [Chapter] 13, convert[s] to [Chapter] 7 just to get some 
more days.  They don’t complete either one of them, but it gives them 
time to move or try to finance or sell.”318 The “breathing room” afforded 
by bankruptcy may also bring stability to a household.  “[A] parent or a 
family [may] . . . just want to keep their child in a school district until he 
gets out of high school, and that’s a successful 13.”319  
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Empirical study of consumer bankruptcy enables us to assess the 
operation of the system generally, and evaluate the extent to which its 
objectives are being met in the most efficient and equitable manner. More 
time will allow to us to further evaluate how the increased costs 
associated with each consumer bankruptcy case is affecting the system, 
the professional stakeholders as well as debtors themselves. This 
“exceedingly complex organism”320 will continue to evolve and adapt and 
researchers will need to continue updating and exploring not only the 
                         
316 “The system allows room for strategy.” Notes on file with Principal Investigator.  
317 Bankruptcy Judges Survey, question 29 (data on file with Principal Investigator). 
318 Focus Group of Chapter 13 Trustees (July 15, 2010) (transcript on file with Principal 
Investigator).  Another Chapter 13 Trustee observed, “Because to get a loan mod[ification] may be 
a success for them.  That’s all they needed was the time to figure it out.  If they don’t have a 
lien strip, they don’t really need us after they get the loan mod[ification].” Id.  
319 Focus Group of Chapter 13 Trustees (July 15, 2010) (transcript on file with Principal 
Investigator).   
320 White, supra note 61, at 866.   
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nature of bankruptcy costs but other aspects of the consumer bankruptcy 
system as well.     
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Appendix I: Detailed Methodology  
 
Quantitative Data 
  
 Sample Selection 
 
 We were given access to group identifying information for all non-
commercial bankruptcy cases filed from 2003 through the end of 2009.321  
The goal was to create a database of detailed information for 0.11% of 
the total population of non-commercial Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 case 
filings during this period, or approximately 10,225 consumer bankruptcy 
cases.  
 
 The “target” number of cases was identified for Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 13 for each judicial district by time period—2003; 2004; January 
1 to October 16, 2005; October 17 to December 31, 2005; 2006; 2007; 
2008; 2009).  These per district target numbers represented 0.11% of the 
cases filed in that district for each of the time periods, for each of 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 filed cases.  
 
 Ultimately, a random selection of cases by district and by year, in 
proportion to the total number of consumer cases filed in each district 
for the corresponding period, was generated.322 The sample was twice as 
large as our total target number in anticipation of finding a number of 
“dud” cases.  Research Assistants were instructed to code the target 
number of valid cases within each district for the corresponding time 
period, omitting any bankruptcy cases with incomplete information. As we 
expected, there were cases we were not able to code—files with duplicate 
case numbers, cases that had been entered in error, cases without 
petitions or schedules online, closed cases with no Trustee Final Report, 
as well as cases that had been dismissed at the outset for failure to file 
                         
321 We are indebted to AACER/Epic for their assistance in generating this file.  
322 We initially asked AACER to generate our sample from the cases it identified, based upon 
specifically indentified parameters.  After a week or so of coding and reviewing the data, we 
recognized that the sample provided by AACER included a disproportionate number of cases filed 
in the earlier months of each year.  We then commissioned Professor Donihue to write a program 
that generated a random sample that reflected cases filed in each month of each calendar year.   
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schedules. Because of our generous list of targeted cases, we met our 
goal for nearly every district in each time period.  
 
 Cases were assigned in equal proportion to each of six research 
assistants. To blunt the impact of human coding error, each research 
assistant’s distribution list included cases from a multitude of districts 
and time periods.  
 
 Coding Manual, Web-based Entry, & Quality Control 
 
 As a predicate to data collection, we walked through numerous 
consumer bankruptcy case dockets to determine what data ought to be 
extracted and coded for inclusion in the data set.323 After a discussion of 
the hypotheses, themes and objectives of the National Study, we 
developed a Coding Manual and data collection template. 
 
 We designed the Coding Manual to be used with an original web-
based data entry form.324 Each section on the data entry form was color 
differentiated and corresponded to a section in the Coding Manual and 
to a case document or section on the docket. The Coding Manual also 
provided information and context for each data point and directed the 
research assistant to where on the docket the information was likely to 
be found.325 For each case coded, the research assistants accessed the 
PACER website for the particular bankruptcy court in which the case was 
filed. From there, the case docket report was accessed. From the docket 
report, the research assistants were able to read and review the relevant 
case documents, which typically included the petition and schedules, 
disclosure of compensation of attorney for the debtor(s), reaffirmation 
agreement/s, and the Trustee Final Report.  
 
                         
323 Our methodical review included a critique of the Pilot Study Coding Manual and coding 
process.  This resulted in the removal of some data points, and the addition of others.  
324  The password protected data collection site was hosted by Colby College, where our 
Statistical Consultant Professor Michael Donihue is Chair of the Economics Department. See infra 
Appendix VIII for screenshots of the entry form.  
325 Public Access to Electronic Court Records (“PACER”) system was used to access the bankruptcy 
case files.  PACER is an online system that provides access to Bankruptcy court records.  Each 
court maintains its own database of case information within the larger PACER system.  
Accordingly, each court has its own website to access its PACER system. We requested PACER fee 
waivers from all 90 districts in the Study.  We received waivers for 88 of those districts. 
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 For each case, coders opened the web data entry form, inserted 
the unique case identifier (case number and state) from their unique case 
list and entered the case data by clicking on radio buttons, selecting 
choices from drop menus, and by typing data in or filling in fields by 
cutting and pasting from the petitions, schedules, reports, and dockets. 
We found that coding on this web-based form was considerably more 
accurate and efficient than coding directly onto a spreadsheet.   
 
 Once the data for each case was entered, it was downloaded onto 
a master spreadsheet.326  Periodically, the data was downloaded from the 
master spreadsheet and a new master spreadsheet was opened.  The 
data from each download was backed up on multiple computers and 
external data storage system, as well as on an external server.   
  
 The data endured multiple rounds of “scrubbing” to catch coding 
errors and irregularities. Scrubbing consisted of removing typographical 
errors including spelling mistakes, stray punctuation, and alphabetical 
entries in numerical fields. For entries that were unusually high or low, 
the case was re-accessed to confirm that the questionable entry was 
correct. As an additional quality control measure, 10% of the cases 
coded in the first month were coded twice, and at the final stage of the 
data collection process, all 11,221327 cases were (i) electronically checked 
for aberrations and outliers, and (ii) manually reviewed for errors and 
irregularities.328   
 
Under-Sampling of Discharged Chapter 13 Cases and of 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases Filed in Certain Districts 
 
 As noted above, our sample was developed as a percentage of all 
consumer cases filed in each district for each Chapter and time period.  
Our analysis, however, divided the sample into Chapter 7 cases and 
Chapter 13 cases filed pre-BAPCPA and post-BAPCPA.  Moreover, we 
divided our Chapter 7 cases, for purposes of extracting descriptive fee 
                         
326 The Coding Manual also instructs the research assistant how the data is to be entered (the 
relevant “Code”). For example, numerical values (such as dollar amounts of claims and value of 
property) were to be entered as whole numbers without non-numerical characters.  
327 See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text. 
328 The first round of coding for the National Study took place between June 2010 and January 
2011. Subsequent over-sampling took place in the spring and summer of 2011.  
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data, into asset cases and no-asset cases.  These were further divided 
by cases that were discharged, converted and dismissed.  Likewise, the 
database of Chapter 13 cases was divided into subsets of dismissed, 
open, and discharged cases.   
 
 As the data were being coded, preliminary calculations of summary 
statistics revealed that through random selection we had obtained what 
appeared to be a disproportionate number of dismissed or still open (at 
the time of our sampling) Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings for the post-
BAPCPA period. We found that approximately 350 discharged Chapter 13 
cases filed following BAPCPA’s enactment had been coded.  This was due 
to the length of time a Chapter 13 case remains open prior to discharge 
(three to five years) and the small number of cases that end with the 
debtor receiving a discharge.  
 
 To remedy this deficiency, we identified an additional 3,603 
Chapter 13 cases filed in 2006,  2007, and the last two months of 2005, 
reasoning that cases filed in late 2005 through 2007 had the greatest 
possibility of being closed and discharged. We organized the cases by 
district and time period and prepared a target list reflecting the number 
of cases filed in that district for the particular time period.  Only those 
Chapter 13 cases designated as “discharged” on the docket report were 
coded: a total of 785 additional cases.    
 
 When we began to develop descriptive data tables of discharged 
cases broken down by district, state and circuit, it was revealed that in 
some districts our sample was too small from which to draw reliable 
inferences.  We examined each district, identified a target number of 
cases and endeavored to meet the newly identified targets in each 
under-sampled district.  We conducted a second round of over-sampling 
to fill in areas where the sample was too small. In some districts we met 
our target numbers, and in others, we came close. In still other districts, 
however, there simply were not enough cases filed that had gone to 
discharge that could be added to our data set. In yet other districts, 
cases were not available on-line, and we did not have access to the 
data. At the end of the second round of over-sampling, we coded an 
additional 3,113 cases. 
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 Survey of “Presumptively Reasonable” Fees  
 
 The relationship between the fees attorneys receive and the 
relevant presumptively reasonable fee in the district was an important 
issue to be studied.  In order to examine this relationship over time, we 
developed a database of presumptive fees, by district or court, in effect 
from 2003 to present.329  Because so many districts do not codify their 
presumptive fee information or keep archival records, we relied largely 
upon the institutional memories of obliging Chapter 13 Trustees and 
debtor attorneys to provide and confirm the presumptive fees of almost 
ten years ago.330  
 
 Coming by much of the data outlined in Appendix VI took some 
scouting and tenacity.  We started by reviewing each bankruptcy district’s 
website to see if the fee information was provided in the district’s local 
rules, general orders, or standing orders.  This method provided the 
current presumptive fees in each district that had codified or 
memorialized its fee.  A few districts offered an on-line archive of local 
rules and general orders that outlined the district’s earlier presumptive 
fees. The majority of courts’ websites, however, failed to provide historical 
presumptive fee information.  
 
 After exhausting the material publicly available online, calls were 
made to bankruptcy courts in an effort to access local rules and orders 
archives.  Unfortunately, for the most part, this effort was futile, as most 
clerks could not access archival rules and orders.  Next, information was 
sought from the Standing Chapter 13 Trustee offices.  Chapter 13 
Trustees were able to provide varying degrees of information.  For 
example, some Trustees provided year specific codified fees in their 
districts, while others provided presumptive fees that were established by 
custom.   
  
                         
329 See infra Appendix VI. The GAO Study collected information on the no-look fees in place in 48 
districts, before and after BAPCPA.  The GAO found that the Chapter 13 no-look fee increased in 
almost all of the districts (or divisions) studied.  In more than half of those cases, the increase 
was 55% or more. As noted in the GAO Study, “a division is a sublevel below that of a federal 
judicial district.” THE GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 24–25.  
330 See infra Appendix VI. 
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 After the available Chapter 13 Trustees were surveyed, we sought 
assistance from practicing consumer debtors’ attorneys.  Attorneys were 
chosen in five ways: (1) general internet search for practicing debtor 
attorneys in specific districts; (2) Chapter 13 Trustee referrals; (3) 
bankruptcy court clerk referrals; (4) attorney referrals; and (5) attorneys 
listed on Chapter 13 cases filed pre-BAPCPA and post-BAPCPA.  Debtors’ 
attorneys proved to be the best source of information about presumptive 
fees set by custom or unwritten practice.  It should be noted that, at 
times, attorneys within the same district gave us different dollar amounts 
when asked what the “unwritten” no-look was in their district. Interestingly, 
a few practicing attorneys had never heard of a presumptive or no-look 
fee.   
 
 
Qualitative Data 
 
 Focus Groups 
 
 To develop a body of qualitative data, I conducted twelve focus 
groups over a period of eighteen months: eight comprised of consumer 
debtor attorneys, one of Standing Chapter 13 Trustees, one of Chapter 7 
Panel Trustees, one of bankruptcy judges, and one of U.S. Trustees.  In 
addition, I conducted dozens of one-on-one in-person, e-mail, and 
telephone interviews with bankruptcy professionals practicing and serving 
around the country.  I endeavored to contact a national cross section of 
consumer bankruptcy lawyers, and offer the opportunity of attorneys who 
were not members of ABI, NACBA, or other professional bankruptcy 
organizations to participate. 
 
 With respect to the Focus Groups, invitations were extended to 
potential participants in a variety of ways. In a number of instances, I 
identified the debtors’ attorneys with consumer practices who were 
planning to attend an upcoming ABI conference. I then extended e-mail 
invitations to these individuals to participate in a Focus Group that was 
to be held on the conference site. In other cases, I contacted the 
Chapter 13 Trustee or the bankruptcy judge in the district where ABI was 
organizing a conference to get his or her help in identifying bankruptcy 
attorneys with active consumer practices. In other instances, I solicited 
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the assistance of members of the Study’s Advisory Board to suggest 
names of invitees for upcoming focus groups.  
  
 In addition to five national and regional ABI conferences,331 I 
conducted Focus Groups at each of the following professional 
organizations’ meetings: the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy 
Attorneys (April 2010, San Francisco, California); the American Consumer 
Bankruptcy College (September 2010, Las Vegas, Nevada); the National 
Association of Bankruptcy Trustees (April 2010, Savannah, Georgia);  the 
National Association of Chapter 13 Trustees (July 2010, Grapevine, 
Texas); and the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges (October 
2010, New Orleans, Louisiana). In addition, I visited the Executive Office 
of the United States Trustee in Washington, D.C. to conduct a focus 
group of U.S. Trustees.  
 
 Each focus group took place in a conference room, a hotel 
meeting room, or in one case, an empty restaurant. Participants sat 
around a table, with the Principal Investigator at the head serving as the 
moderator and interviewer. A digital recorder was place in the center of 
the table, and the discussion was recorded. Once each focus group 
interview concluded, the recording was transcribed.332   
 
 In each of these focus group interviews, I asked the same series of 
open-ended questions and raised the same series of issues. These 
questions included: 
 
 How has consumer bankruptcy practice changed, following 
the BAPCPA amendments? 
 What are the most significant changes? 
 What are the least significant changes? 
 Has your work-load increased? 
 Have you raised your fees, post-BAPCPA? 
                         
331 ABI Northeast Consumer Bankruptcy Conference, Boston, Mass. Jan. 18, 2010; ABI Caribbean 
Insolvency Conference, Boca Raton, Fla., Feb. 11, 2010; ABI Northeast Bankruptcy Conference, 
Cape Cod, Mass. July 8, 2010; ABI Southwest Bankruptcy Conference, Las Vegas, Nev., Sept. 23, 
2010; Detroit Consumer Bankruptcy Conference, Detroit, Mich., Nov. 10 2010. 
332 After each focus group interview, I uploaded the digital recording to an on-line transcription 
service, GMR Transcription.  Within a week, they returned a transcript of the interview in a 
Microsoft Word document. See GMR TRANSCRIPTION, http://www.gmrtranscription.com/ (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2011).  
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 Have the costs of bankruptcy deterred or delayed debtors 
from filing? 
 What other effects have you observed? 
 
The issues raised in the focus groups informed many of the questions in 
the surveys. 
 
 Survey Instruments 
 
 In an effort to gather additional qualitative data about 
professionals’ experiences working within the consumer bankruptcy system, 
four survey instruments were developed and administered.  A separate 
survey was crafted and tailored to: (i) consumer debtors’ attorneys; (ii) 
Standing Chapter 13 Trustees; (iii) Chapter 7 Panel Trustees; and (iv) 
bankruptcy judges. 
 
 The purpose of a survey is to provide statistical estimates of the 
characteristics of a target population.333 To do that, a subset of that 
population is designated—a sample—from which information is 
collected.334  With respect to the Standing Chapter 13 Trustees, the 
Chapter 7 Panel Trustees, and the bankruptcy judges, the task was fairly 
straightforward as many of the individuals in these groups had publicly 
available contact information and the population was finite and 
manageable.335  We sent survey requests to every person whose contact 
information was publicly available.  Our response rate was 48% (86 of 
179) for Standing Chapter 13 Trustees, 23% (193 of 836) for Chapter 7 
panel Trustees, and 29% for bankruptcy judges (99 of 342). 
 
 Developing the sample of consumer debtors’ counsel was not as 
simple an endeavor, in large part because it was not clear what type of 
sample would be representative of a national, geographically, culturally, 
                         
333 FLOYD J. FOWLER, JR., SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS 11 (4th ed. 2009). 
334 Id. 
335 We developed our list of Standing Chapter 13 Trustees from the Department of Justice’s 
website. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, U.S. Trustee Program, Private Trustee Information, 
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/private_trustee/locator/13.htm. We developed our list of Bankruptcy 
Judges from ABI’s membership list and from individual court websites. Our list of Chapter 7 Panel 
Trustees was collected from the Department of Justice’s website. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, U.S. 
Trustee Program, Private Trustee Information, 
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/private_trustee/locator/7.htm.  
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and economically diverse population of attorneys practicing consumer 
bankruptcy law.  We ultimately decided on a multi-prong approach, 
accessing the population of debtors’ counsel through multiple entry 
points.  We had access to the American Bankruptcy Institute membership 
list, and from that, created a roster of e-mail contacts comprised of all 
attorneys who self-identified as “consumer bankruptcy lawyers.”336  
Because we did not want to restrict the survey respondents to ABI 
members, we researched (on the internet and through other sources of 
advertising) and developed a list of e-mail addresses for consumer 
bankruptcy lawyers from every part of the country.  In addition, the 
names of the 308 attorneys who aided in the compilation of the 
“presumptively reasonable fee” information were added to the roster. We 
further contacted bankruptcy court clerks and asked if they would share 
contact information for their “top volume filers.” In addition, members of 
the Study’s Advisory Board included a link to the survey in e-mails sent 
out on consumer bankruptcy list-servs and arranged to have a notice and 
link to the survey posted in the NACBA June 2011 newsletter.  Finally, we 
engaged in “chain referral sampling,” where respondent groups grew 
through referrals from others in the group.  In this way, we endeavored 
to develop a sample that was as representative of the population as 
possible.  In the end, using the method of purposive sampling, we 
developed a pool of 1,923 potential debtors’ counsel survey respondents.  
The response rate was 25%.337  
 
 The survey instruments were prepared using the online survey 
development and administration tool, Survey Monkey.338 Each survey was 
accompanied by a cover e-mail from the Principal Investigator explaining 
the purpose of the Consumer Bankruptcy Fee Study, the objectives of the 
                         
336 It soon became clear to me that this list was over-inclusive. I receive a number of e-mail 
responses letting me know that I had made contact with an attorney with a practice that 
exclusively involving business representation; an attorney who exclusively represented creditors; or 
a financial advisor, consultant or accountant.  
337 A total of 479 responses. Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney Survey (data on file with Principal 
Investigator).  
338 See SURVEYMONKEY, http://www.surveymonkey.com/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2011). The Gold 
professional plan allows unlimited questions and unlimited responses, randomization of questions 
and answers, the ability to create text-based analysis (ex. cloud view of frequently used phrases 
from text answers), the ability to download responses and create charts, and the transmission of 
survey responses over a secured SSL connection.   
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survey, and the period of time the survey would remain open.339 Each 
survey began with standard demographic questions and then proceeded 
to pose a series of specific questions about consumer bankruptcy 
practice, fee arrangements, professional practices, professional 
interactions, and questions about consumer debtors.  There was ample 
opportunity provided for open-ended answers or elaboration of answers 
to multiple-choice questions.  In this way, the survey instruments tracked 
many of the open-ended questions, prompts and issues raised in the 
focus group interviews.   
  
 
                         
339 In compliance with the CAN-SPAM Act, the survey also provided the name and contact 
information of the Principal Investigator and the option of “opting out.” 
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Appendix II: Chapter 13 Quantitative Data Tables 
 
Table A - 1. Chapter 13 Total Direct Access Costs Pre-BAPCPA Compared to Post-
BAPCPA 
Pre-BAPCPA Post-BAPCPA 
Total direct access 
costs 
Total direct access 
costs 
Statistical 
Significance 
  
% of all cases 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
% of all cases 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
Open cases 2.9%   29.8%   
Closed discharged 
cases 53.7% $2,169 $2,260 41.0% $2,972 $2,861 *** *** 
Closed dismissed 
cases 36.8% $1,409 $1,462 25.7% $1,964 $1,809 *** *** 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level; 
"no" no statistically significant difference 
Average values for total direct access costs do not include pro bono cases 
Total Direct Access Costs equals attorneys’ fees plus debtor education fee plus filing fee  
 
 
Table A - 2. Chapter 13 Pro Se Debtor Cases 
  
Pre-
BAPCPA 
Post-
BAPCPA 
Statistical 
Significance 
All cases 3.0% 2.1% ** 
  
Discharged cases 1.5% 0.8% * 
Dismissed cases 5.0% 5.9% No 
Open cases 4.7% 0.3% *** 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level; 
"no" no statistically significant difference 
 
 
Table A - 3. Chapter 13 Pro Se Debtor Cases With a Petition Preparer 
Pre-BAPCPA Post-BAPCPA 
Preparer Fee Preparer Fee 
Statistical Significance 
  
% of 
cases Current 
$ 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
% of 
cases Current 
$ 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
% of 
cases 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
All pro se cases 40.0% $193 $205 100.0% $201 $181 *** No no 
  
Discharged cases 0%     0%     Too few cases 
Dismissed cases 33% $188 $204 100% $185 $164 no No no 
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Open cases 0%     0%     Too few cases 
* Significant at the 10% level; "no" no statistically significant difference 
 
 
Table A - 4. Chapter 13 Pro Se Debtor Cases That Hired an Attorney 
  Pre-BAPCPA 
Post-
BAPCPA 
Statistical 
Significance 
All cases 1.3% 0.4% *** 
    
Discharged cases 1.1% 0.4% ** 
Dismissed cases 1.5% 0.9% No 
Open cases 4.8% 0.0% *** 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level; 
"no" no statistically significant difference 
 
 
Table A - 5. Average Chapter 13 Attorney Fee Pre-BAPCPA Compared to Post-BAPCPA 
Pre-BAPCPA Post-BAPCPA 
Total attorney fees Total attorney fees 
Statistical 
Significance 
  
% of all cases 
Current $s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
% of all cases 
Current $s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
Closed discharged 
cases 53.6% $1,978 $2,061 40.8% $2,663 $2,564 *** *** 
Closed dismissed 
cases 26.9% $1,217 $1,262 19.0% $1,618 $1,491 *** *** 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level; 
"no" no statistically significant difference 
Average values for total attorney fees do not include pro bono cases 
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Appendix III: Chapter 7 Quantitative Data Tables 
 
Table A - 6. Chapter 7 Total Direct Access Costs Pre-BAPCPA Compared to Post-
BAPCPA 
Pre-BAPCPA Post-BAPCPA 
Total direct access 
costs 
Total direct access 
costs 
Statistical 
Significance  
  
% of 
all 
cases 
% of 
all 
asset / 
no 
asset 
cases 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
% of 
all 
cases 
% of 
all 
asset / 
no 
asset 
cases 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
All asset cases 9.9%   $1,047 $1,087 10.6%   $1,591 $1,424 *** *** 
  Discharged cases 9.1% 92.5% $998 $1,035 10.1% 95.8% $1,581 $1,414 *** *** 
  Dismissed cases 0.7% 7.5% $1,665 $1,742 0.4% 4.2% $1,805 $1,636 no no 
  Discharged 
converted cases 
0.5% 5.1% $1,857 $1,974 0.6% 6.0% $2,057 $1,830 no no 
  Dismissed 
converted cases 
0.0% 0.2% $1,765 $1,936 0.2% 1.5% $1,344 $1,238 Too few cases 
  
No asset cases 90.1%   $840 $866 89.4%   $1,463 $1,304 *** *** 
  Discharged cases 89.0% 98.8% $842 $868 86.9% 97.2% $1,469 $1,309 *** *** 
  Dismissed cases 1.1% 1.2% $717 $748 2.5% 2.8% $1,215 $1,099 *** *** 
  Discharged 
converted cases 
2.8% 3.1% $1,547 $1,609 3.6% 4.0% $2,186 $2,002 *** *** 
  Dismissed 
converted cases 
0.0% 0.0% $1,409 $1,462 0.5% 0.6% $2,018 $1,860 Too few cases 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level; 
"no" no statistically significant difference 
Average values for total direct access costs do not include pro bono cases 
Total Direct Access Costs equals attorneys’ fees plus debtor education fee plus filing fee 
 
Table A - 7. Chapter 7 Pro Se Debtor Cases 
  
Pre-
BAPCPA 
Post-
BAPCPA 
Statistical 
Significance 
All cases 7.4% 5.8% *** 
  
All asset cases 5.8% 3.3% No 
  Discharged cases 6.0% 2.8% ** 
  Dismissed cases 3.2% 14.3% * 
  
No asset cases 7.6% 6.1% ** 
  Discharged cases 7.4% 5.5% *** 
  Dismissed cases 23.4% 28.2% No 
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* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level; 
"no" no statistically significant difference 
 
Table A - 8. Chapter 7 Pro Se Debtor Cases With a Petition Preparer 
Pre-BAPCPA Post-BAPCPA 
Preparer Fee Preparer Fee 
Statistical Significance 
  
% of 
cases Current 
$ 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
% of 
cases Current 
$ 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
% of 
cases 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
All pro se cases 97.6% $187 $192 96.8% $208 $184 no ** no 
  
All pro se asset 
cases 100% $210 $216 75% $286 $265 no no no 
  Discharged cases 100% $210 $216 75% $286 $265 no no no 
  Dismissed cases 0%     0%     Too few cases 
  
Pro se no asset 
cases 97.4% $186 $191 97.8% $204 $181 no * no 
  Discharged cases 98.0% $186 $191 98.8% $209 $185 no ** no 
  Dismissed cases 66.7% $176 $178 88.9% $159 $139 no no no 
* Significant at the 10% level; "no" no statistically significant difference 
 
 
Table A - 9. Chapter 7 Pro Se Debtor Cases That Hired an Attorney 
  Pre-BAPCPA 
Post-
BAPCPA 
Statistical 
Significance 
All cases 0.7% 0.3% * 
    
All asset cases 1.9% 1.0% No 
  Discharged cases 2.1% 0.7% * 
  Dismissed cases 0.0% 7.7% * 
    
No asset cases 0.6% 0.2% ** 
  Discharged cases 0.6% 0.2% ** 
  Dismissed cases 0.0% 2.1% No 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level; 
"no" no statistically significant difference 
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Table A - 10. Average Chapter 7 Attorney Fee Pre-BAPCPA Compared to Post-BAPCPA 
Pre-BAPCPA Post-BAPCPA 
Total attorney fees Total attorney fees 
Statistical 
Significance 
  
% of 
all 
cases 
% of 
all 
asset / 
no 
asset 
cases 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
% of 
all 
cases 
% of 
all 
asset / 
no 
asset 
cases 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
All asset cases 9.9%   $840 $872 10.6%   $1,209 $1,082 *** *** 
  Discharged cases 9.1% 92.5% $791 $821 10.1% 95.8% $1,199 $1,072 *** *** 
  Dismissed cases 0.7% 7.5% $1,458 $1,526 0.4% 4.2% $1,423 $1,289 No no 
  Discharged 
converted cases 
0.5% 5.1% $1,651 $1,757 0.6% 6.0% $1,674 $1,489 No no 
  Dismissed 
converted cases 
0.0% 0.2% $1,565 $1,716 0.2% 1.5% $965 $888 Too few cases 
                      
No asset cases 90.1%   $633 $653 89.4%   $1,080 $962 *** *** 
  Discharged cases 89.0% 98.8% $635 $654 86.9% 97.2% $1,087 $968 *** *** 
  Dismissed cases 1.1% 1.2% $510 $533 2.5% 2.8% $834 $755 ** * 
  Discharged 
converted cases 
2.8% 3.1% $1,340 $1,394 3.6% 4.0% $1,805 $1,655 *** ** 
  Dismissed 
converted cases 
0.0% 0.0% $1,200 $1,245 0.5% 0.6% $1,640 $1,512 Too few cases 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level; 
"no" no statistically significant difference 
Average values for total attorney fees do not include pro bono cases 
 
Table A - 11. Number of Chapter 7 Cases in Which an In Forma Pauperis Motion Was 
Filed  
Post-BAPCPA 
Attorney Fees 
  
% of 
cases Current 
$ 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
All in forma 
pauperis cases 1.9% $783 $695 
  in forma pauperis 
granted 71.2% $563 $502 
   
in forma pauperis 
asset cases 0% none 
in forma pauperis 
no assets 100% $783 $695 
No statistically significant difference for any category 
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Appendix IV: Quantitative Data Tables Showing Distribution to 
Unsecured Creditors in Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 
 
Table A - 12. Distribution to Unsecured Creditors as a Percentage of Allowed Unsecured 
Creditor Claims in Chapter 13 Cases 
Pre-BAPCPA Post-BAPCPA 
Statistical 
Significance 
  
Distributions ÷   
Claims 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
Distributions ÷   
Claims 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
All closed cases 29.5%   26.4%     
  Average 
unsecured claims $25,090 $25,980 $25,836 $24,519 no no 
  Median unsecured 
claims $13,532 $14,206 $13,918 $13,245   
  Average 
distributions $7,373 $7,670 $6,700 $6,465 no * 
  Median 
distributions 
  
$2,021 $2,119 
  
$1,674 $1,617   
  
Discharged cases 35.9%   35.7%     
  Average 
unsecured claims $31,022 $32,131 $28,672 $27,632 no ** 
  Median unsecured 
claims $19,146 $19,721 $16,907 $16,297   
  Average 
distributions $11,125 $11,545 $10,201 $9,856 no ** 
  Median 
distributions   $5,995 $6,347 
  
$5,100 $4,831   
  
Dismissed cases 11.5%   3.9%     
  Average 
unsecured claims $16,875 $17,462 $21,105 $19,324 ** no 
  Median unsecured 
claims $7,971 $8,242 $9,936 $9,466   
  Average 
distributions $1,885 $2,000 $794 $746 no no 
  Median 
distributions   $0 $0 
  
$0 $0   
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level; 
"no" no statistically significant difference 
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Table A - 13. Distribution to Unsecured Creditors as a Percentage of Estimated 
Unsecured Liabilities as Reported on the Schedules in Chapter 13 Cases 
Pre-BAPCPA Post-BAPCPA 
Statistical 
Significance 
  
Distributions ÷   
Liabilities 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
Distributions ÷   
Liabilities 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
All closed cases 21.5%   18.0%     
  Average 
unsecured liabilities $34,742 $35,721 $38,245 $35,939 no no 
  Median unsecured 
liabilities $16,702 $17,281 $19,257 $18,296   
  Average 
distributions $7,373 $7,670 $6,700 $6,465 no ** 
  Median 
distributions 
  
$2,021 $2,119 
  
$1,674 $1,617   
  
Discharged cases 25.0%   23.6%     
  Average 
unsecured liabilities $44,971 $46,157 $43,513 $41,737 no no 
  Median unsecured 
liabilities $22,735 $23,632 $23,589 $22,908   
  Average 
distributions $11,125 $11,545 $10,201 $9,856 no ** 
  Median 
distributions   $5,995 $6,347 
  
$5,100 $4,831   
  
Dismissed cases 8.8%   2.7%     
  Average 
unsecured liabilities $22,074 $22,798 $30,642 $27,569 ** no 
  Median unsecured 
liabilities $10,235 $10,463 $13,755 $12,651   
  Average 
distributions $1,885 $2,000 $794 $746 no no 
  Median 
distributions   $0 $0 
  
$0 $0   
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level; 
"no" no statistically significant difference 
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Table A - 14. Distribution to Unsecured Creditors as a Percentage of Allowed Unsecured 
Creditor Claims in Chapter 7 Cases 
Pre-BAPCPA Post-BAPCPA 
Statistical 
Significance  
  
Distributions ÷   
Claims 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
Distributions ÷   
Claims 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
All asset cases 10.1%   5.1%     
  Average 
unsecured claims 
$35,091 $36,417 $66,993 $60,176 *** *** 
  Median unsecured 
claims 
$21,400 $21,896 $32,300 $29,218   
  Average 
distributions $3,553 $3,668 $3,379 $3,069 no no 
  Median 
distributions 
  
$1,362 $1,439 
  
$813 $755   
  
Discharged asset 
cases 10.4%   5.1%     
  Average 
unsecured claims $36,614 $37,995 $68,944 $61,916 *** ** 
  Median unsecured 
claims $22,434 $23,085 $35,037 $30,660   
  Average 
distributions $3,826 $3,951 $3,489 $3,169 no no 
  Median 
distributions   $1,547 $1,590 
  
$900 $818   
  
Dismissed asset 
cases 1.3%   4.0%     
  Average 
unsecured claims $17,203 $17,886 $27,276 $24,731 
no no 
  Median unsecured 
claims $5,556 $5,785 $1,289 $1,173   
  Average 
distributions $237 $240 $1,097 $999 no no 
  Median 
distributions   $0 $0 
  
$0 $0   
  
Discharged no asset 
cases 1.9%   0.9%     
  Average 
unsecured claims $53,841 $55,429 $68,530 $60,710 *** no 
  Median unsecured 
claims $30,832 $31,796 $40,142 $35,865   
  Average 
distributions $990 $1,030 $598 $546 * ** 
  Median 
distributions   $0 $0 
  
$0 $0   
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level; 
"no" no statistically significant difference 
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Table A - 15. Distribution to Unsecured Creditors as a Percentage of Estimated 
Unsecured Liabilities as Reported on the Schedules in Chapter 7 Cases 
Pre-BAPCPA Post-BAPCPA 
Statistical 
Significance  
  
Distributions ÷   
Liabilities 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
Distributions ÷   
Liabilities 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
Current 
$s 
Inflation 
Adjusted 
2005 $s 
All asset cases 5.4%   4.0%     
  Average 
unsecured liabilities 
$66,378 $68,450 $85,164 $76,119 * no 
  Median unsecured 
liabilities 
$34,644 $35,282 $51,548 $45,429   
  Average 
distributions $3,553 $3,668 $3,379 $3,069 no no 
  Median 
distributions 
  
$1,362 $1,439 
  
$813 $755   
  
Discharged asset 
cases 5.5%   4.1%     
  Average 
unsecured liabilities $70,214 $72,388 $86,348 $77,156 no no 
  Median unsecured 
liabilities $36,080 $36,957 $52,368 $47,739   
  Average 
distributions $3,826 $3,951 $3,489 $3,169 no no 
  Median 
distributions   $1,547 $1,590 
  
$900 $818   
  
Dismissed asset 
cases 1.2%   1.9%     
  Average 
unsecured liabilities $19,360 $20,183 $58,193 $52,487 *** no 
  Median unsecured 
liabilities $10,870 $11,692 $31,706 $28,414   
  Average 
distributions $237 $240 $1,097 $999 no no 
  Median 
distributions   $0 $0 
  
$0 $0   
  
Discharged no asset 
cases 1.9%   0.9%     
  Average 
unsecured liabilities $52,004 $53,568 $66,238 $58,678 *** no 
  Median unsecured 
liabilities $29,965 $31,011 $39,200 $35,035   
  Average 
distributions $990 $1,030 $598 $546 * ** 
  Median 
distributions   $0 $0 
  
$0 $0   
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level; 
"no" no statistically significant difference 
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Appendix V: Average Attorney Fees Adjusted for Inflation 
 
Table A - 16. Average Attorney Fee by Circuit for Discharged Chapter 13 Cases 
Adjusted for Inflation 
Circuit Average Fee 
Pre-BAPCPA 
Average Fee Post-
BAPCPA 
Difference % Difference 
1 $3,151.42 $3,349.94 $198.52 6% 
2 $1,992.37 $2,797.48 $805.11 40% 
3 $1,940.39 $2,845.58 $905.20 47% 
4 $1,656.75 $2,617.77 $961.02 58% 
5 $2,080.93 $2,620.37 $539.44 26% 
6 $1,636.40 $2,370.64 $734.24 45% 
7 $2,113.35 $2,669.44 $556.09 26% 
8 $1,679.74 $2,150.37 $470.63 28% 
9 $2,267.58 $2,925.12 $657.54 29% 
10 $2,013.71 $2,354.77 $341.06 17% 
11 $1,905.68 $2,392.88 $487.20 26% 
DC $1,620.11 $2,602.86 $982.75 61% 
 
 
 
Table A - 17. Average Attorney Fee by State for Discharged Chapter 13 Cases 
Adjusted for Inflation 
State Average Fee Pre-
BAPCPA 
Average Fee 
Post-BAPCPA 
Difference % Difference 
AK $2,390.06 $2,048.46 -$341.60 -14% 
AL $1,645.99 $1,878.74 $232.75 14% 
AR $1,513.56 $2,064.18 $550.62 36% 
AZ $2,906.86 $3,444.34 $537.47 18% 
CA $2,378.56 $2,864.97 $486.40 20% 
CO $2,093.65 $3,079.38 $985.73 47% 
CT $2,331.42 $3,316.92 $985.50 42% 
DC $1,620.11 $2,602.86 $982.75 61% 
DE $1,689.49 $2,905.87 $1,216.39 72% 
FL $2,125.75 $2,666.58 $540.84 25% 
GA $1,863.06 $2,451.26 $588.20 32% 
HI $1,561.41 $2,382.70 $821.29 53% 
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State Average Fee Pre-
BAPCPA 
Average Fee 
Post-BAPCPA 
Difference % Difference 
IA $1,364.34 $2,240.51 $876.17 64% 
ID $1,391.37 $2,992.06 $1,600.69 115% 
IL $2,278.58 $2,719.45 $440.88 19% 
IN $1,975.92 $2,818.97 $843.05 43% 
KS $2,129.41 $2,337.43 $208.02 10% 
KY $1,329.78 $2,484.67 $1,154.89 87% 
LA $1,786.41 $2,446.94 $660.53 37% 
MA $2,301.01 $2,324.35 $23.35 1% 
MD $1,570.65 $2,944.68 $1,374.03 87% 
ME $3,711.53 $4,950.28 $1,238.75 33% 
MI $2,285.26 $2,676.74 $391.47 17% 
MN $1,603.94 $1,712.20 $108.25 7% 
MO $1,983.89 $2,523.10 $539.22 27% 
MS $1,341.32 $2,022.67 $681.35 51% 
MT $2,019.90 $2,062.17 $42.26 2% 
NC $1,725.97 $2,453.97 $728.00 42% 
ND $1,465.73 $1,560.35 $94.62 6% 
NE $1,972.85 $2,357.73 $384.88 20% 
NH $3,373.67 $4,294.57 $920.90 27% 
NJ $2,120.93 $2,528.60 $407.67 19% 
NM $1,789.64 $2,717.49 $927.86 52% 
NV $2,344.96 $4,335.98 $1,991.02 85% 
NY $1,909.17 $2,768.86 $859.69 45% 
OH $1,451.73 $2,220.92 $769.19 53% 
OK $1,907.30 $1,991.58 $84.28 4% 
OR $2,864.75 $3,358.27 $493.52 17% 
PA $1,886.01 $2,930.50 $1,044.49 55% 
RI $2,768.41 $2,832.21 $63.80 2% 
SC $1,806.35 $3,007.13 $1,200.78 66% 
SD $1,780.62 $2,276.03 $495.41 28% 
TN $1,517.91 $2,149.73 $631.83 42% 
TX $2,236.77 $2,789.28 $552.51 25% 
UT $2,176.52 $2,598.45 $421.94 19% 
VA $1,557.99 $2,686.47 $1,128.49 72% 
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State Average Fee Pre-
BAPCPA 
Average Fee 
Post-BAPCPA 
Difference % Difference 
VT $1,977.79 $2,375.53 $397.74 20% 
WA $1,918.26 $2,431.02 $512.76 27% 
WI $1,203.11 $1,865.14 $662.03 55% 
WV $1,273.81 $1,959.52 $685.71 54% 
WY $2,203.40 $1,798.04 -$405.36 -18% 
 
 
 
Table A - 18. Average Attorney Fee by District for Discharged Chapter 13 Cases 
Adjusted for Inflation 
Circuit District Average Fee 
Pre-BAPCPA 
Average Fee 
Post-BAPCPA 
Difference % Difference 
11 ALMB $1,621.05 $2,133.01 $511.96 32% 
11 ALNB $1,631.70 $1,685.06 $53.36 3% 
11 ALSB $1,820.81 $2,183.64 $362.83 20% 
9 AKB $2,390.06 $2,048.46 -$341.60 -14% 
9 AZB $2,906.86 $3,444.34 $537.47 18% 
8 AREB $1,513.76 $2,105.03 $591.27 39% 
8 ARWB $1,512.85 $1,982.47 $469.62 31% 
9 CACB $2,572.39 $2,671.52 $99.13 4% 
9 CAEB $2,379.52 $3,265.09 $885.57 37% 
9 CANB $2,354.04 $2,883.35 $529.31 22% 
9 CASB $2,218.05 $2,688.59 $470.54 21% 
10 COB $2,093.65 $3,079.38 $985.73 47% 
2 CTB $2,331.42 $3,316.92 $985.50 42% 
3 DEB $1,689.49 $2,905.87 $1,216.39 72% 
11 FLMB $2,062.40 $2,668.36 $605.96 29% 
11 FLNB $1,981.66 $2,515.05 $533.39 27% 
11 FLSB $2,292.38 $2,813.15 $520.76 23% 
11 GAMB $1,307.96 $2,178.56 $870.60 67% 
11 GANB $2,310.17 $2,606.39 $296.22 13% 
11 GASB $1,506.15 $2,260.53 $754.38 50% 
9 HIB $1,561.41 $2,382.70 $821.29 53% 
9 IDB $1,391.37 $2,992.06 $1,600.69 115% 
7 ILCB $1,750.52 $2,157.86 $407.33 23% 
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Circuit District Average Fee 
Pre-BAPCPA 
Average Fee 
Post-BAPCPA 
Difference % Difference 
7 ILNB $2,567.73 $2,727.21 $159.48 6% 
7 ILSB $2,248.42 $3,156.43 $908.01 40% 
7 INNB $2,065.26 $2,253.48 $188.23 9% 
7 INSB $1,900.32 $3,195.96 $1,295.64 68% 
8 IANB $1,246.26 $2,581.11 $1,334.85 107% 
8 IASB $1,600.51 $1,644.47 $43.96 3% 
10 KSB $2,129.41 $2,337.43 $208.02 10% 
6 KYEB $945.75 $2,396.98 $1,451.23 153% 
6 KYWB $1,617.79 $2,586.97 $969.18 60% 
5 LAEB $1,614.87 $2,141.59 $526.72 33% 
5 LAMB $1,544.74 $2,112.32 $567.58 37% 
5 LAWB $1,908.32 $2,615.65 $707.33 37% 
1 MEB $3,711.53 $4,950.28 $1,238.75 33% 
4 MDB $1,570.65 $2,944.68 $1,374.03 87% 
1 MAB $2,301.01 $2,324.35 $23.35 1% 
6 MIEB $2,301.28 $2,702.67 $401.38 17% 
6 MIWB $2,245.22 $2,542.77 $297.55 13% 
8 MNB $1,603.94 $1,712.20 $108.25 7% 
5 MSNB $1,217.04 $2,043.71 $826.67 68% 
5 MSSB $1,714.16 $1,991.11 $276.94 16% 
8 MOEB $1,718.50 $2,639.35 $920.85 54% 
8 MOWB $2,315.62 $2,417.43 $101.81 4% 
9 MTB $2,019.90 $2,062.17 $42.26 2% 
8 NEB $1,972.85 $2,357.73 $384.88 20% 
9 NVB $2,344.96 $4,335.98 $1,991.02 85% 
1 NHB $3,373.67 $4,294.57 $920.90 27% 
3 NJB $2,120.93 $2,528.60 $407.67 19% 
10 NMB $1,789.64 $2,717.49 $927.86 52% 
2 NYEB $2,591.89 $3,752.23 $1,160.34 45% 
2 NYNB $1,740.79 $2,198.10 $457.32 26% 
2 NYSB $2,089.40 $3,258.36 $1,168.96 56% 
2 NYWB $1,168.57 $1,988.32 $819.76 70% 
4 NCEB $1,519.22 $2,614.70 $1,095.47 72% 
4 NCMB $1,694.03 $2,399.47 $705.44 42% 
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Circuit District Average Fee 
Pre-BAPCPA 
Average Fee 
Post-BAPCPA 
Difference % Difference 
4 NCWB $2,239.05 $2,299.51 $60.46 3% 
8 NDB $1,465.73 $1,560.35 $94.62 6% 
6 OHNB $1,209.04 $1,548.08 $339.05 28% 
6 OHSB $1,729.10 $2,656.29 $927.18 54% 
10 OKEB $2,147.62 $1,942.42 -$205.19 -10% 
10 OKNB $1,847.11 $1,877.97 $30.86 2% 
10 OKWB $1,426.83 $2,373.94 $947.11 66% 
9 ORB $2,864.75 $3,358.27 $493.52 17% 
3 PAEB $1,443.47 $2,583.73 $1,140.27 79% 
3 PAMB $2,019.98 $3,454.16 $1,434.18 71% 
3 PAWB $2,345.96 $2,536.00 $190.04 8% 
1 RIB $2,768.41 $2,832.21 $63.80 2% 
4 SCB $1,806.35 $3,007.13 $1,200.78 66% 
8 SDB $1,780.62 $2,276.03 $495.41 28% 
6 TNEB $1,179.60 $1,916.92 $737.32 63% 
6 TNMB $1,758.52 $2,201.40 $442.87 25% 
6 TNWB $1,507.30 $2,306.60 $799.31 53% 
5 TXEB $2,271.62 $2,819.98 $548.36 24% 
5 TXNB $2,128.88 $2,876.52 $747.65 35% 
5 TXSB $2,069.04 $2,435.13 $366.10 18% 
5 TXWB $2,483.02 $2,914.97 $431.95 17% 
10 UTB $2,176.52 $2,598.45 $421.94 19% 
2 VTB $1,977.79 $2,375.53 $397.74 20% 
4 VAEB $1,683.24 $2,998.49 $1,315.25 78% 
4 VAWB $1,140.46 $2,156.04 $1,015.58 89% 
9 WAEB $1,736.75 $1,839.55 $102.80 6% 
9 WAWB $2,009.01 $2,592.33 $583.32 29% 
4 WVNB $1,324.69 $2,888.56 $1,563.88 118% 
4 WVSB $1,121.17 $1,262.74 $141.57 13% 
7 WIEB $1,547.12 $2,072.18 $525.05 34% 
7 WIWB $859.10 $1,451.08 $591.98 69% 
10 WYB $2,203.40 $1,798.04 -$405.36 -18% 
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Table A - 19. Average Attorney Fee by State for Dismissed Chapter 13 Cases 
Adjusted for Inflation 
State Average Fee Pre-
BAPCPA 
Average Fee 
Post-BAPCPA 
Difference % Difference 
AK $712 $960 $248 34.8% 
AL $1,343 $799 -$544 -40.5% 
AR $1,281 $1,191 -$90 -7.1% 
AZ $1,481 $3,782 $2,301 155.4% 
CA $1,445 $2,342 $897 62.1% 
CO $1,782 $1,111 -$671 -37.6% 
CT $1,854 $2,143 $288 15.5% 
DC $744 $199 -$545 -73.3% 
DE $1,425    
FL $1,347 $1,757 $409 30.4% 
GA $1,415 $1,598 $184 13.0% 
HI  $2,093   
IA $1,064 $979 -$85 -8.0% 
ID  $1,699   
IL $1,269 $1,807 $538 42.4% 
IN $1,296 $1,663 $367 28.3% 
KS $1,130 $1,841 $711 62.9% 
KY $1,263 $1,157 -$106 -8.4% 
LA $1,279 $1,327 $49 3.8% 
MA $1,333 $1,533 $200 15.0% 
MD $975 $1,796 $821 84.2% 
ME $5,238 $1,293 -$3,945 -75.3% 
MI $1,669 $2,332 $662 39.7% 
MN $764 $1,700 $937 122.7% 
MO $1,047 $1,298 $250 23.9% 
MS $680 $995 $315 46.4% 
MT $855 $255 -$600 -70.2% 
NC $1,315 $1,873 $558 42.4% 
ND     
NE $2,028 $2,228 $200 9.8% 
NH $543    
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State Average Fee Pre-
BAPCPA 
Average Fee 
Post-BAPCPA 
Difference % Difference 
NJ $1,523 $3,015 $1,492 97.9% 
NM $1,581 $1,187 -$394 -24.9% 
NV $1,363 $2,521 $1,158 84.9% 
NY $1,537 $1,810 $273 17.8% 
OH $1,160 $1,291 $131 11.3% 
OK $1,136 $1,388 $252 22.2% 
OR $1,135 $2,582 $1,447 127.4% 
PA $1,471 $1,730 $259 17.6% 
RI $411 $1,396 $985 239.9% 
SC $1,249 $1,291 $42 3.3% 
SD  $1,409   
TN $886 $1,041 $155 17.5% 
TX $1,406 $1,525 $119 8.5% 
UT $1,511 $940 -$571 -37.8% 
VA $1,225 $2,235 $1,011 82.5% 
VT     
WA $970 $1,836 $867 89.4% 
WI $1,542 $1,808 $267 17.3% 
WV $337 $1,517 $1,181 350.8% 
WY  $1,646   
 
 
Table A - 20. Average Attorney Fee by District for Dismissed Chapter 13 Cases 
Adjusted for Inflation 
Circuit District Average Fee 
Pre-BAPCPA 
Average Fee 
Post-BAPCPA 
Difference % Difference 
11 ALMB $540 $877 $337 62.5% 
11 ALNB $1,352 $781 -$571 -42.2% 
11 ALSB $1,587 $914 -$673 -42.4% 
9 AKB $712 $960 $248 34.8% 
9 AZB $1,481 $3,782 $2,301 155.4% 
8 AREB $1,305 $1,191 -$115 -8.8% 
8 ARWB $1,136    
9 CACB $1,564 $2,479 $915 58.5% 
9 CAEB $832 $1,889 $1,056 127.0% 
 
 
144 
 
Circuit District Average Fee 
Pre-BAPCPA 
Average Fee 
Post-BAPCPA 
Difference % Difference 
9 CANB $3,230 $2,988 -$242 -7.5% 
9 CASB $964    
10 COB $1,782 $1,111 -$671 -37.6% 
2 CTB $1,854 $2,143 $288 15.5% 
3 DEB $1,425    
11 FLMB $1,314 $1,750 $436 33.2% 
11 FLNB $1,146 $817 -$328 -28.7% 
11 FLSB $2,455 $1,926 -$529 -21.5% 
11 GAMB $1,145 $1,013 -$133 -11.6% 
11 GANB $1,485 $1,916 $431 29.0% 
11 GASB $1,184 $1,571 $387 32.7% 
9 HIB  $2,093   
9 IDB  $1,699   
7 ILCB $1,964 $2,015 $52 2.6% 
7 ILNB $1,371 $1,785 $414 30.2% 
7 ILSB $916 $1,762 $847 92.5% 
7 INNB $1,244 $899 -$344 -27.7% 
7 INSB $1,349 $2,122 $773 57.3% 
8 IANB $1,064 $979 -$85 -8.0% 
8 IASB     
10 KSB $1,130 $1,841 $711 62.9% 
6 KYEB $1,214 $769 -$444 -36.6% 
6 KYWB $1,311 $2,061 $750 57.2% 
5 LAEB $880 $189 -$691 -78.5% 
5 LAMB  $1,844   
5 LAWB $1,423 $1,393 -$30 -2.1% 
1 MEB $5,238 $1,293 -$3,945 -75.3% 
4 MDB $975 $1,796 $821 84.2% 
1 MAB $1,333 $1,533 $200 15.0% 
6 MIEB $1,758 $2,491 $732 41.6% 
6 MIWB $1,558 $1,695 $137 8.8% 
8 MNB $764 $1,700 $937 122.7% 
5 MSNB $646 $596 -$50 -7.7% 
5 MSSB $845 $1,023 $178 21.0% 
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Circuit District Average Fee 
Pre-BAPCPA 
Average Fee 
Post-BAPCPA 
Difference % Difference 
8 MOEB $832 $925 $93 11.2% 
8 MOWB $1,354 $2,229 $874 64.6% 
9 MTB $855 $255 -$600 -70.2% 
8 NEB $2,028 $2,228 $200 9.8% 
9 NVB $1,363 $2,521 $1,158 84.9% 
1 NHB $543    
3 NJB $1,523 $3,015 $1,492 97.9% 
10 NMB $1,581 $1,187 -$394 -24.9% 
2 NYEB $1,555 $2,606 $1,052 67.6% 
2 NYNB $1,283 $1,493 $210 16.4% 
2 NYSB $2,045 $1,478 -$567 -27.7% 
2 NYWB $1,474 $1,348 -$127 -8.6% 
4 NCEB $969 $1,677 $708 73.1% 
4 NCMB $1,160 $2,046 $886 76.4% 
4 NCWB $2,279 $1,812 -$467 -20.5% 
8 NDB     
6 OHNB $1,095 $1,025 -$70 -6.4% 
6 OHSB $1,275 $1,533 $257 20.2% 
10 OKEB $2,390 $2,358 -$32 -1.3% 
10 OKNB  $791   
10 OKWB $823 $1,338 $516 62.7% 
9 ORB $1,135 $2,582 $1,447 127.4% 
3 PAEB $1,251 $1,753 $502 40.1% 
3 PAMB $2,011 $1,786 -$225 -11.2% 
3 PAWB $1,878 $1,519 -$359 -19.1% 
1 RIB $411 $1,396 $985 239.9% 
4 SCB $1,249 $1,291 $42 3.3% 
8 SDB  $1,409   
6 TNEB $1,473 $1,574 $101 6.9% 
6 TNMB $996 $1,076 $81 8.1% 
6 TNWB $835 $1,002 $167 20.0% 
5 TXEB $1,618 $2,458 $839 51.9% 
5 TXNB $1,342 $1,436 $94 7.0% 
5 TXSB $1,752 $1,612 -$140 -8.0% 
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Circuit District Average Fee 
Pre-BAPCPA 
Average Fee 
Post-BAPCPA 
Difference % Difference 
5 TXWB $910 $896 -$14 -1.5% 
10 UTB $1,511 $940 -$571 -37.8% 
2 VTB     
4 VAEB $1,444 $2,570 $1,126 78.0% 
4 VAWB $457 $1,567 $1,109 242.5% 
9 WAEB $744 $199 -$545 -73.3% 
9 WAWB $1,253 $1,640 $387 30.9% 
4 WVNB $781 $1,869 $1,088 139.4% 
4 WVSB  $1,620   
7 WIEB $337 $1,211 $874 259.7% 
7 WIWB $1,542 $1,762 $221 14.3% 
10 WYB  $1,946   
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Table A - 21. Average Attorney Fee by Circuit for Discharged No-Asset Chapter 
7 Cases Adjusted for Inflation (Including Converted Cases) 
Circuit Average Fee Pre-
BAPCPA 
Average Fee Post-
BAPCPA 
Difference % Difference 
1 $862.48 $1,134.62 $272.14 32% 
2 $749.81 $1,050.40 $300.59 40% 
3 $785.36 $1,025.40 $240.04 31% 
4 $708.55 $974.32 $265.77 38% 
5 $856.50 $1,185.39 $328.89 38% 
6 $610.02 $808.23 $198.21 32% 
7 $709.55 $904.20 $194.66 27% 
8 $675.20 $998.76 $323.56 48% 
9 $713.55 $1,209.00 $495.45 69% 
10 $600.87 $914.38 $313.51 52% 
11 $719.68 $1,120.96 $401.28 56% 
DC $533.02 $904.07 $371.05 70% 
 
 
Table A - 22. Average Attorney Fee by State for Discharged No-Asset Chapter 7 Cases 
Adjusted for Inflation (Including Converted Cases) 
State Average Fee Pre-
BAPCPA 
Average Fee Post-
BAPCPA 
Difference % Difference 
AK $1,470.20 $1,298.76 -$171.44 -12% 
AL $653.84 $934.41 $280.57 43% 
AR $631.54 $698.66 $67.12 11% 
AZ $918.67 $1,530.21 $611.54 67% 
CA $861.91 $1,310.55 $448.65 52% 
CO $718.81 $1,076.86 $358.05 50% 
CT $795.15 $1,304.59 $509.44 64% 
DC $533.02 $904.07 $371.05 70% 
DE $824.09 $996.08 $171.99 21% 
FL $824.92 $1,223.12 $398.20 48% 
GA $638.63 $1,093.39 $454.77 71% 
HI $626.87 $1,084.97 $458.11 73% 
IA $719.47 $1,106.08 $386.61 54% 
ID $503.19 $692.32 $189.13 38% 
IL $805.23 $931.05 $125.82 16% 
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State Average Fee Pre-
BAPCPA 
Average Fee Post-
BAPCPA 
Difference % Difference 
IN $620.30 $839.60 $219.30 35% 
KS $659.74 $992.44 $332.70 50% 
KY $614.80 $749.33 $134.53 22% 
LA $731.10 $1,039.48 $308.38 42% 
MA $956.64 $1,172.37 $215.73 23% 
MD $660.12 $819.87 $159.74 24% 
ME $872.30 $1,271.85 $399.55 46% 
MI $684.75 $919.87 $235.13 34% 
MN $772.35 $1,268.75 $496.39 64% 
MO $650.83 $880.77 $229.94 35% 
MS $516.93 $941.15 $424.22 82% 
MT $673.56 $1,282.88 $609.32 90% 
NC $891.96 $1,103.56 $211.61 24% 
ND $591.32 $1,014.23 $422.91 72% 
NE $666.25 $834.56 $168.31 25% 
NH $831.55 $1,039.35 $207.79 25% 
NJ $828.34 $1,054.39 $226.05 27% 
NM $595.50 $881.35 $285.85 48% 
NV $725.32 $1,070.79 $345.47 48% 
NY $748.11 $1,012.32 $264.22 35% 
OH $603.97 $748.13 $144.17 24% 
OK $559.08 $728.97 $169.90 30% 
OR $519.67 $961.49 $441.83 85% 
PA $756.95 $997.74 $240.79 32% 
RI $538.34 $908.03 $369.68 69% 
SC $895.69 $1,094.81 $199.12 22% 
SD $785.97 $1,238.67 $452.70 58% 
TN $473.39 $855.85 $382.47 81% 
TX $947.36 $1,314.59 $367.23 39% 
UT $396.98 $714.21 $317.23 80% 
VA $539.34 $1,011.05 $471.71 87% 
VT $708.77 $781.63 $72.86 10% 
WA $484.14 $702.61 $218.47 45% 
WI $602.33 $967.93 $365.59 61% 
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State Average Fee Pre-
BAPCPA 
Average Fee Post-
BAPCPA 
Difference % Difference 
WV $585.36 $749.40 $164.04 28% 
WY $691.88 $878.87 $186.99 27% 
 
 
 
Table A - 23. Average Attorney Fee by District for Discharged No-Asset Chapter 
7 Cases Adjusted for Inflation (Including Converted Cases) 
Circuit District Average Fee Pre-
BAPCPA 
Average Fee Post-
BAPCPA 
Difference % Difference 
11 ALMB $610.72 $1,016.28 $405.57 66% 
11 ALNB $689.38 $947.93 $258.55 38% 
11 ALSB $562.13 $678.43 $116.30 21% 
9 AKB $1,470.20 $1,298.76 -$171.44 -12% 
9 AZB $918.67 $1,530.21 $611.54 67% 
8 AREB $638.95 $650.46 $11.51 2% 
8 ARWB $617.30 $766.14 $148.85 24% 
9 CACB $891.12 $1,377.95 $486.83 55% 
9 CAEB $778.01 $1,131.19 $353.18 45% 
9 CANB $796.80 $1,179.31 $382.51 48% 
9 CASB $886.90 $1,514.72 $627.82 71% 
10 COB $718.81 $1,076.86 $358.05 50% 
2 CTB $795.15 $1,304.59 $509.44 64% 
3 DEB $824.09 $996.08 $171.99 21% 
11 FLMB $788.75 $1,148.59 $359.84 46% 
11 FLNB $814.89 $1,080.60 $265.72 33% 
11 FLSB $1,920.67 $1,388.69 -$531.98 -28% 
11 GAMB $625.65 $813.59 $187.94 30% 
11 GANB $633.96 $1,100.16 $466.20 74% 
11 GASB $711.99 $1,581.89 $869.90 122% 
9 HIB $626.87 $1,084.97 $458.11 73% 
9 IDB $503.19 $692.32 $189.13 38% 
7 ILCB $410.75 $543.87 $133.12 32% 
7 ILNB $946.83 $1,089.73 $142.91 15% 
7 ILSB $589.51 $623.68 $34.17 6% 
7 INNB $607.76 $803.32 $195.56 32% 
7 INSB $631.18 $856.00 $224.82 36% 
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Circuit District Average Fee Pre-
BAPCPA 
Average Fee Post-
BAPCPA 
Difference % Difference 
8 IANB $707.30 $1,306.66 $599.36 85% 
8 IASB $735.29 $968.18 $232.88 32% 
10 KSB $659.74 $992.44 $332.70 50% 
6 KYEB $615.88 $750.23 $134.35 22% 
6 KYWB $613.79 $748.28 $134.48 22% 
5 LAEB $661.05 $981.59 $320.53 48% 
5 LAMB $708.81 $911.06 $202.26 29% 
5 LAWB $787.67 $1,123.02 $335.35 43% 
1 MEB $872.30 $1,271.85 $399.55 46% 
4 MDB $660.12 $819.87 $159.74 24% 
1 MAB $956.64 $1,172.37 $215.73 23% 
6 MIEB $706.05 $985.06 $279.01 40% 
6 MIWB $658.46 $864.00 $205.54 31% 
8 MNB $772.35 $1,268.75 $496.39 64% 
5 MSNB $539.88 $1,075.75 $535.87 99% 
5 MSSB $443.49 $842.44 $398.95 90% 
8 MOEB $626.18 $832.46 $206.28 33% 
8 MOWB $675.02 $922.38 $247.36 37% 
9 MTB $673.56 $1,282.88 $609.32 90% 
8 NEB $666.25 $834.56 $168.31 25% 
9 NVB $725.32 $1,070.79 $345.47 48% 
1 NHB $831.55 $1,039.35 $207.79 25% 
3 NJB $828.34 $1,054.39 $226.05 27% 
10 NMB $595.50 $881.35 $285.85 48% 
2 NYEB $814.81 $1,128.61 $313.80 39% 
2 NYNB $639.47 $738.28 $98.80 15% 
2 NYSB $774.32 $1,232.88 $458.55 59% 
2 NYWB $736.83 $887.27 $150.44 20% 
4 NCEB $821.95 $1,174.16 $352.21 43% 
4 NCMB $880.69 $944.61 $63.92 7% 
4 NCWB $1,008.70 $1,151.68 $142.98 14% 
8 NDB $591.32 $1,014.23 $422.91 72% 
6 OHNB $579.17 $748.18 $169.01 29% 
6 OHSB $641.44 $748.08 $106.63 17% 
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Circuit District Average Fee Pre-
BAPCPA 
Average Fee Post-
BAPCPA 
Difference % Difference 
10 OKEB $621.80 $763.33 $141.53 23% 
10 OKNB $507.63 $607.13 $99.50 20% 
10 OKWB $569.88 $805.07 $235.19 41% 
9 ORB $519.67 $961.49 $441.83 85% 
3 PAEB $739.03 $1,047.37 $308.34 42% 
3 PAMB $937.26 $968.08 $30.81 3% 
3 PAWB $719.70 $959.06 $239.37 33% 
1 RIB $538.34 $908.03 $369.68 69% 
4 SCB $895.69 $1,094.81 $199.12 22% 
8 SDB $785.97 $1,238.67 $452.70 58% 
6 TNEB $583.67 $941.81 $358.15 61% 
6 TNMB $356.59 $680.77 $324.18 91% 
6 TNWB $468.62 $884.70 $416.09 89% 
5 TXEB $977.49 $1,300.86 $323.37 33% 
5 TXNB $1,018.95 $1,419.61 $400.65 39% 
5 TXSB $842.21 $1,285.53 $443.32 53% 
5 TXWB $991.51 $1,241.45 $249.95 25% 
10 UTB $396.98 $714.21 $317.23 80% 
2 VTB $708.77 $781.63 $72.86 10% 
4 VAEB $534.39 $1,073.65 $539.26 101% 
4 VAWB $714.99 $876.91 $161.92 23% 
9 WAEB $400.61 $538.27 $137.66 34% 
9 WAWB $508.98 $771.53 $262.55 52% 
4 WVNB $670.59 $810.63 $140.03 21% 
4 WVSB $529.63 $688.16 $158.53 30% 
7 WIEB $538.71 $987.43 $448.72 83% 
7 WIWB $689.28 $940.07 $250.79 36% 
10 WYB $691.88 $878.87 $186.99 27% 
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Appendix VI: Presumptively Reasonable Fees in Chapter 13 
 
Table A - 24: Presumptively Reasonable Fees in Chapter 13 by District 
District 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Current 
ALMB $1,600 (AO) $1,600 (AO) $2,000 (AO) $2,000 
(AO) 
$2,500 
(AO) 
$2,500 
(AO) 
$2,750 
(AO) 
ALNB $2,500 
(LR/AO) 
$2,500 
(LR/AO) 
$2,500 (AO) $2,500 
(AO) 
$2,500 
(AO) 
$2,500 
(AO) 
$2,750 
(AO) 
ALSB $1,800 (GO) $1,800 (GO) $1,800 (GO) $3,000 
(GO) 
$3,000 
(GO) 
$3,000 
(GO) 
$3,000 
(GO) 
AKB $1,750 (LR) $1,750 (LR) $1,750 (LR) $2,500 (LR) $2,500 (LR) $2,500 (LR) $2,750 
(LR) 
AZB – 
Tuscon  
$2,750 (UP) $2,750 (UP) $2,750 
(UP/CL) 
$3,500 
(UP) 
$3,500 
(UP) 
$3,500 (UP) $4,000 
(UP) 
AZB – 
Phoenix 
$2,500, 
$2,750, or 
$3,000 (UP) 
$2,500, 
$2,750, or 
$3,000 (UP) 
$3,500 (UP) $3,500 
(UP) 
$3,500 
(UP) 
$4,000 (UP) $4,000 
(UP) 
AREB $1,500 (GL)  $1,500 (GL) $1,500 (GL) $1,500 
(GL) 
$3,000 
(GL) 
$3,000 (GL) $3,000 
(GL) or 
$3,500 
(debtor 
above 
median 
income) 
(GL) 
ARWB $1,500 (GL)  $1,500 (GL) $1,500 (GL) $1,500 
(GL) 
$3,000 
(GL) 
$3,000 (GL) $3,000 
(GL) or 
$3,500 
(debtor 
above 
median 
income) 
(GL) 
CACB $3,500 (GO) $3,500 (GO) $3,500 (GO) $3,000 
(GO) 
$4,000 (LR) $4,000 (LR) $4,000 
(LR)  
CAEB $2,500 (GL)  $2,500 (GL) $3,500 (GL) $3,500 
(GL) 
$3,500 
(GL) 
$3,500 (GL) $3,500 
(GL) 
CANB – 
Oakland* 
      $4,800 
(GL) 
CANB – 
San Jose* 
      $2,750 
(GL) 
CANB – 
San 
Francisco 
$1,800 (GL) $1,800 (GL) $2,400 (GL) $2,400 
(GL) 
$2,800 
(GL) 
$3,500 (RR) $3,500 + 
$850 if 
involves 
real 
property 
claims (GL) 
CANB – 
Santa 
Rosa 
NF NF NF NF NF NF NF or 
$5,000 
(UP) 
CASB $1,700 (UP) 
or $2,100 
(RR) 
$2,100 (UP) 
or (RR) 
$2,100 (UP) 
or (RR) 
$2,800 
(UP)  
$2,800 
(GO) 
$3,300 
(GO) 
$3,300 
(GO) 
COB $1,500 (GO) $1,500 (GO) $1,500 (GO) $1,500 
(GO) 
$3,000 
(GO) 
$3,000 
(GO) 
$3,300 
(GO) 
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District 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Current 
CTB NF NF NF NF NF NF NF 
DEB $1,500 (JA) $1,500 (JA) $2,000 (JA) $3,000 (JA) $3,000 
(JA) 
$3,200 (JA) $3,200 
(JA) 
FLMB – Ft. 
Myers* 
      $3,525 
(AO) 
FLMB – 
Jacksonvill
e 
$2,500 (UP) $2,500 (UP) $2,500 (UP) $2,500 
(UP) 
$2,500 
(UP) 
$3,000 (UP) $3,500 
(UP) 
FLMB – 
Orlando 
Depends on 
attorney 
(UP) 
Depends on 
attorney 
(UP) 
Depends on 
attorney 
(UP) 
Depends 
on 
attorney 
(UP) 
Depends 
on 
attorney 
(UP) 
$2,500 (UP) $4,500 
(UP) 
FLMB – 
Tampa 
$2,500 (CL) $2,500 (CL) $2,500 (CL) $2,500 
(CL) 
$3,300 
(plans for 
36 months) 
$3,450 
(duration 
of plan 
36-60 
months) 
$3,600 
(duration 
of plan 60 
months) 
(AO) 
$3,300 
(plans for 
36 months)  
$3,450 
(duration of 
plan 36-60 
months) 
$3,600 
(duration of 
plan 60 
months) 
(AO) 
3,300 
(plans for 
36 months 
9/17/07)  
$3,450 
(duration 
of plan 
36-60 
months) 
$3,600 
(duration 
of plan 60 
months) 
(AO) 
FLNB  $1,500 
(until 
9/9/03) 
(SO) 
$2,000 (SO) 
$2,000 (SO) 
 
$2,000 
(until 
11/10/05) 
(SO) 
$2,500 (SO) 
$2,500 
(SO) 
 
$2,500 
(SO) 
$2,500 
(until 
7/17/08) 
(SO) 
$3,000 
(SO) 
$3,500 
(SO) 
FLSB*    $3,000 
(GL) 
$3,000 
(GL) 
$3,000 (GL) $3,500 
(GL) 
GAMB NF NF $1,501 (AO) $1,501 
(AO) 
$2,500 
(AO) 
$2,500 
(AO) 
$2,500 
(AO) 
GANB $2,501  
(GO) 
$2,501 (GO) $2,501 (GO) NF (GO) NF (GO) NF (GO) NF (GO) 
GASB $1,500 (GO) $1,500 (GO) $2,500 (GO) $2,500 
(GO) 
$2,500 
(GO) 
$2,500 
(GO) 
$3,000  
(GO) 
HIB*    $2,100 
(GL) 
$2,100 
(GL) 
$2,100 (GL) $3,200  
$3,500 (if 
plan is 
confirmed 
without 
continuanc
e of the 
initially 
scheduled 
confirmatio
n hearing) 
(GL) 
IDB*    $2,500 
(GO) 
$2,500 
(GO) 
$2,500 
(GO) 
$3,000 
(GO) 
ILCB – 
Danville  
$1,700 (SO) $1,700 (SO) $2,000 (SO) $2,500 
(SO) 
$2,500 
(SO) 
$3,000 
(SO) 
$3,300 
(SO) 
ILCB – 
Peoria 
$1,700 (SO) $1,700 (SO) $2,000 (SO) $2,500 
(SO) 
$2,500 
(SO) 
$3,000 
(SO) 
$3,300 
(SO) 
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District 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Current 
ILCB – 
Springfield 
$1,700 (SO) $1,700 (SO) $2,000 (SO) $2,500 
(SO) 
$2,500 
(SO) 
$3,000 
(SO) 
$3,300 
(SO) 
ILNB $2,200 
(representati
on through 
confirmation) 
$2,700 
(representati
on through 
closing) 
(SO) 
$2,200 
(representati
on through 
confirmation) 
$2,700 
(representati
on through 
closing) 
(SO) 
$2,500 
(representati
on through 
confirmation)  
$3,000 
(representati
on through 
closing) 
(SO) 
 
$2,500 
(representati
on through 
confirmation
) 
$3,000 
(representati
on through 
closing) 
(SO) 
$3,500  
(GO) 
$3,500 
(GO) 
$3,500 
(GO) 
ILSB $2,200 (GO) $2,200 (GO) $3,500 (GO) $3,500 
(GO) 
$3,500 
(GO) 
$3,500 
(GO) 
$4,000 
(GO) 
INNB – 
Fort 
Wayne  
$1,500-
$1,800 (UP) 
$1,500-
$1,800 (UP) 
$2,500 (UP) $2,500 
(UP) 
$2,500 
(UP) 
$3,500 (UP) $3,500 
(UP) 
INNB – 
Hammond 
$1,800 (UP) $1,800 (UP) $2,800 (UP) $2,800 
(UP) 
$2,800 
(UP) 
$2,800 (UP) $2,800 
(UP) 
INNB – 
Lafayette 
$1,800 (UP) $1,800 (UP) $2,800 + 
200 for 
each matter 
after 
requiring 
court 
appearance 
(UP) 
$2,800 + 
200 for 
each matter 
after 
requiring 
court 
appearance 
(UP) 
$2,800 + 
200 for 
each matter 
after 
requiring 
court 
appearance 
(UP) 
$2,800 + 
200 for 
each matter 
after 
requiring 
court 
appearance 
(UP) 
$2,800 + 
200 for 
each 
matter after 
requiring 
court 
appearance 
(UP) 
INNB – 
South 
Bend* 
     $3,200 (UP) $4,000 
(UP) 
INSB $2,500 (LR) $2,500 (LR) $2,500 (LR) $3,500 (LR) $3,500 (LR) $3,500 (LR) $3,500 
(LR) 
IANB $1,001 
(GO) 
$1,251 (GO) $1,251 (GO) $1,251 
(GO) 
$1,751 
(GO) 
$1,751 
(GO) 
$3,001 
(GO) 
IASB NF NF NF NF NF NF NF 
KSB – 
Kansas 
City 
NF NF NF NF NF NF $3,000 
(UP) 
KSB - 
Topeka 
$2,500 (GL) $2,500 (GL) $2,800 (GL) $2,800 
(GL) 
$2,800 
(debtor is 
below 
median 
income) 
$3,300 
(debtor is 
above 
median 
income)  
(GL) 
$2,800 
(debtor is 
below 
median 
income) 
$3,300 
(debtor is 
above 
median 
income)  
(GL) 
$3,100 
(debtor is 
below 
median 
income) 
$3,600 
(debtor is 
above 
median 
income)  
(GL) 
KSB - 
Wichita 
$2,500 (UP) $2,500 (UP) $2,500 (UP) $2,500 
(UP) 
$2,500 
(UP) 
$3,000 (CL) $3,000 
(CL) 
KYEB NF NF NF NF NF NF NF 
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District 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Current 
KYWB*       $2,750 
(amount 
paid into 
plan is 
more than 
$10,000) 
$1,500  
(amount 
paid into 
plan is 
less than 
$10,000) 
 (LR) 
LAEB* $1,500 (GO) $1,500 (GO)   $2,250 (fee 
below the 
means test 
debtor) 
$2,520 (fee 
above the 
means test 
debtor) 
(GO) 
$2,250 (fee 
below the 
means test 
debtor) 
$2,520 (fee 
above the 
means test 
debtor) 
(GO) 
$2,250 
(fee below 
the means 
test 
debtor) 
$2,520 
(fee above 
the means 
test 
debtor) 
(GO) 
LAMB NF NF NF $2,500 (JA) $2,500 
(JA) 
$2,500 (JA) $2,800 
(SO) 
LAWB – 
Alexandria 
$1,500 (UP) $1,500 (UP) Gradual 
increase 
(UP) 
Gradual 
increase 
(UP) 
Gradual 
increase 
(UP) 
Gradual 
increase 
(UP) 
$2,800 
(SO) 
LAWB – 
Lafayette 
and Lake 
Charles 
$1,500 (UP) $1,500 (UP) $2,250 
(under 
median 
income) 
$2,750 
(above 
median 
income) 
(UP) 
$2,250 
(under 
median 
income) 
$2,750 
(above 
median 
income)  
(UP) 
$2,250 
(under 
median 
income) 
$2,750 
(above 
median 
income) 
(UP) 
$2,700  
(UP) 
$2,800 
(SO) 
LAWB – 
Shreveport 
and 
Monroe* 
  $2,650 
(under 
median 
income)  
$3,000 
(above 
median 
income) 
(SO) 
$2,650 
(under 
median 
income)  
$3,000 
(above 
median 
income) 
(SO) 
$2,650 
(under 
median 
income)  
$3,000 
(above 
median 
income) 
(SO) 
$2,650 
(under 
median 
income)  
$3,000 
(above 
median 
income) 
(SO) 
$2,800 
(SO) 
 
MEB 
       
 
$2,500 - 
$3,000 
(UP) 
 
 
156 
 
District 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Current 
MDB* $1,500 (LR) $1,500 (LR)     $3,500 (all 
matters in 
main case)  
$4,500 
(waives any 
future 
opportunity 
for fees) 
$2,000 (all 
matters 
relating to 
plan 
confirmatio
n) 
(LR) 
MAB $2,500 + 
$500 for 
post –
confirmation 
(CL) 
$2,500 + 
$500 for 
post –
confirmation 
(CL) 
$2,500 + 
$500 for 
post –
confirmation 
(CL) 
$2,500 + 
$500 for 
post –
confirmation 
(LR) 
$2,500 + 
$500 for 
post –
confirmatio
n (LR) 
$3,500 
+$500 for 
post –
confirmation 
(LR) 
$3,500 
+$500 for 
post –
confirmatio
n (LR) 
MIEB $1,800 (UP) $1,800 (UP) $1,800 (UP) $3,000 (UP $3,000 
(UP) 
$3,000 (UP) $3,500 
(LR) 
MIWB $1,800 
(MO) 
$1,800 
(MO) 
$1,800 
(MO) 
$2,400  
$2,600 
(attys 
receive 
“chapter 
13 
expertise” 
status) 
$2,900 
(attys 
certified by 
ABC) (MO) 
$2,400  
$2,600 
(attys 
receive 
“chapter 
13 
expertise” 
status) 
$2,900 
(attys 
certified by 
ABC) (MO) 
$2,400  
$2,600 
(attys 
receive 
“chapter 13 
expertise” 
status) 
$2,900 
(attys 
certified by 
ABC) (MO) 
$2,400  
$3,000 
(attys 
receive 
“chapter 
13 
expertise” 
status) 
$3,300 
(attys 
certified by 
ABC) (MO) 
MNB $1,250 (LR) $1,250 (LR) 1,250 (LR) $2,000 (LR) $2,500 
(below 
applicable 
median 
income) 
$3,000 
(above 
median 
income) 
(LR) 
$2,500 
(below 
applicable 
median 
income) 
$3,000 
(above 
median 
income) (LR 
) 
$2,500 
(below 
applicable 
median 
income 
$3,000 
(above 
median 
income) 
(LR ) 
MSNB* $1,300 (SO) $1,500 (SO)   $2,200 
(SO) 
$2,500 
(SO) 
2,900 (SO) 
MSSB $1,500 (SO) $1,500 (SO) $1,700 (SO) $2,200 
(SO) 
$2,200 
(SO) 
$2,500 
(SO) 
$2,500 
(SO) 
MOEB $2,300 (LR) $2,300 (LR) $3,000 (LR) $3,000 (LR) $3,000 (LR) $3,000 (LR) $4,000 
(LR) 
MOWB  $1,500 (LR) $1,500 (LR) $2,000 (LR) $2,000 (LR) $3,000 (LR) $3,000 
(GO) 
$3,000 
(LR) 
MTB $1,750 (LR)  
 
$1,750 (LR) 
 
$1,750 (LR) 
 
$1,750 (LR) 
 
$1,750 (LR)  
 
$1,750 (LR)  
 
$3,500 
(LR) 
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District 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Current 
NEB $1,100 (LR) $1,100 (LR) $1,800 (LR) $1,800 (LR) $3,000 (LR) $3,000 (LR) $3,000 
(below 
median) 
$3,500 
(above 
median) 
(LR) 
NVB* ~$2,500 
(UP) 
~$2,500 
(UP) 
$5,000 (UP) $5,000 
(UP) 
$5,000 
(UP) 
$5,000 (UP)  
NHB $2,500 (pre 
confirmation) 
$1,000 (post 
confirmation) 
(AO) 
$2,500 (pre 
confirmation)   
$1,000 (post 
confirmation) 
(AO) 
$2,500 (pre 
confirmation) 
$1,000  
(post 
confirmation)  
(AO) 
$2,500 (pre 
confirmation
)  
$1,000 
(post 
confirmation
)  
(AO) 
$2,500 (pre 
confirmatio
n)   
$1,000 
(post 
confirmatio
n)  
(AO) 
$2,500 (pre 
confirmation
)   
$1,000 
(post 
confirmation
)  
(AO) 
$2,500 
(pre 
confirmatio
n) 
$1,000 
(post 
confirmatio
n)  
(AO) 
NJB $2,000 (LR) $2,000 (LR) $2,500 (LR) $3,500 (LR) $3,500 (LR) $3,500 (LR) $3,500 
(LR) 
NMB NF or 
$2,000 (UP)  
NF or 
$2,000 (UP)  
NF or 
$2,000 (UP)  
NF or 
$3,000 
(UP)  
NF or 
$3,000 
(UP)  
NF or 
$3,000 (UP) 
NF or 
$3,500 
(UP)  
NYEB Case 
specific 
(UP) 
Case 
specific 
(UP) 
Case 
specific 
(UP) 
Case 
specific 
(UP) 
$4,000 
(one 
trustee) 
(UP) 
Case 
specific 
(UP) 
$4,000 
(one 
trustee) 
(UP) 
Case 
specific 
(UP) 
$4,500 
(one 
trustee) 
(UP) 
Case 
specific 
(UP) 
$5,000 
(one 
trustee) 
(UP) 
NYNB – 
Albany 
Division 
$1,650 - 
1690 (UP) 
$1,650 - 
$1,890 (UP) 
$2,650 (UP) $2,650 -
$3,500 
(UP) 
$2,650 - 
$3,500 
(UP) 
$3,700 
(GO) 
$3,700 
(GO) 
NYNB – 
Utica 
Division 
NF NF NF NF NF NF $3,700 
(AO) 
NYNB - 
Syracuse 
NF NF NF NF NF NF NF  
NYSB – 
Poughkeep
sie 
$2,500-
$3,500 (UP) 
$2,500-
$3,500 (UP) 
$2,500-
$3,500 (UP) 
$2,500-
$3,500 
(UP) 
$2,500-
$3,500 
(UP) 
$2,500-
$3,500 (UP) 
$2,500-
$3,500 
(UP) 
NYSB NF NF NF NF NF NF NF 
NYWB NF NF NF NF NF NF NF or 
$2,100-
$2,500 
(one 
judge) (UP) 
NCEB $1,400 or 
$1,600 (AO) 
$1,600 (AO) $1,600 (AO) $3,000 (LR) $3,000 (LR) $3,000 (LR) $3,000 
(LR) 
NCMB $1,500 (SO) $1,500 (SO) $2,500 (SO) $2,500 
(SO) 
$3,000 
(SO) 
$3,000 
(SO) 
$3,000 
(SO) 
NCWB $1,600 (LR) $1,600 (LR) $1,600/ 
2,000 (LR) 
3,000 (AO) $3,000 (LR) $3,000 (LR) $3,250 
(LR) 
NDB   $2,500 (UP) $2,500 
(UP) 
$3,000 
(UP)  
$3,000 (UP)  $3,000 
(UP) 
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District 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Current 
OHNB – 
Akron  
$1,250 (max 
of $350 up 
front, only 
allowed 
$1,000 in 
atty fees if 
atty gets 
more than 
$350 up 
front) (AO) 
 
$2,000 
(max of 
$600 up 
front) (AO) 
$2,000 
(max of 
$600 up 
front) (AO) 
$2,000 
(AO) 
$2,000 
(AO) 
$3,000 
(AO) 
3,000 (AO) 
OHNB – 
Canton 
$1,050-
$1,250 (AO) 
$1,250 or 
$1,750 (if 
$500 paid 
up front) 
(AO) 
$1,500 or 
$2,000 (if 
$500 paid 
up front) 
(AO) 
$1,500 or 
$2,000 (if 
$500 paid 
up front) 
(AO) 
$1,500 or 
$2,000 (if 
$500 paid 
up front) 
(AO) 
$2,000 or 
$3,000 
(AO) 
 
$2,000 or 
$3,000 
(AO) 
OHNB – 
Cleveland 
$1,700 (AO) $1,700 (AO) $3,000 (AO) $3,000 
(AO) 
$3,000 
(AO) 
$3,000 
(AO) 
$3,000 
(AO) 
OHNB – 
Youngstow
n* 
 $1,500 (AO) 1,500 (AO) 2,000 (AO) $2,000 
(AO) 
$3,000 
(AO) 
$3,000 
(AO) 
OHNB - 
Toledo 
$950 (UP) $950 (UP) $950 (UP) $1,500 
(UP) 
$1,500 
(UP) 
$1,500 (UP) $1,500 
(UP) 
OHSB $1,500 (LR) $1,500 (LR) $3,000 (LR) $3,000 (LR) $3,000 (LR) $3,000 (LR) $3,500 
(LR) 
OKEB $2,000 (GO) 
 
$2,000 (GO) 
 
$2,000 (GO) $3,750 
(GO) 
$3,750 
(GO) 
$3,750 
(GO) 
$3,750 
(GO) 
OKNB $2,000 (two 
judges 
recognize) 
(UP) 
$2,000 (two 
judges 
recognize) 
(UP) 
$2,000 (two 
judges 
recognize) 
(UP) 
$2,000 
(two judges 
recognize) 
(UP) 
$2,000 
(two judges 
recognize) 
(UP) 
$2,500 (two 
judges 
recognize) 
(UP) 
$2,500 
(two judges 
recognize) 
(UP) 
OKWB $1,500 (GL) $1,500 (GL) $1,500 (GL) $2,500 (LR) $2,500 (LR) $2,500 (LR) $3,500 
(LR) 
ORB*    $4,500 
(total 
compensati
on) or  
$3,250 (flat 
fee with no 
itemization) 
(LR) 
$4,500 
(total 
compensati
on) or  
$3,250 (flat 
fee with no 
itemization) 
(LR) 
$4,500 
(total 
compensatio
n) or  
$3,250 (flat 
fee with no 
itemization) 
(LR) 
$4,500 
(total 
compensati
on) or  
$3,250 
(flat fee 
with no 
itemization) 
(LR) 
PAEB*     
 
 $3,000 
(below 
median 
income) 
$3,500 
(above 
median 
income) 
(LR) 
$3,000 
(below 
median 
income) 
$3,500 
(above 
median 
income) 
(LR) 
PAMB $3,000  
(UP) 
$3,000  
(UP) 
$3,500  
(UP) 
$3,500  
(UP) 
$3,500  
(UP) 
$3,500  
(UP) 
$3,500  
(UP) 
PAWB 2,000 (GO) 2,000 (GO) $2,000 (GO) $2,000 
(GO) 
$2,500 
(GO) 
$3,100 
(GO) 
$3,100 
(GO) 
RIB $2,500 (LR) $2,500 (LR) $3,500 (LR) $3,500 (LR) $3,500 (LR) $3,500 + 
$500 (LR) 
$3,500 + 
$500 (LR) 
SCB $1,500 or 
$1,800 (UP) 
$1,500 or 
$1,800 (UP) 
$3,000 (UP) $3,000 
(UP) 
$3,000 
(OO) 
$3,000 
(OO) 
$3,000 
(OO) 
 
 
159 
 
District 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Current 
SDB $1,000 (LR) $1,000 (LR) NF NF NF NF NF 
TNEB $2,000 (LR) $2,000 (LR) $3,000 (LR) $3,000 (LR) $3,000 (LR) $3,000 (LR) $3,000 
(LR) 
TNMB NF  NF  NF  NF  NF  NF  NF  
TNWB $1,500 (UP) $1,500 (UP) $2,400 (UP) $2,400 
(UP) 
$2,400 
(UP) 
$2,400 (UP) $3,000 
(UP) 
TXEB $2,500 (LR) $2,500 (LR) $2,500 (LR) $2,500 (LR) $2,500 (LR) $3,000 
(GO) 
$3,000 
(LR) 
TXNB $2,000 (GO) $2,000 (GO) $3,000 (GO) $3,000 
(GO) 
$3,000 
(GO) 
$3,000 
(GO) 
$3,000 
(GO) 
TXSB $2,250 (GO) $2,050 
(paid out in 
first 
available 
funds) (GO) 
$2,460 
(receive 
payment out 
of only 
portion of 
available 
funds) (GO) 
$2,050 
(paid out in 
first 
available 
funds) (GO) 
$2,460 
(receive 
payment out 
of only 
portion of 
available 
funds) (GO) 
$3,085 
(GO) 
$2,700 
(dismissed 
before 
confirmation 
is effective) 
(GO) 
$3,085 
(GO) 
$2,700 
(dismissed 
before 
confirmatio
n is 
effective) 
(GO) 
$3,085 
(GO) 
$2,700 
(dismissed 
before 
confirmation 
is effective) 
(GO) 
$3,085 
(GO) 
$2,700 
(dismissed 
before 
confirmatio
n is 
effective) 
(GO) 
TXWB – 
Austin 
Division 
$2,000 (SO)  
 
$2,300 (SO) 
 
$2,500 (SO) 
 
2,800 (SO) $3,200 
(pre-
confirmatio
n) (SO) 
$3,500 
(post-
confirmatio
n) (SO) 
$3,200 
(pre-
confirmation
) (SO) 
$3,500 
(post-
confirmation
) (SO) 
$3,200 
(pre-
confirmatio
n) (SO) 
$3,500 
(post-
confirmatio
n) (SO) 
TXWB – El 
Paso 
Division 
$2,000 or 
$2,500 (SO) 
$2,000 or 
$2,500 (SO) 
$2,750 (SO) $2,750 
(SO) 
$3,000 
(SO) 
$3,000 
(SO) 
$3,200 
(SO) 
TXWB – 
San 
Antonio 
Division 
$2,000 (SO) $2,000 (SO) 2,000 (SO $3,200 
(SO) 
$3,200 
(SO) 
$3,200 
(SO) 
3,200 (SO) 
TXWB – 
Waco 
Division 
$2,000 - 
$2,500 (UP) 
$2,000 -
$2,500 (UP) 
$2,750 (SO) $2,750 
(SO) 
$3,000 
(SO) 
$3,000 (S) $3,000 
(SO) 
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District 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Current 
UTB $1,800 (UP) $1,800 (UP) $2,000 (UP) $2,750 
(MO) 
$2,750 
(MO) 
$2,750 
(MO) 
$3,000 
(below 
median 
income & 
chapter 13 
plan 
payment of 
less than 
$150) 
$3,250 
(below 
median 
income & 
chapter 13 
payment 
over $150)  
$3,500 
(above 
median 
income) 
(GL) 
VTB $1,500 (LR) $1,500 (LR) $1,500 (LR) $1,500 or 
$2,500 
$2,500 
(SO) 
$2,500 (LR) $2,500 
(LR) 
VAEB $1,500 (LR) $1,500 (LR) $3,000 (SO) $3,000 
(SO) 
$3,000 
(SO) 
$3,000 
(SO) 
$3,000 
(SO) 
VAWB $1,500 - 
$1700 (UP) 
$1,500 - 
$1700 (UP) 
$2,500 (UP) $2,500 
(UP) 
$2,500 
(UP) 
$2,500 (UP) $2,500 - 
$3,000 
(UP) 
WAEB $1,500 (LR) $1,500 (LR)  $1,500 (LR) $2,000 (LR) $2,500 (LR) $2,500 (LR) $2,500 
(LR) 
WAWB $1,300 
(until 
7/1/03) 
(GO)  
$1,800 
(after 
7/1/03) 
(GO)  
$1,800 (GO) $1,800 (GO) $1,800 
(GO) 
$1,800 
(GO) 
$1,800 
(GO) 
$3,500 
(GO) 
WVNB  NF  NF NF NF ~$3,500 
(UP) 
~$3,500 
(UP) 
~$3,500 
(UP) 
WVSB $750 + 4% 
(GO) 
$750 + 4% 
(GO) 
$750 + 4% 
(GO) 
$750 + 4% 
(GO) 
$750 + 
4% (GO) 
$750 + 4% 
(GO) 
$750 + 
4% (GO) 
WIEB  $2,500 (UP) $2,500 (UP) $2,500 (UP) $2,500 
(UP) 
$3,000 
(CP) 
$3,000 (CP) $3,500 
(CP) 
WIWB NF  NF  NF  NF  NF  NF  NF  
WYB $1,500 (LR) $1,500 (LR) $2,000 (LR) $2,000 (LR) $2,500 (LR) $2,500 (LR) $3,000 
(LR) 
 
CP = Court Policy  
OO = Operating Order  
NF = No Presumptively Reasonable Fee  
RR = Rights and Responsibilities  
UP = Unwritten Practice  
GL = Guidelines  
CL = Case law  
LR = Local Rule  
GO = General Order  
SO = Standing Order  
AO = Administrative Order 
MO = Memorandum  
JA = Judge announced  
*court did not provide no look fee, and repeated calls to local professionals went 
unanswered 
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Appendix VII: Macroeconomic Variables 
 
Table A - 25. Average Unemployment Rates and Employment Growth Rates by 
State 
Pre-BAPCPA Post-BAPCPA 
State Unemployment 
Rate 
Monthly 
Change in 
Employment 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Monthly 
Change in 
Employment 
AK 7.2% 18.0% 6.7% 0.0% 
AL 4.4% 19.0% 5.4% -15.9% 
AR 5.5% 14.2% 5.9% -11.9% 
AZ 4.8% 25.0% 7.8% -7.7% 
CA 5.9% 13.7% 9.0% -24.4% 
CO 5.5% 18.3% 5.7% -6.1% 
CT 4.9% 10.3% 6.6% -8.8% 
DC 6.8% 17.1% 6.8% 14.0% 
DE 4.0% 7.0% 6.1% -21.4% 
FL 4.4% 26.6% 7.7% -17.5% 
GA 5.0% 22.5% 7.0% -17.0% 
HI 3.3% 14.2% 5.1% -21.4% 
IA 4.4% -3.0% 4.7% -2.2% 
ID 4.5% 21.8% 5.6% -10.6% 
IL 6.2% 12.0% 7.6% -19.3% 
IN 5.4% 9.8% 6.5% -14.9% 
KS 5.4% 6.1% 5.2% -3.3% 
KY 6.0% 9.7% 7.7% -6.3% 
LA 7.1% -26.2% 5.0% 6.2% 
MA 5.2% 1.0% 6.0% -8.7% 
MD 4.3% 11.7% 5.3% -15.8% 
ME 4.8% 4.7% 6.0% -18.2% 
MI 6.8% 6.0% 8.3% -19.9% 
MN 4.4% 2.3% 6.0% -4.2% 
MO 5.5% 7.3% 6.7% -14.6% 
MS 7.7% -50.0% 7.7% -8.3% 
MT 4.0% 10.7% 4.4% 1.4% 
NC 5.7% 15.1% 7.0% -7.3% 
ND 3.5% 12.0% 3.6% 1.7% 
NE 3.9% 2.6% 3.6% -5.0% 
NH 3.9% 10.6% 4.6% -6.0% 
NJ 5.0% 11.3% 6.6% -12.9% 
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Pre-BAPCPA Post-BAPCPA 
State Unemployment 
Rate 
Monthly 
Change in 
Employment 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Monthly 
Change in 
Employment 
NM 5.4% 20.4% 5.0% -2.5% 
NV 4.8% 28.2% 9.1% -20.7% 
NY 5.8% 9.2% 6.2% -8.8% 
OH 6.0% 7.8% 7.5% -17.5% 
OK 5.1% 5.4% 4.8% -5.9% 
OR 6.7% 17.1% 8.0% -7.8% 
PA 5.3% 8.6% 6.0% -12.2% 
RI 5.3% 4.7% 8.7% -11.0% 
SC 6.8% 16.5% 8.2% -12.6% 
SD 3.6% 4.0% 3.9% 1.7% 
TN 5.5% 19.2% 7.4% -5.4% 
TX 5.9% 13.9% 5.7% 9.8% 
UT 4.9% 28.0% 5.1% -3.8% 
VA 3.8% 16.4% 4.7% -0.4% 
VT 3.3% 10.0% 4.7% 0.0% 
WA 6.3% 24.7% 6.9% -3.7% 
WI 5.0% 5.6% 6.5% -15.9% 
WV 5.3% 10.2% 5.6% -7.7% 
WY 4.0% 15.5% 3.5% 11.1% 
     
US 5.5% 11.7% 6.9% -12.6% 
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Appendix VIII: Screenshots of the Coding Entry Form 
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